In late June this year, Israeli newspapers reported the inauguration of two Israeli research centres dedicated to studying the October 1973 War. These centres are officially set to launch on 6 October, marking 50 years since the October War.
The first centre is the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s Archive, housing over 6,000 documents, including photographs, files, video clips, and maps. These documents cover the pre-war period, the outbreak of the war, and the post-war era, with a specific focus on the internal review of it by the Israeli Agranat Commission.
The second centre, named the Yom Kippur War Studies Centre, is led by a group of retired Israeli officers. Their aim is to convey the facts and lessons learned from the war to Israeli youth and children.
Before delving into an examination of the Israeli documents from the war, there are some essential observations to be made that shed light on Israel’s intentions to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the war. They can be presented as follows:
CURRENT CONTEXT: Israel faces an existential threat today represented by Iran’s military projects, including a military nuclear programme, a ballistic-missile programme, and regional expansion through various armed militias allied with Iran that encircle Israel and create a multi-front war scenario known as the “containment policy” against it.
The current Israeli government sees parallels between the strategic circumstances posed by Iran today and the conditions during the October 1973 War, both on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. It is worth noting that Israeli assessments at that time did not rule out the possibility of Jordan’s intervention from the east to assist the Egyptian and Syrian armies. However, a significant difference between the past and the present is Iran’s unexpected and substantial strikes that have inflicted significant losses on Israel, particularly in terms of morale and military movements.
Consequently, the Israeli government is keen on extracting all possible lessons from the October War in all its various aspects: human, political, intelligence, operational military, economic, and societal. Moreover, the new Israeli research centres believe that internal reviews conducted in the years following the war from 1974 to the 1980s were insufficient in extracting the lessons of it.
This was due to the interference of political and ideological considerations during the investigations, which hindered objectivity in the inquiries and the accountability of those involved. These considerations aimed to shift the blame for the defeat onto a specific political faction, mainly the left-wing, which was alarmed by the rise of the far-right and its aspirations to exploit the October defeat for political gain. This indeed materialised when Menachem Begin’s Likud Party came to power in 1977.
Meanwhile, immediately after the defeat, particularly in November and December 1973, Golda Meir, the leader of the ruling Alignment Party, prepared for general elections and the forming of a new government. The party conducted one of the most significant election campaigns in Israel’s history in order to minimise the effects of the government’s acknowledgment of the defeat.
This caused a severe societal shock among Israelis, leading to extensive protests among reserve officers in the Israeli Defence Forces headed by Motti Ashkenazi. These protests contributed to the fall of Golda Meir’s government and the appointment of Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister in June 1974, ultimately ending long-standing left-wing rule in Israel after the Likud’s victory.
The Israeli military leadership also subscribed to this approach of not accepting responsibility for the defeat in the war. It believed that the collapse of the military’s popularity, which had been shrouded in a Messianic-Torah aura, especially after the victory in the June 1967 War, would have severely negative implications for maintaining security and the monopoly over arms in Israel. This was particularly the case as calls grew within the Gush Emunim Movement (the first settler movement since Israel’s establishment) to bear arms and defend settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Therefore, Israel believes that, after half a century has passed since the defeat in the October War, it will succeed in overcoming political and ideological considerations both within political and military circles. It aims to achieve objectivity in extracting lessons from the war on all levels: political, intelligence, and military within the Israeli General Staff.
However, the passage of 50 years since the war does not necessarily mean that there will be no political or ideological considerations that may still interfere with the internal review of the intricacies and details of it. It is possible that these considerations will still be present, even if to a lesser extent. This is particularly relevant as the left-wing in Israel has started to exploit the ongoing protests in the Israeli streets.
DOCUMENTS OF THE DEEP STATE: By monitoring the recently released Israeli documents regarding the October War, particularly after June this year, it is apparent that the primary responsibility for disclosing these documents lies with Israel’s deep state entities, particularly the Mossad, the Israeli Ministry of Defence, and the Aman Military Intelligence Agency under the Israeli General Staff.
It is noteworthy that for the first time three Israeli agencies are collaborating to reveal secret documents relating to the October War, despite the fact that the regulations governing the disclosure of such documents vary from one agency to another.
