While Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and its military consequences in Gaza have offered Russia certain strategic advantages—partly by diverting Western, notably US, attention from the Ukrainian front, which is heavily dependent on Western military and economic aid, exposing Western double standards, and providing Russia an opportunity to position itself as a more reliable and neutral mediator in the Middle East—Russia is intent on containing the conflict and preventing its spread to additional countries in the region.
This paper explores Russia’s concerns over potential escalation in the Middle East and the Kremlin’s endeavors to mitigate it.
Russian Concerns
As tensions in the Middle East continue to simmer, with the potential for a broader regional conflict looming—particularly in response to the assassination of former Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, a move that could accelerate efforts by some regional and international actors to reshape the region—Russia seeks to manage the escalation to avoid a scenario where the situation spirals out of control, potentially introducing new regional dynamics and power structures. This would challenge the current balance of influence, which Moscow has carefully crafted, with Syria as its cornerstone, and relies on maintaining equilibrium among key regional rivals.
Russian apprehensions regarding the potential for a regional confrontation can be outlined as follows:
Overloading Its Forces with an Additional Conflict: Moscow aims to keep its forces in the Middle East, particularly at the Khmeimim air base and Russian naval facility in Tartus, out of the crossfire of any new conflict that could scatter Russian military efforts while the Ukrainian front remains active. Despite Syria’s efforts to distance itself from the current regional tensions, a potential escalation between Israel and Hezbollah could spill over into Syria. This scenario necessitates Moscow, Tehran, and Tel Aviv to coordinate and exchange intelligence on fighter, missile, and drone movements to prevent incursions into Russian-controlled airspace or damage to its forces and military assets, including bases and weaponry. However, given the unpredictable nature of military confrontations and their potential to expand, Russia remains concerned about the direct threat to its interests, which could compel it to engage more directly in the conflict.
The Potential Downfall of Russia’s Middle Eastern Allies: Moscow aims to carefully steer Iran’s response, ensuring it is limited to restoring honor and placing the primary burden of retaliation on regional proxies. This strategy reflects Russia’s understanding of the immense costs and risks associated with a Middle Eastern war between Iran and Israel, particularly since Israel and its ally, the United States, would likely pursue the complete removal of Iran from the regional power equation and the destruction of its military proxies in the region. Such an outcome would strip Moscow of a key regional ally, one that has been a critical military asset since the onset of the Ukrainian conflict, supplying drones and ballistic missiles and bolstering Russia’s resilience against international sanctions.
As such, a regional war would strip Iran of its capacity to continue supplying Russia with military resources, as its military capabilities would be depleted, forcing it to divert its arsenal of drones and missiles to defend against external threats, given their central role in its defense strategy. Conversely, Iran might find itself in need of Russian military aid, such as advanced air defense systems and modern fighters, at a time when Russia’s ability to deliver such support is severely constrained. Additionally, the weakening of a strategic ally like Tehran would cost Moscow a valuable asset in its broader geopolitical contest with Washington, affecting its influence in regions ranging from the Middle East to Latin America, as well as Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Moreover, the potential for Syria to become a battleground for direct or proxy conflicts could drive Israel to dismantle an allied regime that Russia has heavily invested in politically and militarily. This would enable Western influence to expand within Syria, jeopardizing Moscow’s hold on a state that serves as a cornerstone of its strategic power in the Middle East. Additionally, in the event of a full-scale war with Israel, Hezbollah might be forced to recall some of its fighters from Syria to Lebanon, weakening the forces that support the Syrian government against internal opposition groups and militias, thereby threatening the stability of the Assad regime.
