According to the realism theory, the state is the primary actor in international relations, with non-governmental actors deriving their significance from the state and only being able to act on the international stage through it. Nevertheless, in recent years, the realism theory has faced numerous criticisms as non-state actors have increasingly played a significant role in international affairs. This has been evidenced by the recent attacks carried out by the Houthi movement in the Red Sea, which had far-reaching consequences for maritime security, not only in the region but also for Western powers.
In response to these attacks, the United States and the United Kingdom launched strikes on approximately 60 targets at 16 Houthi sites in Yemen on 12 January 2024. As per the declarations made by Alexus Grynkewich, the Commander of the Air Forces in the US Central Command, the collaborative American-British assault was carried out with the objective of diminishing the military capabilities of the Houthis and safeguarding international trade.
However, Western endeavors have proven ineffective in dissuading the Houthi movement, as the situation in the Red Sea region continues to be fraught with tension at the present moment. This necessitates addressing the factors leading to the rise and expansion of the role of non-state actors before analyzing the serious effects that the Houthi attacks had on the maritime security of regional and international powers and the international responses that followed.
Ascent of the Houthis as a Non-State Actor
Non-state actors are a global phenomenon whose consequences transcend national boundaries. This is particularly evident in the context of globalization, which has led several countries to designate these groups as terrorist organizations on account of the threat they pose to their national interests and security.
There are a variety of internal and external factors that contribute to the emergence and consolidation of non-state actors both within and beyond national boundaries. One of the primary internal factors is the composition of the state. If a state is susceptible to internal conflicts and civil wars as a result of its numerous racial, religious, or ethnic disparities, this is regarded as a contributing factor to the proliferation of non-state actors. These factions will exploit the state’s marginalization of certain groups in order to gain their support through recruitment and the provision of what the state failed to provide. This strategy was abundantly evident with the rise of the Houthis in Yemen, as this faction became active in the early 1990s with the formation of the first movement known as the Believing Youth, motivated by the marginalization that Zaidi regions in Yemen were forced to endure. Later, the movement’s purview broadened to encompass social services delivery, and it developed a stronger political identity by challenging the administration of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Another contributing factor may be associated with the state’s vulnerability and political instability. For instance, the ousting of Saleh’s regime in Yemen in 2012 as a result of the Arab Spring presented a significant chance for the Houthis to enhance their power and sway in the country. The third factor pertains to certain governments employing armed militias to address internal conflicts. This was exemplified by Saleh’s formation of an alliance with the Houthis in 2014, following the overthrow of the legitimate government in Yemen, with the aim of retaking control of Sana’a.
Regarding external factors, one significant aspect pertains to the provision of financial and military assistance by certain countries to non-state actors, with the aim of advancing their own objectives and interests. Iran is a case in point in this regard, as it supports a multitude of non-state actors in the Arab world, including the Houthis in Yemen. Tehran has provided extensive financial and military assistance to the Houthi Movement, supplying them with ballistic missiles, both heavy and light weaponry, explosives, and missiles, and aiding in the establishment of weapons factories, thereby enhancing the Houthi Movement’s defensive capabilities. According to certain sources, leaders and advisors affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are supplying data and intelligence to assist the Houthis in targeting ships in the Red Sea. The second factor has to do with outside threats that facilitate these groups’ formation and expansion. The Houthis strategically utilize contextual elements to construct their political rhetoric. Following the conflict in the Gaza Strip, they have effectively rallied the anti-Israel public to advance their own objectives on domestic, regional, and international scales.
Catalytic Setting
Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip, the influence of non-state actors in the region has increased. The involvement of the Houthis is particularly noteworthy, as they have declared their support for the Palestinian people in response to the ongoing blockade that impedes their livelihood. The Houthi movement confirmed its readiness to involve in the war using missiles and drones, and it began to engage in the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict as follows:
On October 19, 2023, the Houthis began launching ballistic missiles and drones at the Israeli port of Eilat. In a broadcast speech given by the leader of the Houthi movement, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, on 14 November, al-Houthi issued a warning stating that their “eyes are open to constantly monitor and search for any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, especially in Bab al-Mandab, and near Yemeni regional waters.” These remarks were not just meant to be intimidating: on November 19, the movement captured the Galaxy Leader vessel, which is owned by the Israeli-based Ray Shipping. On December 9, the Houthis declared their intention to obstruct the movement of ships from any country traveling to and from Israeli ports unless aid is delivered to the Gaza Strip.
From the moment the ship was captured until now, the Houthis have impeded the commercial activities of vessels transiting the Red Sea. They initiated over thirty assaults in the region. On 3 December, the Houthis declared that they had launched an armed drone and a naval missile to attack two Israeli ships, namely the Unity Explorer cargo ship and Number 9 containership. They also took claimed responsibility for the assault on 12 December on the commercial oil tanker Streinda, which was flying the Norwegian flag. Yahya Sare’e, the military spokesman for the Houthi movement in Yemen, stated on 15 December that the movement used a drone to conduct a military operation on a Maersk cargo ship that was sailing directly towards Israel and struck it.
