The American and British armies initiated missile and air assaults against various Houthi targets on 12 January at dawn in retaliation for the Houthis’ persistent targeting of maritime navigation in the Red Sea. The US Central Command has declared that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted these strikes, with assistance from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and South Korea. These strikes are the first documented American military operations in Yemen since January 2020, when Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, was killed. Furthermore, they are regarded as the first direct military assaults by the United States against the Houthis since 13 October 2016, when three Yemeni radar sites were targeted by cruise missiles.
The Naval and Field Pre-Strike Situation
In recent weeks, the Ansar Allah group, also known as the Houthi Movement, executed a combined count of 23 naval assaults against military and civilian vessels sailing in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea. The majority of these attacks were thwarted by American, British, and French naval assets, such as the American aircraft carrier Eisenhower, the British frigate Diamond, and the French frigate Languedoc, which managed to intercept a total of 79 drones and 15 ballistic, naval, and cruise missiles and destroy three speedboats.
Due to the Houthis’ ongoing naval operations, in addition to a naval presence from China and Iran, a number of American, British, and French naval assets are permanently stationed in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Prior to the commencement of missile and air operations in Yemen, the aircraft carrier Eisenhower and its naval group, comprising four missile destroyers and the submarine Ohio, were stationed in the area. This naval force forms the central component of the US Operation Prosperity Guardian, which also involves a destroyer, two English Navy frigates, and one Dutch Navy frigate.
Regarding the Iranian naval presence in this area, Tehran had earlier dispatched the Alborz frigate to join the Behshad command and intelligence ship and the Bushehr support ship in the Bab al-Mandab area. On 10 January 2024, the three ships commenced their withdrawal towards the southern Bab al-Mandab Strait and are anticipated to reach Iranian ports in the upcoming days. This is in preparation for deploying additional ships to the Bab al-Mandab area, as Iranian vessels typically remain stationed in this area for a duration of three months. However, the command and intelligence ship remains stationed for extended periods within this maritime range.
Over the course of the last two weeks, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of US transport aircraft flying from US bases in Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait towards Djibouti, raising the possibility that the United States will be conducting an airstrike against Yemen. In practice, however, preparations for air and missile strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen have commenced since 6 January 2024, employing RQ-4 reconnaissance drones originating from the Sigonella base in Italy. Hours before the execution of the missile and air strikes, the US Air Force’s RC-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Al-Udeid base in Qatar were dispatched to take charge of combat operations and air strikes, as well as offer intelligence assistance. It is important to highlight that the trajectory of this aircraft served as an unmistakable indication of impending airstrikes against Yemen, which is in itself provided the Houthis with an early warning.
Targets of the Strike
The air and missile strikes targeted the capital, Sana’a, as well as the cities of Al-Hudaydah, Saada, Hajjah, Dhamar, and Taiz. A total of 60 targets were hit across 16 distinct locations. The raids encompassed the subsequent targets:
- Taiz Governorate: The camps around Taiz Airport, particularly the 22nd Infantry Brigade and Al-Jund camps.
- Sanaa: Al-Dulaimi air base close to Sanaa Airport, along with the camp of the Eighth Brigade and the Faj Attan neighbourhood.
- Hajjah Governorate: The area surrounding Abs Airport and other locations.
- Al-Hudaydah Governorate: The naval forces camp in the Dune area, the area around Al Hudaydah Airport, and locations on the outskirts of the Zabid and Zaidiya areas.
- Saada Governorate: Kahlan military base, located east of the governorate.
- Various locations throughout Dhamar Governorate.
These strikes were executed logistically by a combination of air and naval forces. At the air level, Abs Airport—which London claimed was a location for launching drones and missiles toward the Red Sea—and other locations in the Saada and Hajjah governorates were the targets of the British Air Force’s four Typhoon fighters. The aircraft operated out of the British RAF Akrotiri air base in Cyprus. These fighters were supported by Voyager refueling planes, and Paveway IV-guided bombs were used in the strikes. Notably, the British Navy has the capability to access the Bab al-Mandab Strait through the use of the destroyer Diamond.
