As the US presidential election draws closer, the United States grapples with significant economic, social, and political challenges that will be pivotal in deciding whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will assume the presidency. Traditionally, American voters focus more on domestic matters, with illegal immigration, inflation, and economic growth at the forefront of current concerns. While foreign policy generally attracts less attention except in cases directly impacting US interests, the ongoing Israeli conflict with Gaza and Lebanon—and the potential escalation into a wider regional war—elevates the Middle East as a pivotal force shaping electoral dynamics and as a primary region affected by the results.
Against this, this paper examines how developments in the region may influence voter priorities and the policy directions each candidate might pursue.
The Middle East’s Impact on US Presidential Race
Strategic interests have long positioned the Middle East as a core region in US foreign policy, including safeguarding the uninterrupted flow of energy through key maritime routes, guaranteeing Israel’s security as Washington’s foremost ally in the region, countering terrorist groups and Iranian influence, hindering Iran’s nuclear ambitions, limiting the expanding influence of China and Russia, and backing regional allies. Yet, despite the fundamental importance of these issues to American interests, they have rarely influenced voter behavior. The recent intensification of tensions linked to the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts, however, has shifted these concerns to the forefront of election campaigns for Democratic and Republican candidates, becoming a key consideration for voters
The prominent focus on the Middle East within the American political discourse around the presidential elections is tied to how regional events can sway certain domestic voter blocs that, while relatively small, wield decisive power. Among these are the Jewish community, estimated at between 5.5 and 8 million individuals, who hold the sway to influence outcomes in key swing states like Pennsylvania and Nevada, where they form a notably higher-than-average share of the electorate. Additionally, some American citizens residing in Israel also participate in the elections, further underscoring this group’s strategic significance
Also significant is the bloc of Arab and Muslim Americans, comprising over 2.5 million registered voters, with notable concentrations in wing states like Michigan and Georgia. Michigan, with its 15 electoral college votes, is particularly impactful in swaying the election outcome, holding the largest Arab American population (211,405) and one of the highest Muslim populations nationwide; it is also uniquely the only US state with a Muslim-majority community. Traditionally, Muslim and Arab American voters have favored Democrats since 2004, and while their numbers are modest, their strong presence in Michigan makes them a crucial factor in the state’s presidential race. Polls reveal close alignment between their support for Trump and Harris at 42% and 41%, respectively, underscoring the heightened importance of their votes in determining which candidate can secure the narrow margin needed for an electoral victory.
These electoral dynamics have brought Middle Eastern events to the forefront of election debates, compelling the Biden administration to closely monitor regional developments with apprehension, weary that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s drive to capitalize on the current situation—aiming to reshape regional geopolitics in a way that cements Israeli dominance while sidelining Iran from the circle of regional powers—could spark a comprehensive conflict with Iran, thereby disrupting the administration’s strategic plans and compelling it to make reactive decisions that might entangle the United States in a new Middle Eastern war it has diligently worked to avoid.
A war of this scale would profoundly impact the US interior, with expected spikes in energy prices, inflation, and pressures on labor markets—issues that are always pivotal in American election campaigns. As such, Biden is keen to avoid an oil crisis just weeks before the elections, wary that voters—and his rival, Donald Trump—might blame Democrats for mismanaging Middle Eastern issues and pursuing misguided policies. Such backlash could drive undecided voters away from supporting Kamala Harris and instead favor Trump’s re-election, a scenario that aligns with Netanyahu’s preferences. Nonetheless, beyond the domestic impact of the Middle Eastern conflict, its way over voter choices remains limited, with Americans primarily focused on issues such as the economy, abortion rights, immigration, climate change, and democratic governance.
The Biden administration exerted significant pressure on Netanyahu to restrain Israel’s response to the Iranian ballistic missile attacks on October 1, mindful of the potential influence on the US presidential race. Reports from The Washington Post, citing informed officials, indicate that Netanyahu responded to Biden’s appeal, assuring the united States that any Israeli retaliation would be limited to military infrastructure, steering clear of nuclear and energy sites to avoid the impression of meddling in American elections. Striking Iranian oil facilities could drive up global energy prices, while an attack on the nuclear program might dismantle the few remaining restrictions on the Israeli-Iranian conflict, increasing the likelihood of deeper US military engagement in the region.
