The fallout from the Russia-Ukraine conflict has reverberated across various geostrategic domains, creating secondary fronts parallel to the primary combat zones. At the forefront is the Black Sea region, a vital hub for energy supply routes, global trade—especially grain exports—and significant energy reserves, particularly natural gas. Its geographic connection to the Eastern Mediterranean further positions it as a key arena in regional and international maritime competition.
Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Black Sea region has seen growing militarization, driven by the pragmatic strategies of key powers tasked with securing the Black Sea. Several factors shape this landscape, including Russia’s view of the Black Sea as a critical sphere tied to its status as a “maritime superpower,” reinforced by its annexation of Crimea, its military presence in Moldova’s separatist Transnistria region, and its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following their breakaway from Georgia. Turkey, meanwhile, positions itself as a leading actor in ensuring Black Sea security, while NATO regards the region as strategically vital.
Ukraine, a Black Sea littoral state heavily reliant on the Black Sea, faced a Russian naval blockade early in the war. In response, it targeted Russia’s fleet, inflicting significant losses and forcing its retreat. NATO members Bulgaria and Romania have bolstered their defense capabilities and supported the Alliance’s efforts to aid Ukraine, though their involvement has sparked domestic tensions. Beyond the war’s immediate impact, the region has seen deepened partnerships, particularly in energy and trade, under initiatives like the Three Seas Initiative (SI3), launched in 2015, which unites around 13 countries along the Black Sea, Adriatic, and Baltic Seas.
This article aims to dissect the evolving dynamics in the Black Sea region in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting how the conflict has triggered a series of major shifts across political, economic, and security domains—resulting in a reconfiguration of regional interests and power relations, manifested in the following key trends:
1. Depleting and Neutralizing Adversaries: Following the Russia-Ukraine war’s outbreak and the imposition of a naval blockade, Ukraine, with approximately 1,300 kilometers of Black Sea coast, intensified its targeting of Russian naval forces stationed in the Black Sea, despite inferior naval capabilities. This led to a sustained war of attrition against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, driven by continuous Ukrainian attacks using upgraded maritime drones and anti-ship missiles to destroy as many Russian vessels as possible. Between February 2022 and June 2024, for instance, Russian naval forces in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and open waters endured around 42 attacks, leading to the destruction of approximately 22 ships and boats and damage to about 20 others, including some irreparable.
In retaliation for Russian gains in eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces sank the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship missile cruiser Moskva in April 2022 with Neptune anti-ship missiles, after destroying the amphibious landing ship Saratov. October 2022 marked a turning point in the Black Sea conflict, as naval drones joined the battlefield. Ukraine’s military intelligence deployed systems like the MAGURA V5, which sank the Russian missile corvette Ivanovets in February 2024, and the long-range Sea Baby drone to shift the dynamics at sea. These strikes also extended to high-profile targets including the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s command headquarters, the Sevastopol Shipyard, and the strategically vital Crimean Bridge.
As a result, Russia relocated its Black Sea Fleet to safer ports, including Novorossiysk, after losing nearly a third of its vessels. In a bid to strengthen its naval resilience and rebuild one of its four core fleets, Moscow also replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov with Northern Fleet commander Aleksandr Moiseyev as navy chief. The Black Sea Fleet is not only central to protecting Russia’s geostrategic interests but also plays a pivotal role in projecting power abroad—particularly in Syria, Libya, and the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, in October 2023, Abkhazia’s de facto leader Aslan Bzhania noted Russia’s intent to build a military base in Ochamchire, which Georgia’s Foreign Ministry condemned as a “flagrant violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Despite its naval setbacks, Russia maintains significant defensive and deterrent capabilities, with over 60 submarines and 42 surface ships capable of launching nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles, according to General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command (EUCOM), in a US Senate statement on April 3, 2025. Russia is further strengthening these capabilities, with President Vladimir Putin announcing on April 11, 2025, plans to invest approximately 8.4 trillion rubles (around $100 billion) in its naval forces over the next decade.
This reflects Moscow’s increasing focus on its naval power, which could play a central role in the coming period, aligning with Russian objectives to secure its vital interests and expand its operations in distant waters, now a key focus of Russian naval activity.
2. Expansion into Distant Waters: While Russia has worked to solidify its presence in nearby waters—boasting roughly 800 kilometers of Black Sea coast, bases in Georgia, Moldova, and Crimea, and naval collaboration with China via joint drills in the South China Sea, Sea of Japan, and Sea of Okhotsk, as part of the expansive Ocean 2024 exercises in 2024 spanning the Pacific, Arctic, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Caspian Seas—it has also pursued expansion into distant seas. This strategy seeks to evade Western containment in its critical maritime sphere and affirm its naval power status. To this end, Russia has demonstrated force in the Indian Ocean through partnerships with “friendly states,” conducting exercises like the Mosi-2 drill with China and South Africa in February 2023, its inaugural exercise with Myanmar in November 2023, and the historic docking of its ships at Bangladesh’s Chittagong port in the Bay of Bengal, marking a step toward broadening its Indian Ocean presence.