Regarding the Mossad, for example, this adheres to the policies of the prime minister’s office administratively. Nevertheless, it issued a statement “on behalf of the prime minister” authorising full powers to the head of the Mossad, David Ben Yaacov, to disclose the documents relating to the October War, specifically those pertaining to Ashraf Marwan, an agent tasked with providing information about its timing and nature.
Meanwhile, Israeli Military Intelligence has collaborated with the Defence Ministry Archive to reveal over 6,000 secret documents published on Israel’s Ministry of Defence for October War Studies website. These can be divided into various groups.
The first group consists of political documents related to secret discussions between Golda Meir’s government ministers, particularly her military deputy Yisrael Lior and defence minister Moshe Dayan. Some of these secret sessions were attended by Chief of Staff David Elazar, known as “Dado”, and his intelligence chief Eli Zeira. Mossad director Zvi Zamir did not attend many of the secret sessions but was responsible for providing reports to Golda Meir.
The political documents also shed light on the Golda Meir government’s management of the war and its request for US assistance to compensate for falling behind in it, particularly against the Egyptian Army. The US agreed to establish an airlift on 14 October, after Washington became certain that the Soviet Union had already established an airlift for Egypt and Syria two days earlier.
The second group consists of military documents related to monitoring the movements of the Egyptian and Syrian armies on both the Sinai and Golan Heights fronts. They also detail the Israeli Defence Forces’ actions, which were significantly delayed due to Egypt’s “malicious” strategic deception plan, as former Israeli Military Intelligence officer Shimon Mendes describes it in his book Sadat’s Jihad.
The primary element of this deception plan was the element of surprise in striking Israeli military strongholds in the Occupied Sinai and Golan Heights. The Egyptian and Syrian armies successfully achieved this, as revealed by the Israeli documents. Another element within the deception plan, as seen in the Israeli documents, was to seize the opportunity to prevent Israel from preparing a general mobilisation plan and halting the massive military exercises of its “Blue and White” Reserve Plan.
The military documents include the Egyptian plan to cross the Suez Canal, Egyptian commando ambushes, and the transfer of anti-aircraft missile-launch platforms from one distant point to another. They also discuss the failure of the Israeli counterattack and the “Battle of the Chinese Farm” after creating a breach in the Deferswar region led by the armoured paratrooper brigade commanded by Ariel Sharon, described in the documents as “rebellious”.
The Israeli general staff wanted to discharge Sharon from service during the war, according to the documents, but were prevented from doing so by then defence minister Moshe Dayan.
A third group of documents are societal documents that focus on the events that occurred after the defeat, particularly after the formation of the Agranat Commission charged with looking into it. The commission received submissions from military leaders and reports from the heads of the intelligence agencies.
The collaborative effort by these agencies to release the documents reveals a significant step in unveiling the historical record of the October War and understanding the complexities of the period.
KEY THEMES: Prominent themes addressed in the documents, emphasised by the Israeli Ministry of Defence Archive in collaboration with Military Intelligence, include the Generals’ War; reserve mobilisation and the Operation Blue and White Plan; and the fall of “the concept”.
The Generals’ War is the appellation assigned to the divergence of perspectives among some Israeli Military leaders and the Israeli Intelligence community that commenced during the hostilities of the October 1973 War and persisted for several years thereafter.
This conflict was not the first of its kind in the annals of the Israeli Defence Forces. Indeed, it had already manifested itself shortly after Israel’s establishment in 1948, as the first prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, clashed with the early military leadership, particularly due to his reluctance to appoint leaders of the Jewish armed formations, such as the Stern, Irgun, and Palmach, to high-ranking positions in the newly formed Israeli Military.
This move was aimed at breaking revolutionary traditions and establishing a modern institutionalised system.
Israel also witnessed a similar phenomenon during the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956. In this war, confrontations took place between the then chief of staff, General Moshe Dayan, and two other leaders of the forces, one of whom was associated with the Southern Command, Asaf Simhoni, and the other with the Paratroopers Brigade, General Ariel Sharon.
The war was brief, and the disputes between Dayan, Simhoni, and Sharon did not spill into the media at the time. However, they found expression in later works about the war.
In the October 1973 War, the Generals’ War that unfolded resulted in numerous failures, starting with the mobilisation of reserve forces and extending to the details of battle management. What’s more, it also assumed a political dimension as those involved aligned themselves with the two major parties competing during the Knesset election campaign that coincided with the outbreak of the war between the Alignment and Likud.
