Amid its intensifying confrontation with Hezbollah–which has reached a level that has led Tel Aviv to regard the Lebanese front as a primary battlefield since early September–Israel has concentrated on employing a dual-tier operational tactic. The first tier entails a “scorched earth policy,” manifested through unparalleled airstrikes across Lebanon, especially in areas near the borders and the southern suburbs of Beirut, which sets the stage for the ground offensive that was announced to commence on October 1. The second focuses on intelligence operations, specifically the assassinations of many top- and second-tier Hezbollah leaders, most notably the killing of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Additionally, Hashem Safieddine, who was seen as Nasrallah’s likely successor, was also targeted in an operation whose result remains unknown at the time of writing this article. These developments, especially the leadership vacuum created by Israel’s targeted assassinations, raise questions about how Hezbollah will manage this crisis and the impact it will have on the ongoing conflict between the two sides.
I. Hezbollah’s Internal Power Structure
Hezbollah was established in 1982, shaped by three primary factors: the Lebanese civil war, the resistance to Israeli occupation, and internal divisions within the Shiite Amal Movement. In 1985, as Israeli forces began withdrawing from southern Lebanon, Ibrahim Amine al-Sayyed, Hezbollah’s official spokesperson, held a press conference at the Husseiniya of Chiyah in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where he unveiled the Hezbollah’s first political manifesto, titled “The Open Letter.” This document laid the foundation for Hezbollah’s internal structure, outlining its organizational frameworks and strategic direction. Drawing from this manifesto and key Hezbollah’s literature, such as Sheikh Naim Qassem’s book, Hezbollah: Methodology, Experience, and Future,” it is evident that Hezbollah’s organizational structure consists of:
1. The Secretary-General: Occupying the pinnacle of the party’s leadership structure, the Secretary-General is selected by Hezbollah’s Shura Council, a body consisting of seven members. The position was first held by Subhi al-Tufayli in 1989, followed by Abbas al-Musawi in May 1991 until his assassination in 1992, and later by Hassan Nasrallah, who served from 1993 until his assassination on September 28, 2024. Notably, all three were key figures in the founding of Hezbollah. According to the party’s internal regulations, the Secretary-General is eligible for re-election to successive terms.
2. The Shura Council: As Hezbollah’s supreme governing body, the Shura Council is led by the Secretary-General and comprises seven members. These members head the party’s key councils, including the Deputy Secretary-General, the heads of the Judicial and Political Councils, the Chief Political Advisor to the Secretary-General, the head of the Executive Council, and the head of the Parliamentary Council (the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, or the political wing of Hezbollah in the Parliament of Lebanon).
3. The Executive Council: Positioned as the second-highest authority in Hezbollah’s hierarchy, following the Shura Council, the Executive Council has been led by Hashem Safieddine—whom Israel has threatened to assassinate and who has been the leading candidate to succeed Nasrallah—since July 1995. Key aides included Sultan Asaad and Nabil Qaouk (whose assassination was announced by Israel on September 29, 2024). This council, often referred to as “Hezbollah’s government,” comprises executive, logistical, and security officials, as well as the leadership of regions where the party operates (the southern suburbs, north and south of the Litani, and the Beqaa Valley). This council oversees various critical departments, including media, education, health, finance, unions, and foreign relations.
4. The Jihad and Military Council: Established in 1995, this council oversees all military affairs within Hezbollah. It was long led by the late Imad Mughniyeh and its leadership includes the Secretary-General along with several key security figures. Since Mughniyeh’s assassination in Damascus in 2008, Hezbollah has shrouded the council’s activities and leadership in secrecy. Despite this, certain names circulate as the core members of the Jihad and Military Council, including Hashem Safieddine (who is reportedly a target for assassination by Israel), Wafiq Safa (intelligence chief, with reports claiming his sons were targeted in the Pager operation, and previous unconfirmed news of an assassination attempt on him), Hassan Khalil Yassin (whose assassination was announced by Israel on September 28, 2024), Abbas Rouhani, Ibrahim Aqil (head of Hezbollah’s operations department, assassinated by Israel on September 20, 2024), Fuad Shukr (Hezbollah’s top military commander, assassinated on July 30, 2024), Abu Ali Rida (leader of the Badr unit, assassinated by Israel September 28, 2024), Abdul Hadi Hamadi (a key security figure detained in Germany and released in 2005), and Khalil Harb (a long-serving security and military advisor to Hezbollah’s Secretary-General).