Moreover, in October 2024, Russia initiated the IMEX-2024 joint exercises in the Indian Ocean with Oman and Iran to foster “collective regional security, multilateral cooperation, and showcase goodwill and the capabilities needed to protect peace, friendship, and maritime security,” against the backdrop of Red Sea turmoil tied to the Israeli-Gaza conflict. Russia also dispatched Pacific Fleet vessels—elevated in importance amid the ongoing war and subject to surprise readiness inspections in April 2023 per President Putin’s orders to strengthen Russian fleets—to Indian Ocean coastal countries. The fleet also joined exercises with Indonesia in November 2024 and participated in the Komodo-25 drills in February 2025.
These moves were followed by the Maritime Security Belt exercises with China and Iran in March 2025 near Iran’s Chabahar port, part of a deepening trilateral alliance to address common security threats. These drills also served as an indirect response to Western and NATO movements, which now regard Moscow as a “threat to Euro-Atlantic security,” China as a “critical supporter” of Russia’s Ukraine war, and both as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security.” Between March 26 and April 10, 2025, Russian and Indian forces conducted the INDRA 2025 exercises. Russia persists in seeking a stable Red Sea presence, via Sudan or Eritrea, to ensure secure access to the Indian Ocean.
3. Reinforcing and Defining Spheres of Influence: Amid the escalating militarization of the Black Sea, NATO has undertaken a strategic reevaluation of its position and role in the Black Sea region to address perceived and emerging threats. This was articulated in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which noted that “Moscow’s military build-up, including in the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Sea regions, along with its military integration with Belarus, challenge our security and interests.” It further declared the Western Balkans and Black Sea region as strategically vital to the Alliance. To bolster its eastern flank, NATO established two multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, under Italian leadership, and Romania, under French leadership, effectively positioning the Black Sea as a potential arena for Russia-NATO confrontation, especially as the likelihood of clashes grows.
Russia, in turn, has sought to reassert its dominance in the Black Sea region, as detailed in its Maritime Doctrine revised in July 2022. The doctrine highlights the potential use of force as a last resort to protect Russia’s interests in key areas like the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Baltic Sea. Specifically for the Black Sea, Russia aims to “secure—under international maritime law—an advantageous international legal framework in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, establish protocols for exploiting marine biological resources, explore and develop hydrocarbon deposits, and construct and operate underwater pipelines.”
The doctrine also outlines strengthening the Black Sea Fleet’s capabilities and force structure, advancing its infrastructure in Crimea and along the Krasnodar coast, constructing competitive maritime transport ships, and outfitting the fleet with vessels suited for mixed (river-sea) navigation, besides developing a shipbuilding complex, encompassing the construction and repair of heavy-tonnage military and civilian ships, utilizing shipbuilding and repair facilities in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
As a result, Russia has found itself navigating a complex competitive landscape, seeking to reinforce its status while securing key maritime routes for energy and food shipments, alongside striving to maintain safe passage to the warm waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, especially given the erosion of its naval strength in the Black Sea, the progressive curtailment of its Baltic Sea influence, and the existential threats now confronting its Syrian bases since the collapse of the Assad regime.
Turkey, leveraging its strategic location and the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates civilian and military ship transit through the Turkish Straits, has seen its role in Black Sea affairs grow significantly since the war began. Ankara has adeptly used global conflicts to advance its interests, shaped by domestic political changes, regional ambitions, its role as a heavyweight in international crisis management, and its drive to expand its gains from the war, which served as a practical showcase of the pragmatic nature of Turkish foreign policy.
This pragmatism was evident in Turkey’s rejection of Black Sea militarization, even as it supported Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones and took part in upgrading Ukraine’s naval capabilities. Ankara also opposed Russia’s annexation policies—particularly in Crimea—citing its concern for the Crimean Tatars, a community it views as a priority, alongside its broader support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Nonetheless, Turkey avoided aligning with Western sanctions to isolate Russia, securing continued Russian energy flows.
Under its “Turkey First” approach, Ankara postponed endorsing Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession until obtaining political and military gains, such as F-16 aircraft in February 2024. Alongside NATO allies, Turkey contributed to multinational battlegroup operations in Bulgaria and Romania. However, it drew criticism for preventing two British minehunter ships from transiting the Black Sea to Ukraine in January 2024, despite their defensive purpose, as highlighted by former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis.
Through these moves, Turkey has established itself as a central player in Black Sea security, not merely as a coastal state but through the intricate network of interests it has built during the war, ensuring its pivotal role in future Black Sea arrangements. This was demonstrated by its hosting of a military meeting on April 15-16, 2025, with representatives from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine to address Black Sea security. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy outlined its significance, noting: “This is a military meeting on security in the Black Sea, first of all, a coalition of the willing, appropriate steps. This is not about ending the war, this is about what will happen after the ceasefire – security guarantees.”
4. Mitigating the War’s Fallout: The Black Sea region has seen multiple attempts to mitigate the rising dangers of the Russia-Ukraine war on global trade pathways. Notably, Turkey, working with the United Nations, spearheaded a temporary ceasefire to revive grain exports through the Black Sea. Active from July 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative enabled the export of about 33 million tons of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs until Russia’s unilateral exit in July 2023, citing Western restrictions on its own grain and food exports.