The concept of the Generals’ War can be dissected into several key levels: the level of the Military leadership, within the Intelligence establishment, encompassing Mossad and Aman, and within the security apparatus itself, particularly the Israeli Military Intelligence Division.
On 8 October 1973, a failed counterattack was launched on the Sinai front. The battle began as a counteroffensive against the Israeli Defence Forces’ armoured units, with the goal of penetrating the Egyptian line established on the east bank of the Suez Canal after its success at the onset of the war.
However, the Egyptian army managed to halt the Israeli forces tasked with this attack. The 162nd Abraham Adan Division formed the 143rd Division under Sharon’s command as a reserve unit until noon, after which it was redirected southward for another operation, ultimately not participating in the battle. Throughout the day and into the evening, reports from the 162nd Division concealed the extent of the failure, and false reports of significant success reached the government buildings in Tel Aviv in the morning, creating a euphoria that persisted into the afternoon.
Influenced by this perceived success, the chief of staff decided to withdraw support from Sharon’s division around noon and sent it southward to launch another attack with a different division from the south.
As per document number 120/264/2016 (phone conversation between minister of defence Moshe Dayan and Haim Bar-Lev on 19 October 1973 at 10:35am), it appears that the conversation witnessed by the Intelligence Gathering Committee indicated that Sharon’s battalion would not be able to move due to the full readiness of the Egyptian forces, and there was a lack of information about the nature of the area for crossing the canal.
However, on the following day, Haim Bar-Lev did not provide Dayan with details of the counterattack plan but emphasised that it was logical, given the quantity of Israeli forces in several battalions on multiple fronts, for Israel to succeed in the counterattack plan. Nevertheless, it ultimately failed.
The published Israeli documents do not specify where the error occurred, whether between the Intelligence Gathering Committee and the reports within the military, or if the chief of staff failed to inform the Ministry of Defence, representing Golda Meir’s government in Tel Aviv.
Document number 168/264/2016, on 18 October, documents the notes of Major Avner Shalev in the Southern Region. It reveals that Chief of Staff Haim Bar Lev was incensed due to Sharon’s insubordinate behaviour, despite receiving reports from Elazar confirming that Sharon’s attempts to cross the canal were ill-conceived, describing them as “foolish”.
Furthermore, reports suggest that the defence minister was aware of these reports. Nonetheless, Dayan instructed Bar Lev to moderate his tone when issuing orders to Sharon.
Disputes and accusations persisted among the generals involved, even after the war, extending to the Agranat Commission. Tensions arose between Shmuel “Gorodish” Gonen (commander of the Southern Israeli Military Region), Avraham “Bren” Adan (commander of the attacking force near the Suez area), and Sharon (commander of the paratroopers).
Gorodish accused Bren of lying in his reports and insubordination, while Bren accused Gorodish of obstructing Bar Lev’s orders and failing to send the promised reinforcements. He also complained that Gorodish and his Chief of Staff Uri Ben-Ari ignored his reports on difficulties and requests for aerial support and assistance from Sharon’s unit throughout. On the morning of the battle, it became evident that the Israeli offensive had failed, and the Egyptians seized the entire Bar Lev Line, even occupying parts beyond the sand barrier 10 km from the Suez Canal.
Sharon claimed after the war that he had never received orders to send reinforcements and received an order to move south with his unit instead. The disputes on that day, which subsided after the war when the facts became clear, involved accusations against Chief of Staff David Elazar, Gorodish, and Sharon. These accusations included claims that Sharon did not attack in the afternoon before dusk in his sector, and that his forces were moving too slowly.
Gorodish, who was convinced that Sharon’s forces were still at Tasa, did not believe that part of Sharon’s unit had already reached the Mitla and Jadid passages and that the forces needed to be redirected north for the attack. Even after the war, Gorodish and Elazar blamed Sharon for the slow pace of his actions, which could have facilitated his mission.
Through the Agranat Commission publications, it became clear that Gorodish did not heed the accurate reports from Sharon’s unit or refused to believe that Sharon’s forces were moving south faster than expected. In short, he issued an order for an attack that was deemed unfeasible.