5. The Political Council: Established in 1995, replacing the former “Political Bureau,” Hezbollah’s Political Council is led by Ibrahim Amine al-Sayyed. This body holds limited executive power, functioning mainly as an advisory group to the Secretary-General and the Shura Council.
6. The Parliamentary Council: Since its formation in 1995, Hezbollah’s Parliamentary Council has been chaired by MP Mohammad Raad, the leader of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc. The council’s primary functions include managing Hezbollah’s political and parliamentary activities, as well as solidifying internal political alliances.
7. The Judicial Council: Established within Hezbollah in 1993, this council is composed of religious and legal judges. Its primary role is to resolve disputes, both internal and those involving Hezbollah’s Shiite support base, operating in accordance with the Shiite Jaafari doctrine, which serves as Hezbollah’s religious and legal reference.
II. Defining Traits of Hezbollah’s Leadership Crisis
Many aspects have surfaced throughout the current escalation, signaling an unprecedented leadership vacuum in Hezbollah’s history since its founding. This crisis is reflected in the following key elements:
1. Assassination of All First-Tier Leaders: The peculiarity of the current period for Hezbollah lies in Israel’s use of the shock doctrine, focusing on eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders, especially its military figures. Major assassinations include Hassan Nasrallah, Hashem Safieddine (still unconfirmed), Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, Ali Karaki, and several Redwan Force leaders. Through this strategy, Israel seems to be pursuing four key goals: first, to create a leadership void in Hezbollah; second, to induce confusion within the party regarding the escalation level; third, to lower morale among Hezbollah’s fighters, base, and support community; and fourth, to capitalize on this crisis to dismantle the party’s central and historic leadership.
2. Lack of an Effective Response to the Assassinations: Hezbollah’s typical approach, until recently, has been to adhere to the so-called “rules of engagement.” This may be due to internal Lebanese dynamics, which present significant challenges to any uncontrolled escalation, or perhaps due to Tehran’s hesitation to expand the conflict. This has shaped Hezbollah’s restrained response to the numerous assassinations of its leaders, to the extent that many have begun to question the “legend” of Hezbollah and its much-publicized capabilities of recent years. However, part of this restrained reaction may be tied to the shock and confusion that hit Hezbollah at both leadership and grassroots levels, triggered by Israel’s precision assassinations. Additionally, there are growing signs of a serious security breach within Hezbollah, whether at the technological or human level.
3. Disrupting Hezbollah’s Communication System: Media reports have frequently mentioned the phrase “losing contact with the targeted leaders” following Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah figures. It appears that Israel has deliberately sought to disrupt the communication and coordination systems between Hezbollah’s leadership and its bases, as well as between its leaders and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This has been accomplished through both targeted assassinations and intelligence breaches, serving as an additional indication of the broader crisis that has accompanied the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership.
4. Imbalance of Power and Deterrence: One of the most significant consequences of the large-scale assassinations targeting Hezbollah’s leadership has been the growing perception of an imbalance in power and deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel. According to this view, the “rules of engagement” would require Hezbollah to respond to these assassinations with actions of equal importance and impact. However, Hezbollah has yet to do so, allowing Israel to continue its escalation while banking on this strategic hesitation. This situation highlights the leadership crisis Hezbollah is grappling with, exacerbated by the absence of its charismatic and historical leaders, which has undoubtedly led to a decline in the morale among its ranks and broader support base.
III. Hezbollah’s Potential Paths for Navigating the Current Crisis
The recent developments, particularly those related to Hezbollah’s leadership crisis, introduce significant repercussions and potential pathways for Hezbollah, whether in relation to its internal organizational restructuring and the management of the escalating conflict with Israel, which has escalated in recent hours after Israel intensifying its ground operations in southern Lebanon. In this evolving situation, Hezbollah is likely to pursue multiple critical avenues to respond to these challenges.