To address the increasing hazard of drifting sea mines in the Black Sea, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria signed a security pact in January 2024 to tackle these risks. They established a joint task force, funded by the three countries, to counter mines in the Black Sea, with the goal of safeguarding maritime shipping routes without any country being targeted. This effort operates independently of NATO’s regional activities. According to the pact, the task force includes three mine-countermeasure vessels and a command vessel, tasked with conducting at least two deployments every six months under rotating command, with each mission lasting roughly 15 days.
As the war persists without resolution, the Black Sea’s centrality has also emerged in technical-level discussions held separately between US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials in Riyadh from March 23 to 25, 2025, to pave the way for a final war settlement. Following these talks, the White House announced an agreement between the warring parties to “ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea, in addition to banning strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine.” In a separate but aligned White House statement on the temporary Black Sea truce, it was noted that the United States would “ help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.”
Russia responded with conditional approval. While Kirill Dmitriev, Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy on Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, described the talks’ outcomes as “a major shift toward peace, enhanced global food security, and essential grain supplies for over 100 million additional people,” Moscow tied its commitment to the agreement to the lifting of US sanctions. Three days after the announcement, Kremlin spokesperson said that an integral part of the Black Sea initiative is the removal of sanctions and restrictions related to its agricultural and food trade. He added, “European countries’ reluctance to lift sanctions on Moscow signals their unwillingness to pursue peace.”
5. Gauging Preparedness for Collective Defense: The Russia-Ukraine war has redefined security threats in the Black Sea region and reshaped NATO’s role, as the area has become a renewed focal point of strategic interest—not only for the Alliance itself but also for Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. This is reflected in NATO’s ongoing annual exercises, involving regional states to boost force readiness and evaluate their ability to counter modern warfare scenarios. A prime example is the tenth edition of the Sea Shield-25 exercises, led by Romania, with its 245-kilometer Black Sea coast. The drills included about 2,600 personnel from 12 NATO countries, such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, with approximately 1,600 Romanian troops. The Romanian Navy labeled it “the most complex event it has conducted.” To test the allies’ ability to respond to threats emerging from the war, the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group took part in the drills, alongside specialized units in radiological, nuclear, chemical, and biological defense, as well as combat divers.
Beyond supporting NATO’s collective defense framework, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have prioritized upgrading their own defense capabilities. Bulgaria, for instance, modernized its air and naval defenses, pledging 2% of its GDP to defense spending. Romania committed to raising its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP, enhancing its navy to meet current threats. This has been manifested in acquiring two minehunter vessels from the United Kingdom in September 2023, investing around $2.7 billion to expand the Mihail Kogqlniceanu airbase, and hosting US forces, which grew from 1,000 troops in January 2022 to roughly 3,000 by June 2023, strengthening deterrence and threat response.
Turkey, NATO’s second-largest military force, increased its defense budget and bolstered its armed forces, consisting of about 775,000 personnel, 92 ships, 1,900 tanks, 3,100 artillery systems, and 850 aircraft, relying on its domestic industry while diversifying arms and air defense acquisitions. Turkey also joined Germany’s European Sky Shield initiative in February 2024, enabling the purchase of non-European systems like US Patriot and Israeli Arrow-3 missiles. Turkey’s Defense Minister called this “a significant step toward addressing NATO’s requirements.”
Notably, NATO allies in the region enhancing their defense capabilities and safeguarding security interests may pave the way for energy cooperation. This is driven by the move to phase out Russian energy, Turkey’s goal to become a regional energy hub, the region’s key role in energy transit to Europe, and its substantial energy reserves. An October 2023 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report, titled Troubled Waters – How Russia’s War In Ukraine Changes Black Sea Security, noted that Turkey estimates 710 billion cubic meters of gas in its exclusive economic zone, Romania holds 150-200 billion cubic meters, and Ukraine’s shelf may contain over 2 trillion cubic meters, based on initial projections.
This could explain Russia’s persistent attacks on Odessa to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Romania seeks to ramp up gas production, with the Neptun Deep offshore project launching drilling in the Black Sea in March 2025. According to Romania’s Ministry of Energy, the project could make Bucharest a “net gas exporter,” though—though no details have been released about likely export volumes, especially given the possibility of rising domestic demand. On a parallel front, Turkey announced in April 2025 that it is working on an agreement to secure an exploration deal off Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast.
In short, despite efforts by key stakeholders to ensure Black Sea security, these endeavors are fragmented and often competitive, raising the specter of increased conflict in the region, especially between Russia and Ukraine if the war drags on without a clear path to peace anytime soon. On another front, friction could spike between Russia and NATO’s Black Sea states—Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, bound by collective defense principles. Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey, tied by pragmatic ties and overlapping interests in several conflict zones, might channel their rivalry into backdoor confrontations elsewhere rather than the Black Sea itself. Still, that doesn’t rule out Russia pushing back against Turkey in the Black Sea, especially as Ankara ramps up its regional moves and eyes a bigger role in shaping Ukraine’s post-war future.