The strike’s primary weight fell on the United States and was carried out by 22 American F-18 fighters, with two variants designed for aerial bombardment and electronic warfare operations. The aircraft lifted off from the American aircraft carrier Eisenhower, accompanied by E2C early warning aircraft, en route to their designated destinations in Al-Hudaydah, Sanaa, Taiz, and Dhamar. On the naval side, Yemeni targets were targeted with Tomahawk cruise missiles by the submarine Florida and the destroyers Mason, La Bon, Gravely, and Philippine Sea.
Furthermore, auxiliary air operations were conducted, featuring RC-135 electronic intelligence aircraft, PA-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and KC-135 refueling aircraft, all of which were took off from the Isa air bases in Bahrain and Al-Udeid base in Qatar.
Notwithstanding the US Central Command’s assertion that Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Bahrain provided direct support for these missile and air strikes and the joint statement issued by the governments of Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Britain, and the United States concerning these strikes, the basic onus of the operations was placed on Britain and the United States, with officers from the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and Bahrain being present at the main base of Operation Prosperity Guardian, which the United States was eager to incorporate these strikes into its overall activities.
It is noteworthy that some of the aircraft involved in these attacks traversed Arab airspace en route to Yemen, just as the British Typhoon fighters most likely traversed Egyptian airspace en route from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, while the RC-135 electronic intelligence aircraft, the PA-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and the KC-135 refueling aircraft all took off from the Sheikh Issa and Al-Udeid bases and flew over Saudi and Emirati airspace before reaching the Red Sea.
Currently, there has been no definitive official response from the Houthis or the Iranian alliance regarding this strike, except for the statement made by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claiming responsibility for two missile strikes; the first targeted a location near Jordan River Park in Palestine, while the second targeted the city of Eilat early this morning on 15 January. It is worth noting that the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported this evening that a missile explosion occurred near a civilian ship, 90 nautical miles east of the Yemeni port of Aden.
The strikes had two goals:
1. Impeding and diminishing the Houthis’ targeting capability by depriving them of radars and monitoring systems, which serve as early warning and reconnaissance tools.
2. Disrupting the Houthi side’s armament arsenal, including launch sites, drones, and missiles, in order to minimize the likelihood of a retaliation.
At a broad level, this Western action against the Houthis marks a significant change in approach towards addressing their escalating threats in light of the ongoing consequences of the Gaza Strip conflict. It ushers in a transition by the United States and its allies from a strategy of deterrence to a strategy of warfare when dealing with the Houthis.
With regard to the global and regional actors’ responses to these developments, we observe that they varied from endorsement to condemnation of the attacks. Furthermore, certain countries, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, expressed concerns about the overall state of tension. Japan, Australia, France, Denmark, Germany, Britain, and the United States expressed their support for the attacks, attributing responsibility to the Houthis for this escalation. Conversely, Russia (which requested a Security Council session on the matter), Iran, and Iraq condemned the attacks. The Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Hezbollah, and Iraqi Al-Nujaba movement have all expressed their opposition to these attacks, deeming them an “encroachment on Yemeni sovereignty.”
Furthermore, within the framework of responses condemning these assaults, Bloomberg News Agency documented on Friday that certain quarters of the American Democratic Party started to denounce and critique these attacks. Bloomberg cited Democratic Representative Rashida Tlaib’s statement that these attacks violate Article 1 of the United States Constitution because Biden launched them without congressional approval. Democratic Representative Mark Pocan maintained the view that “the United States cannot risk getting entangled in another decades-long conflict without Congressional authorization.” Similarly, Democratic Party representatives Pramila Jaipal, Summer Lee, Cori Bush, Ro Khanna, and Valerie Howell expressed disapproval of these attacks.