On the night of 8 October, a meeting was held at the headquarters and attended by defence minister Dayan. The leadership was reprimanded by Dayan for the day’s failure. Instructions were given to Sharon to have the freedom to initiate a counterattack. The next day, Sharon’s unit began working in its sector and found a gap between the Egyptian forces. Sharon informed Gorodish and requested permission to breach the bridgehead instead. Gorodish agreed to the operation, but the Chief of Staff, who learned of it in the afternoon, ordered Gorodish to stop Sharon’s unit and withdraw forces from the area near the canal.
Gorodish could not convey the orders to Sharon, and a disconnect occurred between the command and the unit. Gorodish himself went to Sharon to issue the withdrawal order.
Gorodish complained that Sharon had disobeyed his orders and demanded that Chief of Staff David Elazar dismiss Sharon. After the Defence Minister intervened, Sharon remained in his position, and, even more significantly, Gorodish was relieved of his position, with Haim Bar-Lev assuming command of the Southern Front.
New Southern Regional Commander Haim Bar-Lev criticised Sharon for repeatedly disobeying orders and instructions in every new battle or tactic issued by the chief of staff. Furthermore, due to some of Sharon’s successes in the battles at the Bar Lev Line and the Chinese Farm against Egyptian forces, he did not shy away from making political statements directed at the Israeli public. He justified this by stating that the truth could not be hidden from the Israelis.
The extensive media coverage during the prolonged fighting contributed to the wide dissemination of information. There was intense activity around Sharon, with a large number of reservist soldiers and officers witnessing and conveying events to the public in various ways. This meant that all conflicts between these individuals did not remain secret, and rumours about them reached the public during the battles. The repeated echo of their struggles added to the tensions. Thus, Sharon became aware that the top leadership of the Israeli army was considering removing him from his position as division commander. Sharon complained to his officers that the purpose of these rumours was to harm him before the Knesset elections.
In a later stage, a conflict within the Intelligence community emerged, pitting the head of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, against the head of Aman, Eli Zeira. This conflict revolved around the credibility of the agent initially known only by the codename “the Angel,” later revealed to be Ashraf Marwan.
The Mossad’s position, under Zamir’s leadership, was that Marwan was a reliable source providing valuable information about Egypt’s intention to launch an attack on Israel. This included details about Egypt’s military movements and the expected timing of the war. Zeira’s stance on Marwan’s role during the October 1973 War, as documented in his 1993 book The Yom Kippur War: Myth versus Reality, was that Marwan was a double agent who successfully misled Israel.
Later on, Zeira explicitly mentioned Marwan’s name, and Zamir accused Zeira of exposing the identity of Israel’s most significant source in Egypt at that time, causing serious damage to Israel’s ability to recruit agents.
Zamir, along with two senior officers who served in Aman under Zeira’s leadership, Amos Gilboa and Yossi Langotsky, filed a complaint with the prosecutor-general “for the purpose of drawing lessons and conclusions to prevent such disclosures in the future.” On 19 April 2005, Zeira filed a defamation lawsuit against Zamir in Tel Aviv. In 2007, retired judge Theodor Or, who was appointed as the judge in this case, heard Zamir’s account.
On 27 June 2007, Marwan was found dead under the balcony of his London apartment. Zamir wrote about his death that “I am filled with sorrow for the man who ended his life this way, anger at the circumstances that led to his death, and a sense of helplessness at my inability to protect him. The investigation into Marwan’s death has concluded.”
“It had reached a dead-end… but I am tormented by the idea that his name and identity as a significant Israeli agent may be revealed. The Egyptian is the one who hastened his fall from the balcony of his home in London.”
In July 2008, it was announced that the Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Agency) and the Israeli police were investigating suspicions that Eli Zeira had disclosed state secrets by revealing Marwan’s name. However, in June 2012, the Israeli attorney-general decided to close the case against Zeira, citing his age (around 84 at the time) and his significant role in Israel’s state-building and security efforts.
Official Israeli documents, published by the recently established Yom Kippur War Studies Centre, indicate that the “Egypt” section in the research branch of Israeli Military Intelligence received information from an Egyptian agent codenamed “Goliath” that indicated Egypt was preparing for a significant military exercise, including the arrival of substantial reinforcements, suggesting an impending war.
