Following a period of fluctuating relations over the past two years, Egypt and Turkey are now progressing towards rapprochement and breaking the impasse, with Turkish President Erdogan making his first visit to Cairo today. This will be Erdogan’s first visit to Cairo in slightly over 11 years and the first in his capacity as president rather than prime minister. The visit is the last step in a series of preparatory agreements that sought to defuse tensions, restore calm, and increase mutual understanding of conflicting interests.
International and Regional Concerns on the Agenda
The talks between Al-Sisi and Erdogan are expected to tackle several pressing issues that have gained prominence due to recent shifts in the global and regional landscape. These shifts have given rise to new dynamics that require a reassessment of regional partnerships and alliances in the Middle East. The following points delineate the most noteworthy areas of shared concern for Cairo and Ankara:
Developments in Israel’s Aggression against Gaza: The Israeli military’s aggressive actions against Gaza will be a significant focus of the talks between Al-Sisi and Erdogan, particularly given that the Gaza war is one of the few regional dossiers on which both countries take a similar stance and advocate for bilateral consultations and regional coordination, pushing contentious issues to the sidelines. Both Cairo and Ankara oppose the Israeli political propositions and aggressive military actions that seek to eliminate the Palestinian cause by forcibly displacing the Palestinian people. Opportunities also present themselves for Cairo and Ankara to jointly manage different issues, including those pertaining to prisoners and detainees and the entry of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the aligned perspectives of Cairo and Ankara on opposing the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the imperative of attaining Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation as a prerequisite for resuming the peace process in the Middle East can serve as a significant bolster for Egyptian initiatives concerning the Palestinian cause within Western policy circles, given Ankara’s NATO membership, strategic ties with the United States (the primary global guarantor of the Middle East peace process), and open lines of communication with all Palestinian factions. Additionally, the extensive security risks arising from the escalation of the conflict and its evolution into a comprehensive regional confrontation, along with the critical juncture in the two countries’ relations with Israel, prompt them to engage in regional coordination and jointly address shared threats.
Enhancing Technological and Defence Cooperation: Drone diplomacy has evidently emerged as a prominent instrument in Turkish foreign policy, serving to augment influence and acquire prestige. Approximately thirty countries, including Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, and others, have expressed interest in acquiring Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, in addition to other models including Bayraktar Akıncı and Bayraktar Kızılelma. This interest stems from the effectiveness and capability of Turkish drones to derail conflicts in diverse arenas, including Syria, Libya, Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and others. Cairo emerges as a lucrative market for the Turkish drone industry, as Ankara has agreed to supply combat drones and other sophisticated defense technologies to Egypt, as stated by the Turkish ambassador to Cairo, Salih Mutlu Şen, a few days prior to Erdogan’s visit. This indicates that there has been ongoing and unrestricted communication between the two countries in recent months, enabling the exchange of demands and diverse perspectives regarding their respective interests.
The visit is to discuss the key lines of the future of defence and technological cooperation, including the potential for joint manufacturing of military equipment. This will guarantee the progression of bilateral relations towards a level of strategic partnership that instills stability and sustainability, notwithstanding the multitude and intricacy of contentious issues. In effect, military alliances are frequently characterized by their enduring and strategic nature. This deal will facilitate the fulfilment of the strategic objectives of both countries. On the one hand, it will bolster Turkey’s standing as a significant participant in the worldwide defence industry. On the other hand, it will enable Cairo to establish a strategic military equilibrium in the Middle East, considering the presence of regional rivals who possess advanced drone technology, let alone non-state armed groups, such as Iranian militias and terrorist organizations. It is worth recalling that, over the past five years, expenditure on drones in the Middle East, excluding Israel, has totaled $1.5 billion.
Apart from strengthening Egypt’s defense capacities and providing it with a tactical edge in conflicts, the Turkish drones stand out for their versatility in performing a range of duties such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting accurate strikes. Therefore, they are distinct from the collection of domestically produced Egyptian drones, which include two surveillance drones named June 30 and October 6, as well as two target drones called Taba 1 and Taba 2. The deal is in line with Cairo’s strategy to broaden its military alliances, as it offers a cost-effective and exceptionally efficient option amid the hesitancy of countries like the United States to sell advanced and sizable drones. While the Bayraktar model is currently being highly considered for delivery to Cairo, the discussions may also involve negotiations for more sophisticated models like Akinci and Kizilma.