1. Sustaining Decentralization within the Military Structure: Israel’s strategy of eliminating Hezbollah’s top leadership, especially from the Jihad Council—such as Hassan Nasrallah, Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, and Ali Karaki—has created operational hurdles for the party. These assassinations have resulted in the loss of the commanders who were directly responsible for managing Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel, thereby impacting, at least to some extent, the party’s overall operational readiness.
Such situation will likely drive Hezbollah toward a greater dependence on a decentralization framework, particularly in military operations management. This assumption is supported by several key considerations and factors. Firstly, a significant strength of Hezbollah has been its long-standing reliance on the ‘decentralization’ model for orchestrating combat operations throughout its history of engagements with Israel. Secondly, numerous sources close to the party have highlighted in recent years that Hezbollah has been intensifying its efforts to train and empower the second and third tiers of fighters as part of the restructuring of the Jihad Council. Thirdly, current indicators suggest that the party is leaning towards decentralization at the military level, evidenced by a series of operations targeting deep Israeli positions following the assassination of Nasrallah and continuing to this day and the increasing effectiveness of Hezbollah’s fighters in countering ground incursions by elite Israeli forces (a fact even recognized by Hebrew media). Fourthly, Hezbollah’s specialized units stationed in the south each have a local commander who enjoys autonomy in managing direct combat engagements and crafting strategies based on their military assessments and evolving conditions on the ground. Fifthly, it’s important to note that Hezbollah initially developed from a network of decentralized military cells that operated in the south for years, positioning it distinctively away from conventional armies that adhere to a rigid hierarchy and receive directives from a centralized military command structure.
2. Internal Restructuring of the Party: Hezbollah is likely to prioritize an internal restructuring of its leadership ranks, and several key pathways appear to be emerging. The first involves addressing the issue of the party’s ‘interim administration.’ Many analysts had indicated that Hashem Safieddine would be the next Secretary-General; however, following Israel’s announcement of his assassination, there are suggestions that Ibrahim Amine al-Sayyed, the head of the political council, may assume the role, or possibly Mohammad Yazbek. There’s also speculation that the party might delay announcing its new Secretary-General to avoid further targeting, especially given Iran’s indecision over this matter. The second pathway centers on the current main leaders within the party’s military council, primarily represented by Talal Hamieh, who oversees foreign operations, and Khalil Harb, or Abu Mustafa Harb, who has been a military advisor to Hassan Nasrallah for many years. Concurrently, the party is expected to focus on managing the combat front through two main strategies. The first is implementing an effective decentralized model that, according to the data, remains largely unaffected so far. The second strategy involves leveraging its military arsenal to intensify operations targeting the Israeli homeland, ensuring sustained pressure on the Israeli front.
3. Addressing the Security Breach Crisis: The ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has exposed a significant security breach within the party. In this regard, several key hypotheses arise: 1), this breach may be technological, reminiscent of the Pager bombings; 2) reports suggest Israel may have recruited a network of agents in southern Lebanon; and 3), some analyses point to Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, alongside Iranian and Syrian forces, as facilitating the exposure of its military leaders and communications network. Seemingly, these factors have collectively contributed to a deep structural crisis within the party, pushing Hezbollah to focus on containing and mitigating the security flaw that led to this breach, at least temporarily, until more favorable conditions allow for a comprehensive solution.
In conclusion, while Hezbollah has endured unprecedented military strikes and targeted assassinations in recent weeks and months, resulting in notable negative repercussions, this does not imply that the party has become militarily ineffective, nor that its ground operations have been completely halted. Hezbollah’s resilience can be attributed to several reasons. First, the party relies on a decentralized military structure. Second, its military arsenal, according to some Western reports, remains largely unaffected. Third, there is a deeply held conviction among its fighters that they are engaged in an existential fight, especially as Israel’s campaign has shifted from a strategic withdrawal of Hezbollah from north of the Litani to seeking the dismantling of Hezbollah. This has ignited a strong sense of vengeance among the party’s forces.