On 1 October 1973, Colonel Menachem Digli, head of the Collection Department, recommended to the head of the Information Collection Unit in the Aman, Yoel Ben-Porat, the need to activate a full alert and activate Israeli surveillance devices in the Sinai Peninsula to monitor Egyptian movements. Eli Zeira, the head of Aman, rejected this recommendation, citing concerns about the impact on the state’s stability, economy, and public shock, stating that “I won’t even let you think about recruiting a quarter of a person, a quarter of the reserve soldiers.”
Zeira allowed the activation of only one out of two buried devices in Sinai, and even that was for testing purposes only on the night of 4-5 October, just two days before the war, ordering it to be closed within a few hours. Ben-Porat documents his testimony by saying that he was tasked with providing the information to Chief of Staff David Elazar to prevent the Egyptian and Syrian Armies from surprising the Israeli Army on both fronts.
He mentions that one explanation for Zeira’s behaviour regarding the information indicating Egypt’s military preparations for the war was the bias he held due to the information provided by Marwan to the Mossad at the time. Zeira was convinced that Marwan was an Egyptian double agent as part of Egypt’s deception plan.
ISRAELI MOBILISATION: The mobilisation of reserves played a pivotal role in the military readiness of the Israeli army, and its swift execution is a key factor for success in times of war.
In the hours leading up to the October War, the scope of mobilisation was a subject of debate between the defence minister and the chief of staff. However, there was no consensus between them. When the war erupted, the focus shifted to accommodating and deploying reserve forces to the front lines as quickly as possible.
Following the 1948 War, the Israeli army relied on both regular and reserve forces, with a relatively small core of career soldiers. Its main strength during emergencies lay in the reserve system, where troops were trained for combat and operational roles. During times of war, they were integrated into combat support and actual combat activities.
The recruitment element was a cornerstone of the Israeli Army’s state of readiness, expected to be achieved within 24 to 48 hours as a warning of the intention to initiate war. Once recruited, the reserve forces were supposed to assist the regular forces in combat duties as soon as possible.
The mobilisation process comprised three main stages, starting from the moment the decision to activate the reserves was made. In the first stage, command was deployed in the field, regional mobilisation centres were opened, and teams of recruiters were dispatched to homes. Finally, those notified were transported to their units.
In the second stage, recruits were equipped and organised at bases for deployment to the field. In the third stage, they moved towards assembly areas near the front lines. The Israeli army used both secret and public recruitment methods, with secret recruitment usually conducted at night through telephone calls and recruitment teams, while public recruitment focused on the radio, using pre-agreed encoded names between units.
On the eve of the October War, the regular forces of the Israeli army numbered approximately 115,000 men, while the reserve formations totalled around 350,000 men. The majority of its strength relied on five reserve armoured divisions, forming the backbone of the ground forces.
The reserve divisions were allocated as follows: Southern Command had 143 and 162 reserve divisions; Northern Command had 36 and 210 reserve divisions; and Central Command had 146 divisions. Additionally, there were reserve infantry forces, with a focus on Paratrooper Brigades 247 and 317, as well as combat support units from artillery, engineering, logistics, communications, and maintenance branches.
In the naval and air forces, there was already a significant core of career soldiers, but they also had a recruitment system, particularly for pilots and for reconnaissance, surveillance, and air defence.
During general mobilisation, the Civil Defence (CDF), consisting of approximately 50,000 personnel, was supposed to operate as part of the Emergency Mobilisation Plan (EMP). Around 160,000 individuals in 2,700 designated factories were also expected to work as part of the emergency economy.
In the period leading up to the October War, the Intelligence Division held the concept that there would be no expected war between Israel and its neighbours before 1975, and the assessment was that the likelihood of a comprehensive campaign was low, despite tensions on the borders. However, after the hasty evacuation of Soviet advisers’ families on the night of 4-5 October 1973 from Egypt and Syria, which Israeli Intelligence struggled to interpret, precautionary measures were decided upon.
However, they were not implemented swiftly, which tipped the balance against Israel.
On the morning of 5 October, the readiness level was raised to Level C, signifying that the mobilisation of reserve forces was ready for activation. Additionally, prime minister Golda Meir authorised defence minister Moshe Dayan to mobilise the reserve system. It was expected that the increased alertness would lead to the bolstering of regular formations in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The selective recruitment of reserve soldiers in specific Air Force positions was planned, as Dayan refused to give a direct order for full mobilisation.