The Houthis launched nearly their largest attack on the Red Sea since the they started their oeprataions on 9 January, employing approximately 18 drones and 3 anti-ship missiles. The US and British forces promptly declared that they had successfully thwarted the attack. In a related development, Yahya Sare’e stated on the X platform on February 1 that the group targeted a British commercial ship in the Red Sea that was sailing to Palestinian ports in response to the recent US-British attacks on Yemen. On 2 February, the Houthis, as part of the ongoing escalation in the region, employed explosive-laden boats to target a cargo ship. This marks the first instance of such tactics being used by the Houthis since the beginning of the escalation, as reported by the US military. In addition, the Houthi movement conducted two military campaigns in the Red Sea, one aimed at the American vessel Star Nasia and the other at the British ship Morning Tide on February 6.
Implications for Maritime Security
Undoubtedly, the consequences of the Houthi assaults on vessels in the Red Sea not only impacted Israel but also posed a threat to the interests and economies of regional and international powers. The Republican senator for Arkansas argued that Houthi attacks on vessels would be detrimental to the US economy. These attacks caused a significant shift in global trade, with numerous countries opting to redirect their ships from the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope route. Consequently, this redirection led to higher shipping costs and longer delivery times, marking the most substantial disruption to international trade in decades. The escalation in the Red Sea also compelled a number of companies, including Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, and several other global container ship lines (MCS Shipping, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and Frontline), to suspend the passage of their vessels through the Red Sea starting in December 2023.
In this regard, the Secretary-General of the United Nations International Maritime Organization, Arsenio Dominguez, stated on 4 January 2024, that “a significant number of companies, around 18 shipping companies, have already decided to reroute their vessels around South Africa in order to reduce the attacks on vessels.” He also added that “this represents an additional 10 days to the journeys (and) negative impact on trade and on increasing freight rates.”
For instance, on 15 November, 2023, the container ship Maersk sailed from Singapore to Slovenia and, after travelling via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, arrived in Port Said in just 12 days. Upon its return journey, the ship arrived in Port Said once more on 17 December. However, due to the escalated attacks by the Houthis, the ship altered its course and circumnavigated Africa. It did not reach Singapore until a month of continuous sailing had passed. This situation resulted in a 1.3% decrease in global trade during the months of November and December 2023, and the costs of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait increased significantly, reaching a rate of 170%.
According to statements made by Admiral Osama Rabie, Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) on 11 January 2024, there was a 30% decrease in navigation traffic in the Suez Canal from 1-14 January. This decrease in traffic resulted in a 40% decrease in the Canal’s income compared to the same period in 2023. The number of ships passing through the canal decreased from 777 to 544 during this time. Nevertheless, Rabie emphasized the consistent and uninterrupted navigation in the Suez Canal, despite the obstacles faced. He further stated that the SCA is committed to making every possible effort to minimize the impact of the current circumstances on its customers. Egypt’s inclination is rooted in the significance of the Red Sea Road to international commercial shipping routes as the Suez Canal facilitates the passage of approximately 8% of the worldwide natural gas movement and 12% of the worldwide trade movement, respectively.
International Action
The ongoing conflict in the region has witnessed a significant increase in the influence of non-state actors. This has resulted in the expansion of the conflict to areas in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and even the Red Sea. As a result, these actors now play a major role in the conflict equation. This has prompted international powers to reassess their presence in the region, with the objective of limiting the movements of these actors. International action in this regard can be described as follows:
Operation Prosperity Guardian: The Houthi attacks had a significant impact not only on regional trade but also on global trade, causing severe damage to the interests of numerous countries. In response to the increasing assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin declared, in the early hours of December 18, 2023 in Bahrain, the establishment of a multinational naval force to safeguard maritime transportation in the area, emphasizing the necessity for international collaborative efforts to address this issue. Austin declared that Britain, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain are members of the naval force. Furthermore, they will conduct joint patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian, which he described as being coordinated by the Joint Naval Forces and the leadership of Task Force 153—a military unit established in mid-April 2022 with an emphasis on international maritime affairs.
US-Japan Security Council Resolution Draft: The United States and Japan jointly proposed a draft resolution to ensure unrestricted movement in the red sea, which was officially approved by virtue of Security Council (SC) Resolution 2722 on 11 January. The resolution garnered support from 11 members, while 4 members chose to abstain. It denounced the assaults perpetrated by the Houthis on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, while also censuring the supply of any form of armaments and associated resources to the Houthis. The resolution passed requires that “the Houthis immediately cease all such attacks, which impede global trade and undermine navigational rights and freedoms as well as regional peace and security.” In response to the SC resolution, Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, expressed on X that the resolution pertaining to the security of navigation in the Red Sea is a political maneuver and that the United States is the party breaching international law.