Upon extrapolating this action taken by Operation Prosperity Guardian against the Houthis, it becomes evident that Western countries, led by the United States, Britain, and their allied countries under the 19 December 2023 Prosperity Guardian security structure, have shifted their focus from deterrence to confrontation and potential war with the Houthis. This indicates that the United States and its allies have transitioned from a strategy of merely repelling Houthi assaults, such as those launched by ballistic missiles or drones, to one of directing preemptive strikes against the Houthi combat infrastructure. The primary objectives of this shift are twofold: firstly, to dissuade the Houthis from targeting navigation in the Red Sea; and secondly, to completely destroy the Houthi militia’s infrastructure to the point where it is incapable of launching these assaults in the Red Sea. Nevertheless, the paramount factor to be taken into account is the message of the strikes: Operation Prosperity Guardian’s primary objective will not only be to defend against attacks initiated by the Houthi militia but also to initiate pre-emptive strikes.
The central question at hand pertains to the extent to which the Houthis, who are supported by Iran, will respond to this escalation by the United States and its allies. It appears that these responses will take the form of a gradual escalation. That is to say, Iran will give orders to some of its militias in the region, specifically in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, to launch more attacks against American and Israeli targets in these territories. This strategy aims to raise the cost of Western involvement in the ongoing war and ease the burden of escalation on the Houthis. Meanwhile, the Houthis will continue their current pace of escalation or potentially increase it in order to exert maximum pressure on Operation Prosperity Guardian and the participating countries.
Expected Scenarios
The foregoing, together with the announcement that the EU will be sending a naval fleet to the Red Sea to defend commercial ships from Houthi attacks, leads us to delineate three potential future developments in the Red Sea region:
1. Restricted Assaults on Vessels Traversing the Bab al-Mandab Strait: The Houthis may intensify operations to target civilian ships crossing the Bab al-Mandab Strait in order to demonstrate their continued possession of the missile and logistical capabilities required for this and prove that the American strikes have had no impact on these capabilities or the potential to execute such assaults. Under this scenario, the Houthis might endeavor to engage in a naval assault against the naval assets that were involved in the assault against Yemen, employing anti-ship ballistic missiles or naval drones.
2. Limited Missile Attacks against Countries or Bases: The Houthis may decide to launch more missile attacks against Israel or other countries they believe were involved in the US strikes on Yemen, either by permitting aircraft to pass through their airspace or by maintaining a naval presence within Operation Prosperity Guardian. Such an action would require an Iranian decision to escalate on the ground, which the current situation does not appear to permit. The potential targets for these strikes may encompass air bases that were involved in the US strikes, particularly air bases located in Qatar and Jordan. However, the likelihood of this scenario is diminished due to the considerable distance from Yemen.
3. Medium- to Large-Scale Missile Assaults against United States Bases in the Region:
This scenario necessitates an expansion of the zone of confrontation in the region and, of course, an Iranian choice to engage in an open conflict with the United States. Significantly, there are certain conditions and considerations pertaining to the relationship between Iran and Qatar in relation to the Al-Udeid military base, as well as the ongoing reconciliation between Tehran and Saudi Arabia concerning US military bases. The following air bases in the region should be noted as potential targets for the Houthis:
- The Assab Air Base in Eritrea, which currently houses a squadron of 12 French Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft.
- The Isa Air Base in Bahrain, which houses two P-8A maritime patrol aircraft that are owned by the US Navy.
- The Al-Udeid base in Qatar, which houses RC-135 electronic intelligence aircraft and RQ-4B reconnaissance drones.
- The Chabelley and Ambouli bases in Djibouti, which house a combined total of sixteen French Mirage-2000 fighters.
- The Saudi Prince Sultan, King Abdulaziz, and Umm Al Melh air, which currently house a total of 12 US F-16 fighters and MQ-C1 drones.
In summary, the recent escalation of military operations by the United States and the United Kingdom against the Houthis may have adverse consequences, given the current signs suggesting that the Houthis may be preparing a counteroffensive to these assaults, which will result in subsequent escalation of tensions in the Bab al-Mandab region and the Red Sea. This could potentially lead to adverse consequences for trade in the Red Sea, thereby directly impacting the Egyptian economy. Existing Egyptian estimations lean towards this, as evidenced by statements of the head of the Suez Canal Authority, who confirmed that canal revenues decreased by 40% between 1 and 11 January. Therefore, it is imperative for the Egyptian government to develop a well-defined strategy to address this situation, encompassing political and security measures, as well as effectively managing the adverse economic consequences resulting from the current state of heightened tension.