On 6 October at around 4:30am, amidst the morning’s darkness, the Mossad reported to Intelligence that a war was highly likely to begin in the evening, led by the armies of Egypt and Syria. In response, the General Staff immediately ordered the Air Force to recruit all pilots and their personnel in air defence units. The prime minister’s office authorised the recruitment of thousands of officers by the Leadership Wing (AGM). Simultaneously, preparations for general recruitment were made through radio broadcasts to the Israeli Army.
At around 6am, a discussion took place chaired by defence minister Dayan and chief of staff David Elazar, regarding a pre-emptive air strike and the extent of mobilisation. Dayan adamantly ruled out a pre-emptive strike for political reasons, leading the discussion to focus on the percentage of the reserve forces to be mobilised. Elazar believed that given the imminent war, the entire combat force and most of the approximately 200,000 reserve troops should be mobilised. On the other hand, Dayan adopted a minimalist approach and agreed to mobilise the entire Air Force and just two divisions, one for the north and one for the south, totalling 50,000 to 60,000 fighters.
The chief of staff did not accept the minister’s position and decided to escalate the dispute to the prime minister’s office. This marked the first instance of conflict among Israeli generals before and during the war.
During a discussion held in the prime minister’s office between 8am and 9:20am, Golda Meir supported Dayan’s decision to avoid a pre-emptive strike, but she also accepted Elazar’s position regarding broader mobilisation and approved the mobilisation of four divisions. Regardless of the mobilisation of the Air Force, this was a grave strategic error at the onset of the war.
The Israeli Military commenced the covert mobilisation of its forces, but after the outbreak of the war at around 2pm, recruitment became widespread. With little warning, the Israeli army relied on organised deployment on the first night of combat.
The initial reserve forces reached the Golan Heights by midnight, first from Brigade 179 and later from Brigade 679. However, a substantial build-up of force continued throughout 7 October. As the main reserve units were mobilised and pushed to the front lines, they could be employed in counterattacks on 8 October.
The continued fighting led to the recruitment of numerous fighters abroad, with a focus on tank crews, promptly transported to Israel. Based on this, the Hundred Tanks Battalion was established under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ehud Barak, who engaged in combat on the Southern Front as part of Brigade 460, and the Katz Force under the leadership of Major Amos Katz, who participated in combat on the Northern Front as part of the Seventh Division.
THE BLUE-WHITE PLAN: To address the question of why Israel failed to fully mobilise its reserve forces before and during the war, it is worth mentioning the “Blue-White Plan”, which outlined the general mobilisation plan for the reserve forces and the distribution of deployment tasks in wartime and weapons procurement.
“Blue-White” is a codename for the Israeli army’s war preparedness plan from May to August 1973. During this period, its regular forces were on high alert primarily along the borders with Syria and Egypt, in anticipation of a possible outbreak of war.
Amidst the enthusiasm in Israel for the Israeli army’s achievements in the raid on the Palestinian resistance headquarters in Beirut as part of Operation Spring Youth, news began to accumulate in mid-April 1973 warning of Egypt and Syria’s intent to wage war in May.
The information gathered through practical activities, including the arrival of 16 Iraqi fighters in Egypt and the transfer of 18 Mirage aircraft from Libya to Egypt, prompted the first-ever meeting of the general staff on 16 April. For an intelligence assessment on this matter, a consultation session was held at Golda Meir’s residence two days later, with the participation of ministers Yisrael Galili and Moshe Dayan, chief of staff Elazar, head of Military Intelligence Eli Zeira, and Mossad chief Zvi Zamir.
Dayan, Elazar, and Zamir believed there was a chance that Israel might face war, while Zeira was more cautious and estimated the chances as low. He held onto a set of assessments known as the “concept”, under which Egypt would not initiate a war as long as it lacked the capability to launch a deep attack into Israel.
Elazar ordered the leadership and forces to increase their readiness and initiate comprehensive work in preparation for a war scenario. Central Command assumed full responsibility for the entire Jordanian border, and both Southern and Northern Commands were ordered to prepare for defence and offence.