Developments in the Libyan Crisis: The situation in Libya is also a top priority at the negotiating table. While the ongoing Turkish military presence in Libya complicates the already complex Libyan situation and hinders complete political consensus between the two countries concerning the Libyan crisis, security, military, and political understandings are attainable in light of the two countries’ increased acceptance of one another’s interests and their openness to all Libyan parties. A level of coordination that reconciles the political and economic interests of Turkey with Egypt’s apprehensions regarding ongoing divisions, political unrest, and the proliferation of mercenaries—a security menace perceived by Cairo— could be attainable. As two overlapping and intersecting actors in the Libyan crisis, there is no doubt that the existence of Egyptian-Turkish understandings regarding Libya will have a positive impact on the Libyan crisis by reducing the intensity of political polarization and advancing the political process towards establishing a road map for holding presidential and parliamentary elections.
Hazards to Navigation in the Red Sea: Given that the Red Sea is a crucial economic artery for both Egypt and Turkey, both countries are concerned about the growing security risks associated with the Houthi movement’s targeting of maritime navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well as the policy of international military buildup in the region and the associated risks of conflict spillover. The Red Sea serves as both the southern entrance to the Suez Canal and a major shipping route for Turkish exports to the Middle East and Africa. As such, impeding trade along this waterway and the resulting rise in shipping costs globally put further strain on the economies of both countries. While the Red Sea region was an arena in which Cairo and Ankara vied for influence, which manifested itself in Ankara’s attempts to establish a permanent political and military presence in the Horn of Africa region, become a major player in regional security, and participate actively in global trade routes, the two countries now face a shared challenge in the form of navigational hazards, which also present prospects for collaborative endeavours.
Riches of the Eastern Mediterranean: One of the main factors influencing the divergence and rapprochement trends between Cairo and Ankara is resource sharing in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Just like Cairo’s propensity to form a regional cooperation network for the Mediterranean Basin that excluded Turkey (the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Organisation) and to sign maritime border demarcation agreements with Cyprus, Greece, and Libya was a significant contributing factor to the escalation of disputes, the failure of Turkish gunboat diplomacy to disrupt the recurring patterns of political alignment against it led Ankara to recognise that achieving peace could be the key to resolving differences and penetrating the regional cooperation network formed by the so-called tripartite cooperation mechanisms (Egypt-Cyprus-Greece and Cyprus-Greece-Israel).
As such, Erdogan will undoubtedly bring up the issue of delineating the maritime borders between Egypt and Turkey during his talks with Al-Sisi. Indeed, this issue has been on the agenda of the exploratory talks since March 2021, but no agreement has been reached. It is unlikely that any progress will be made given Cairo’s insistence on finishing any border demarcation in line with pertinent international conventions and treaties and in a way that does not interfere with its partners’ interests in the Mediterranean Basin. As a result, advancements in demarcating the maritime borders between Egypt and Turkey are contingent on the latter resolving its border disputes with Greece and Cyprus. In this regard, Egypt has the potential to act as a constructive mediator.
Promoting and Strengthening Trade and Economic Ties: Considering the economic crises in Cairo and Ankara, characterised by high inflation and a decline in the exchange rate, the leaders of both countries have the political will to boost trade and economic relations, particularly since they have already been progressing in a favourable direction notwithstanding the political tensions. According to data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, the bilateral trade between Egypt and Turkey has surged to $7.7 billion in 2022, marking a 14% increase from the $6.7 billion recorded in 2021. The two countries hope to raise these figures to approximately $20 billion. In this vein, there is an effort to foster dialogue between Egypt and Turkey’s private sector and within the Egypt-Turkey business council. Local currency trade exchanges may also be discussed, but this is still a step that will likely be delayed given Egypt’s requirement for dollar liquidity and both countries’ concerns that the United States will put restrictions on or charge high customs fees to countries that reduce their reliance on the dollar in an attempt to maintain the dollar’s hegemony in international trade.