In contrast, Trump is poised to capitalize on any lapse in the Democratic administration’s control over current events, intensifying his critique of Biden’s foreign policy by attributing global instability to the Democrats. He argues that the peace and stability his administration brought to the Middle East are unraveling under Biden’s leadership, accusing Biden and Harris of allowing regional tensions to spiral out of control and edging the United States closer to another foreign conflict—an issue now resonating with American voters. This stance allows Trump to reinforce his image as a leader who achieved Middle Eastern peace by countering Iran through a “maximum pressure” policy and establishing a regional security framework that included Israel’s integration within its Arab neighbors via the Abraham Accords, thereby re-introducing himself as a “strong and decisive leader” in stark contrast to a “weak, conciliatory administration” to draw in undecided voters who prioritize national security.
In any case, the ongoing Middle East crisis strengthens Trump’s appeal among pro-Israel voters, particularly given his past decisions like relocating the US embassy to Jerusalem and endorsing Netanyahu’s hardline policies. Trump remains largely unconcerned about Arab and Muslim voters due to his tough stance on immigration from Muslim-majority countries and unwavering support for Israel, often at the expense of a fair resolution for the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, Harris faces the delicate challenge of balancing support for Israel with the concerns of Muslim Americans, many of whom have been profoundly affected by the Gaza war and broader Middle Eastern tensions. This balancing act is especially significant in swing states like Michigan and Florida, where Arab and Muslim votes could be pivotal. However, it carries the risk of leaving both sides unsatisfied: Muslim voters may feel neither Trump nor Harris’s policies go far enough to protect Palestinian and Lebanese interests or halt Israeli aggression, while pro-Israel voters may view the Biden administration’s stance as hesitant and inadequate.
In Michigan, some Arab voters have shifted away from supporting Harris, choosing instead to back Trump or third-party candidates—not out of alignment with Trump’s policies, as his anti-Muslim stance and pro-Israel alignment make him an unappealing option, but rather as a form of protest against Harris and to penalize the Democratic administration. They hold the Democrats responsible for enabling the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and seek to assert their political influence, demonstrating their ability to sway future US elections, positioning themselves as a significant force in party calculations. Additionally, the Arab American Political Action Committee has announced it will not endorse either Harris or Trump—a groundbreaking stance for the committee, which has consistently supported Democrats since its establishment in 1998.
Prospective US Policies in the Middle East
While the Middle East can influence the American electoral landscape—albeit partially, given current dynamics—the countries in the region are keenly observing the outcome of the electoral race and who will be the new resident of the White House. The United States’ prevailing role in the international system means that the presidential elections are not merely a domestic concern; they carry global implications due to American foreign policy’s capacity to shape events in the Middle East and alter regional dynamics.
Thus, examining the approaches of Trump and Harris toward the region is of great importance. While Trump boasts a history of engagement from his earlier presidency (2017-2021), Harris has had limited involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, with her vice presidential duties mainly centering on domestic priorities. Consequently, observers predict that if Trump secures a second presidential term, his broader policy outlines will largely remain intact, albeit with modifications to tactics in light of new regional developments or the political lessons he has learned. In contrast, Harris is likely to adopt much of Biden’s existing policy framework concerning the Middle East. Below we explore the positions of both Trump and Harris on the key issues facing the region.
• The Palestinian Cause and the Conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon: Drawing on Trump’s previous years in office, his economic background, and his isolationist America First Agenda, it is anticipated that he will wholeheartedly support Israeli initiatives aimed at resolving the Palestinian cause once and for all. Trump may exert pressure on Netanyahu to move away from his favored approach of prolonged conflicts, which he views as a key strategy for reshaping the Middle East to align with Israeli interests. Additionally, he might extend guarantees and reassurances to his close ally Netanyahu regarding his political future and protection from legal repercussions, should the war conclude, all while backing Israel’s plans to evacuate the Gaza population and expand territorial control over Palestinian lands in both Gaza and the West Bank. Furthermore, Trump may reintroduce the concept of economic peace, presenting a revamped version of the previously proposed Deal of the Century that effectively negates the viability of an independent Palestinian state. Ideologically, Trump aligns with Netanyahu’s far-right government, which fundamentally opposes the notion of a two-state solution. The same approach extends to the conflict in Lebanon. Trump is expected to push Netanyahu to pursue Israeli objectives through precise, impactful, swift, and time-limited strikes, likely endorsing targeted Israeli military or intelligence actions against Iranian assets or high-profile assassinations of key political and military figures, while avoiding a full-scale confrontation that could necessitate the deployment of US ground forces or strain US military resources.