Strained Equilibrium with Israel: Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has maintained a delicate balance in its relations with Israel, granting it significant leeway to operate in Syrian airspace to counter the entrenched Iranian presence. This was achieved by establishing an Israeli-Russian deconfliction mechanism that has successfully avoided incidents of friendly fire, despite Russia’s strategic alliance with Iran and positive ties with regional actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Nonetheless, an Iranian-Israeli conflict would upset the current balance, forcing Russia to back Iran, which could prompt Israel to shift its stance and offer direct support to Ukraine. Israel has so far practiced a “cautious balance,” providing humanitarian aid and limited air raid warning systems to Ukraine while avoiding Kyiv’s requests for tanks, air defense systems, and the imposition of sanctions on Russia or severing diplomatic ties with it, notwithstanding the tensions in Russian-Israeli relations due to Russia’s defense cooperation with Iran.
Tension in Russian-Gulf Relations: Russia’s strategy of equilibrium focuses on strengthening ties with the Gulf states, which have reached new heights after the Ukraine war, driven by the Gulf’s strategic push to diversify international partnerships and increase economic ties with Russia, particularly within the OPEC+ coalition. However, just as with Israel, any Russian tilt towards Iran in a regional conflict could jeopardize Russia’s interests with the Gulf, where the economic relationship plays a vital role in alleviating the effects of Western sanctions. Gulf countries have also been instrumental in helping Russia circumvent sanctions and maintain the flow of dollar and euro banknotes to Moscow. They are also major investors in Russia, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar accounting for a substantial portion of Arab investment within Moscow. These investments are largely directed towards vital sectors including gas, oil, real estate, infrastructure, logistics, and food.
Increased US Military Buildup: The US military buildup in the Middle East has surged to unprecedented levels, representing the largest concentration of equipment and combat power since the 2003 Iraq invasion. This includes a historic assembly of US naval and aerial assets, such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines with offensive capabilities, the latest fighter aircraft, and advanced surveillance ships. Such an extensive deployment disrupts the “strategic parity” Moscow aims to achieve in the region, where it seeks to bolster its defensive stance through military bases, arms supplies to regional countries, and the deployment of paramilitary forces like Wagner.
Undermining Iranian Militias: Moscow maintains strong connections with Iran’s regional proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, considering them valuable assets in its rivalry with the United States in the Middle East. This approach is part of Russia’s broader strategy to use paramilitary forces to achieve foreign policy goals while minimizing the political and financial costs of its interventions, in line with its “limited action” strategy. It also aligns with the Kremlin’s conviction in supporting groups adversarial to the United States, analogous to the US’s supply of arms to Ukraine. Perhaps this explains Moscow’s recent efforts to provide military advice and support to the Houthis in Yemen. Reports indicate that three Russian military intelligence officers visited Yemen in late July to advise the Houthis and assist them in live ammunition training, which was later cancelled. Additionally, Moscow had considered supplying the Houthis with anti-ship cruise missiles before retracting due to Saudi objections. The cooperation between Russia and the Houthis is further illustrated by a meeting last July between a Houthi delegation, led by spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, following a similar meeting in January. Given the crucial role Iranian proxies could play in a potential regional conflict, their potential exhaustion would strip Moscow of a key strategic asset.
Growing Chinese Influence in the Middle East: While Moscow and Beijing have a shared version on the need to reform the current international system, advocate for a more equitable global order, and view the Middle East as a crucial battleground for shifting influence and power dynamics, this doesn’t preclude the emergence of potential competitive tensions and conflicting interests between the two major powers in the future. Moscow is concerned that any regional escalation could amplify Beijing’s role in the Middle East, as evidenced by China’s recent mediation efforts—facilitating the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 and brokering agreements among Palestinian factions last July. This growing Chinese influence raises alarms about potential encroachments on Moscow’s own strategic foothold in the region.
In short, although the Ukrainian conflict remains the central focus of Russian foreign policy, the Kremlin cannot overlook the daily developments in the Middle East due to their influence on the current balance of power. In the coming period, Russia is likely to work towards de-escalating tensions by establishing a political equilibrium to counter the American military buildup. This strategy aims to preserve its balanced partnerships with regional actors and sustain its capacity to shape developments in the region.