In defence, there were four basic states, including the deployment of a standing army, based solely on regular forces, a partially reinforced regular formation with reserves, and finally, the full deployment of both regular and reserve forces. In addition, it was decided, as a precaution, to deploy 330 tanks and five artillery battalions in the Sinai region, while in the north, 100 tanks and four artillery battalions would be deployed.
Regarding the offensive, orders were decided to be ready for two opening scenarios: a war initiated by Israel and a war initiated by the enemy with a counterattack. Current operational orders would be updated. The naval and air forces, which had been on a large-scale regular basis, increased their readiness and presented their attack plans that were designed to achieve naval and aerial superiority over the enemy.
While the Israeli army was in the midst of preparations and at a high level of alertness, on 23-24 April 1973, the presidents of Egypt and Syria held a series of meetings at the Arab League headquarters near Alexandria, where they decided to go to war by the end of the year. Anwar Al-Sadat, the president of Egypt, who apparently wanted to go to war in May, as intelligence information indicated, agreed to postpone it until the autumn. One consideration was that the Syrian air-defence system was not yet ready, and a war at this time would make the Syrian Army vulnerable to Israeli air strikes.
The Soviets, according to their sources, were part of the decision. The Soviet leadership was preparing for a summit conference in Washington scheduled for June between President Brezhnev and President Nixon of the US to advance the thawing of relations between the two superpowers. A war in the Middle East at that time would oppose Soviet interests, which sought to curb the rapprochement between the Chinese and the Americans while simultaneously boosting the Soviet Union’s economy by accepting and encouraging investments and signing trade agreements with the US.
As some of these events disappeared from Israel’s view and Egypt’s intentions remained unknown, the Israeli Army raised the level of preparation and alertness. A principle agreement was made to recruit up to 10,000 reservists, accelerate the establishment of Division 210 in the Northern Command, extend the anti-tank ditch, and construct tank ramps in the Golan Heights.
Arms procurement for the Air Force was expedited, and tanks and artillery were brought to the front lines, along with successful team training. Configuration was increased, and plans for aerial, naval, and ground attacks were updated, making the Israeli Army ready. However, as the days passed and May approached without unusual incidents on the borders, the level of alertness was gradually reduced and completely cancelled on 12 August.
The reason for this was that the warnings that led to the state of alertness and the mounting of the Blue-White Plan were not validated. Moreover, there were criticisms of its high financial cost and its adverse impact on the Israeli economy due to the increased inflation and recession at the time. Later on, the readiness elements improved for the war that erupted on 6 October 1973. At the same time, the opinion of the head of the Intelligence, which was apparently accurate, gave him greater credibility in facing information sources that indicated his warning was mistaken.
When the evidence pointed to the outbreak of war and escalated significantly by late September and early October, the weight of the “concept” had surpassed their weight, thus playing a crucial role in the surprise outbreak of war at midday on 6 October.
TAKEAWAYS: Several key takeaways can be derived from the Israeli documents regarding the October 1973 War.
First, Israel “justifies” its defeat in the October 1973 War with Egypt and Syria and attributes the failure to intelligence shortcomings in accurately assessing Egypt’s intentions to enter the war. The Israeli military attempted to input data and information into computers using artificial intelligence, which led to the conclusion that the situation assessment should have indicated Egypt and Syria’s intent to engage in war.
It was also assumed that Israel would have emerged victorious in the war if it had maintained heightened readiness and military preparedness.
There are security, political, and societal considerations surrounding the motives of the Israeli security agencies and the military for revealing these documents. These considerations include the resemblance between the nature of the October War and current challenges Israel faces due to Iran’s containment policy, as Iran supports armed militias in various regions.
Additionally, the political motives may also relate to evaluating the performance of Golda Meir’s government in reading the pre-war situation and military reports.
It can be estimated that one of the significant factors contributing to Egypt’s victory in the October 1973 War was its strategic deception plan, which caused significant disruption in Israeli security intelligence assessments presented to political and military decision-makers regarding Egypt’s intentions to wage war.
Another contributing factor was the disputes among Israeli generals and differing operational perspectives between the defence minister and the chief of staff, as well as between the chief of staff and the commanders on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts.
This article first appeared on Ahram Online on October 3 and a version of it appears in print in the October 5, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