Alongside his political goals of steering clear of a regional conflict, scaling back US military presence in the Middle East, and projecting an image of a strong leader adept at handling regional tensions and promoting peace—since a drawn-out conflict could portray him as a weak American leader—Trump’s expected approach also signals a desire to curb the economic drain on the United States amid the more targeted allocation of resources to support Israel’s war efforts.
Harris is expected to continue Biden’s policy of unwavering support for Israel, sustaining the steady stream of US military assistance, and advocating for an end to prolonged conflicts in the Middle East. However, she will likely struggle to temper Israel’s aggressive drive to expand its fronts. Meanwhile, she is set to uphold the Democratic Party’s longstanding rhetoric advocating for the Palestinians’ right to statehood and humanitarian relief, all under a two-state solution framework. While this stance overlooks the current political and on-ground realities, it serves as a useful formula to maintain the current dynamics while concealing the lack of a complete, implementable Us approach for resolving the Palestinian cause.
• Iran’s Nuclear Program: Both Democrats and Republicans concur on the objective of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. However, Trump’s return to the White House would likely signal a revival of the maximum pressure approach on Iran, employing various methods such as tightening US sanctions, obstructing Iran’s ability to maintain any oil exports, and combining political, economic, and potentially military pressures to destabilize Iran’s position. In this scenario, the “snapback mechanism” could be triggered following “termination day” on October 18, 2025, marking the termination of Resolution 2231 and the Security Council closing Iran’s nuclear file and lifting sanctions. Iran would thus no lnger be under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Hence, activating the “snapback mechanism” would re-impose international sanctions automatically, circumventing any Russian or Chinese veto.
In addition to targeting and diminishing Iran’s regional influence, Trump will likely pressure Arab countries to avoid strengthening ties with Tehran and tacitly approve of assassinations of political and military figures, as well as affiliates of militias. His administration can reference Iran’s missile strikes on Israel, its provision of missiles and drones to Russia amid the Ukraine conflict, and the disruptive actions of its proxies that threaten global maritime security—all of which effectively undermine the prospects for reviving the nuclear agreement.
However, the election of Harris alongside the rise of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran suggests the potential for renewed negotiations. Pezeshkian has expressed a willingness to revive nuclear talks with the West, having received a green light from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This move appears to be part of a “tactical withdrawal” strategy, aimed at engaging the US administration and diverting its attention from backing Israeli strikes against Iran, although it is crucial to note that Netanyahu will likely exert considerable effort to sabotage this scenario.
• Turmoil in the Middle East including Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq: Crises in these countries appear to hold little weight on the US foreign policy agenda for the region when set against the backdrop of Israel’s security, the Iranian nuclear program, and the safeguarding of shipping routes. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have yet to devise a comprehensive, cohesive, and actionable strategy to tackle these crises, with their involvement largely confined to select areas. For instance, while Washington lacks a clear plan to resolve the Yemeni political turmoil, it remains primarily concerned with Houthi activities that threaten maritime safety in the Red Sea. A Harris-led administration is anticipated to perpetuate the existing US stance on Yemen, which aims to avoid further military escalation while minimizing direct US involvement in regional conflicts, all while maintaining a measure of deterrence against the Houthis through targeted airstrikes and their designation as Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entities (SDGT). Conversely, should Trump secure a victory, he is likely to return to his prior strategy of stopping the erosion of US military capabilities via airstrikes, while amplifying measures aimed at undermining adversaries, such as re-designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, curtailing humanitarian assistance to Yemen, and possibly endorsing precise Israeli strikes against Houthi assets.