In pursuit of enhancing trade relations and diminishing transportation expenses, the RoRo shipping line agreement, which was halted in 2015 on account of its unsuitability for Cairo, could be re-instituted with a revised version that balances the interests of both parties and guarantees facilitation of Turkish exports’ transportation from the ports of Mersin and Iskenderun to Damietta and Port Said, where they are subsequently loaded onto Turkish vessels for delivery to the Gulf states via Mina al-Arab on the Red Sea as well as the provision of facilities for Egyptian exports to Europe through Turkish ports, particularly for agricultural products that spoil quickly, thereby expanding Egyptian exports and opening up new markets.
Additionally, Egypt aspires to secure a portion of the growing Turkish investments in Africa and the surrounding regions. Egypt holds significant importance as an investment market for Turkish companies, particularly given the elimination of visa requirements for Turkish citizens, the reduction in production and labor costs, and the potential to leverage customs exemption agreements for accessing African markets. Further, the activation of joint agreements, notably the Agreement on Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments and the Turkey-Egypt Tax Treaty, could further enhance investment prospects. Approximately 200 Turkish companies are currently active in the Egyptian market, employing around 70,000 workers and making investments valued at approximately $2.5 billion. The textile industry presents a lucrative opportunity for Turkish investments. Currently, the four leading textile factories in Egypt are Turkish-owned and account for approximately one-third of the overall textile production. Turkey and Egypt are in talks to create an industrial zone inside the Suez Canal Economic Zone that would focus on the textile and ready-made garment sectors.
And in light of the Egyptian government’s endeavors to generate foreign currency, the tourism industry emerges as a significant contributor to foreign exchange inflows. Turkish tourists have the potential to partially offset the decrease in Russian-Ukrainian tourism caused by the Ukraine war. According to Turkish ambassador to Cairo Salih Mutlu Şen, the cancellation of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens in April 2023 resulted in a fivefold increase in the number of Turkish tourists in 2023 compared to 2022. The energy sector is also a vital area of economic collaboration between Egypt and Turkey, with Egypt serving as a significant provider of liquefied natural gas to Turkey. In the first half of 2022, Turkey ranked first among countries importing liquefied natural gas from Egypt, with an estimated total value of approximately $1.1 billion. Moreover, the renewable energy industry presents prospects for collaboration and joint investments between the two countries in eco-friendly fuel projects and the associated sectors, such as solar panel manufacturing, as well as environmentally-friendly fuel supply activities.
Achieving Food Security: The interlinkages between geopolitical conflicts and economic interests give rise to an intricate web of intertwined interests and present challenges to regional actors, prompting them to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. In light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has entered its third year without reaching a resolution, and the consequential economic and geopolitical turmoil that has precipitated urgent economic crises in numerous countries, as well as Ankara’s mediation in the establishment of a grain export mechanism via the Black Sea, which has facilitated global grain supply chains, the potential trajectories of the Ukrainian war and assurances of food security will be prioritized in negotiations. This is particularly true considering the potential for Ankara to spearhead an initiative to establish a novel system for grain export via the Black Sea, a subject that could occupy considerable prominence in the discussions between Erdogan and Putin during the latter’s anticipated visit to Ankara in late spring.
In short, Erdogan’s visit to Cairo is the culmination of a series of interactions that encompassed a softening of Erdogan’s rhetoric towards Cairo, increased communication between security and diplomatic officials, reciprocated visits between foreign ministers, and brief protocol presidential meetings during various international events. Furthermore, the visit comes at a critical juncture on the international and regional arena, which has further strengthened the two countries’ recognition of the need to shift from a state of conflict and opposition to one of cooperation, coordination, and formulating understandings that acknowledge the existence of different viewpoints on regional issues and conflicting interests that must be addressed and managed concurrently, with an emphasis on the shared aspects of geopolitical and economic collaboration.