Joint US-British Attacks: According to the US Air Force on 11 January, the United States and Britain, with the backing of the multinational maritime force, conducted coordinated airstrikes on 16 Houthi sites in Yemen, more than a month after the initial Houthi attacks. The attacks caused the fatalities of five and the injuries of six members of the Yemeni armed forces, as stated by the Houthi Movement. Following those assaults, the United States has initiated a series of consecutive operations, which as of 2 February amounted to approximately 12 strikes. The British have participated in two of these strikes, in addition to maintaining operations to repel threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Furthermore, on 4 February, a joint strike was executed by the United States and Britain targeting a Houthi anti-ship missile. According to statements made by Sare’e, Western powers carried out approximately 48 raids spread across multiple governorates. On 5 January, Washington initiated an attack on two booby-trapped drone boats owned by the Houthi movement. Nevertheless, the Houthis persistently employed escalatory rhetoric in response to American efforts to deter them. Prior to the 2 February assault on Hajjah Governorate, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared in a speech that the strikes launched by the United States and the United Kingdom against Yemen are fruitless and ineffectual and will not restrict their military capabilities.
Naming the Houthi Movement as a Terrorist Organization: On 16 February 2021, the United States declared the revocation of the Houthi movement’s classification as a terrorist organization. This is because, in the context of the worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen, these designations have the potential to obstruct the access of the Yemeni people to essential goods like food and fuel. Nevertheless, in response to the escalating magnitude of Houthi assaults, the Joe Biden administration declared the re-designation of the Houthi Movement as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization (SDGT) on 17 January, as opposed to the approach taken by the administration of former US President Donald Trump, which classified the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), in an attempt from the current administration to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen, which is currently experiencing the most severe humanitarian crisis on a global scale. The White House affirmed that shipments of food and medicine to Yemeni ports will not be impacted by the measures implemented against the Houthis. It is worth noting that the potential consequences of these measures on the Houthis are challenging to forecast, particularly in light of the White House’s declaration that the measure will be implemented in 30 days, with the option to revoke it if the Houthis seize their assaults on vessels in the Red Sea.
EU Operation Aspides: Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced that European countries plan to set up a naval mission by mid-February to safeguard commercial vessels in the Red Sea from illicit and unauthorized assaults. Additionally, he emphasized that the involved countries will not engage in the American-British airstrikes that are directed at Houthi strongholds. In relation to the European Naval Mission’s headquarters, certain sources have speculated that it may be situated in France, Greece, or Italy and that the precise location of which is contingent upon geographical proximity. Thus far, five member states of the European Union (France, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Belgium) have conveyed their intention to partake in this mission.
In short, non-state actors vary in their characteristics, composition, and origins. However, it is undeniable that given the current challenges in the global order and the ongoing escalation in the Middle East, as well as the widening scope of conflicts involving Western powers, these actors pose a threat to the international community as a whole and to the states in which they appear. This is clearly visible in the fluctuations caused by the Houthis in global trade. The Houthi movement capitalized on the conflict in the Gaza Strip to distract the Yemeni population from the severe economic and humanitarian crisis they are currently enduring by targeting Israeli sites. Ever since the Houthis seized power from the legitimate government in Yemen, the Yemeni people have been facing the imminent threat of starvation, particularly given that over 50% of them live below the poverty threshold.
The situation has gotten worse and more complicated, particularly in the wake of the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea, which ended peace negotiations and other attempts to bring about peace in Yemen and caused a wave of price hikes in the country as a result of impeding international trade. Furthermore, altering the course of global shipping routes will inflict significant damage on the Yemeni economy, primarily due to the halt in port operations and the scarcity of imported goods. This is particularly concerning as the country heavily relies on foreign sources for a majority of its essential commodities.
Notwithstanding the Houthis’ endorsement of escalatory rhetoric and their commitment to a resolute response to the American-British assaults on the movement’s facilities in Yemen, it is evident that the Houthi assaults on vessels in the Red Sea are exclusively for domestic objectives pertaining to deflecting attention from the internal turmoil, preserving the existing internal political equilibrium, and attaining regional popularity on the basis of its support for the Palestinian cause. The Yemeni population is currently enduring a severe humanitarian and economic crisis. If the Houthis continue their actions and the US administration changes its stance on providing humanitarian aid to Yemen, the country will not withstand the repercussions of the sanctions imposed by the United States. Hence, there is a potential for the Houthis to cease their attacks on ships in the event of a deteriorating situation or if the movement’s political rhetoric proves ineffective in attaining its objectives. In addition, Iran has no intention of engaging in direct conflict with the United States, primarily due to various internal factors, including managing domestic opposition and pursuing nuclear armament. Consequently, Tehran may seek to strengthen its connections with the Houthis in a manner that guarantees the Houthis have control over the escalation process. Furthermore, the Houthis are also keen on avoiding any deterioration in their relationship with Saudi Arabia, particularly considering the positive progress made in negotiations with Riyadh prior to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