Regarding Syria and Iraq, a Harris administration is likely to keep US troop levels in Syria steady while shifting and deploying forces in Iraq to bolster US military actions in eastern Syria. In contrast, a Trump-led administration may quickly seek to scale back US forces in both countries, particularly Syria. The second issue concerning Iraq involves sanctions waivers: while Harris might consider extending new waivers to facilitate Iraqi imports of Iranian energy to stabilize Iraq’s electricity supply, a Trump administration would likely be far less willing to issue waivers for Iranian energy imports, aiming instead to weaken Iran swiftly and decisively. In Libya, both administrations’ roles are expected to be limited to supporting European allies’ efforts and curtailing Russian influence.
• US Military Presence in the Middle East: The United States is set to maintain its military engagement in the Middle East, regardless of who will be the next president. However, under a Trump administration, there may be a gradual reduction in US military presence, contingent upon the conclusion of the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, a decrease in Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and a diminished threat to US assets in Iraq and Syria. Achieving this would necessitate efforts for a swift resolution to the ongoing wars, initiatives to foster closer ties between Israel and its neighbors, and a firm stance against the Iranian regime. Such measures would allow for a shift in focus towards addressing perceived threats to US interests in the region, particularly those stemming from rising Chinese and Russian influence, while redirecting military resources to the Indo-Pacific to confront China’s military capabilities.
• Relations with Regional Allies: Under a Trump administration, democracy and human rights are likely to take a backseat in favor of a more transactional, America First approach to foreign policy with Washington’s key regional allies. This would prioritize strategic bilateral deals, such as securing profitable military and economic agreements, while leveraging personal connections with regional leaders to potentially benefit Trump-owned business ventures, notably the Trump Organization.
Under a Harris-led administration, the current pragmatic approach to regional relations is expected to continue, with democracy and human rights issues rising or receding on the agenda based on US political and security interests. These issues may be deprioritized when extensive cooperation is sought, but could serve as effective tools for leverage if Washington aims to push certain countries toward favorable policies. Additionally, the next administration, whether Democratic or Republican, is likely to pursue the ongoing security negotiations with Saudi Arabia initiated by the Biden administration, which include provisions for Saudi access to advanced American weaponry, civilian nuclear technology, and cutting-edge technologies in exchange for security assurances linked to the Kingdom’s defense needs. Trump, however, may be more hesitant to offer explicit security guarantees, focusing instead on expanding arms sales to Riyadh.
• Saudi-Israeli Normalization: Both Republicans and Democrats agree that normalizing diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia would bring greater stability to the Middle East, curb the Iranian threat, and restrict Chinese and Russian influence in the region. The next administration will likely build on Biden’s efforts to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords, although this will hinge on the resolution of the Gaza conflict and advances in the Palestinian situation, or on Washington’s ability to persuade Saudi Arabia to decouple these issues—though this remains a challenging prospect. A second Trump term would likely ramp up diplomatic pressure and incentives to expedite Saudi-Israeli normalization, aiming to solidify his legacy of promoting Arab-Israeli reconciliation initiated in his first term.
In short, the foreign policy course of the forthcoming US administration will ultimately be shaped by evolving political dynamics and developments within the Middle East, often diverging from campaign rhetoric. Past examples speak volumes about this. Take George W. Bush as an example. He campaigned against foreign interventions justified by state-building and democratization, yet pursued extensive interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq upon taking office. Similarly, Joe Biden, who had vowed to isolate Saudi Arabia, later moved to strengthen relations, including a visit to the Kingdom and efforts toward a security agreement. This leaves space for divergence and flexibility beyond standard expectations, though it’s essential to recognize that US foreign policy in the Middle East follows enduring principles, interests, and guidelines, irrespective of whether a Republican or Democratic administration is in power. As such, US policy generally shows continuity, with changes primarily in the methods used, reflecting each president’s unique outlook. Moreover, American policy tends to be institutional rather than personal, except in certain cases like Trump, whose unpredictability complicates any attempts to forecast his political approach to the region.
