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What is happening in the Middle East?

Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
Last updated: 2021/01/14 at 12:58 PM
Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
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The Middle East is a region of particular significance, being mired in endless conflicts and challenging dilemmas. These regional conflicts may take decades before a political solution looms on the horizon, which indicates it is difficult for the region to experience stability and security in the next stage.

The region was and will always be an arena for competition and conflict between international influential powers that solely seek their interests. Therefore, it is important to highlight the current situation in the region, the nature of the problems, and the extent to which they can be solved to evaluate the future course and pinpoint the limits of possible Egyptian moves in the face of these situations.

First: The Libyan conflict

The Libyan conflict has been ongoing for almost a decade without a political settlement appearing in sight. Tremendous endeavors were exerted for the sake of a political settlement, such as the Berlin Conference, the Cairo Declaration, and the host of political, economic, security, military, and constitutional meetings held throughout 2020 in Geneva, Tunisia, Morocco, Hurghada, and Cairo. However, the output of all these efforts did not result in tangible results to change the status quo.

The initial agreement announced by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General Stephanie Williams and agreed by the members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to set 24 December 2021 as the date for national elections is probably the only relatively good thing that has been achieved so far. However, the road to this future goal is full of obstacles and difficulties, which requires great efforts to overcome them.

Egypt is moving positively and effectively with all parties of the Libyan interior, the last of which was the meeting with a delegation from the Libyan south in Cairo on 22 December. Another important meeting is that of a high-level Egyptian delegation with Libyan political and military leaders in Tripoli on 27 December. 

However, the political scene in general is still tense, given the intensification of Turkish communication with Western Libyan officials, both inside Libya and in Ankara, suggesting that some parties are still trying to tip the scales in their favor beyond the Libyan public interest.

It is expected that the general efforts exerted to solve the Libyan conflict will continue in order to reach a political settlement for this crisis. In my opinion, reaching the elections of December 20211 will be related mainly to the ability to stop the intervention of some regional powers in the Libyan affair, as well as the stability of the security situation on all Libyan lands, particularly the removal of armed militias. These points cannot be easily achieved and there is no evidence that they can be ended in the coming period.

The recent Egyptian move toward the Libyan conflict has received the support of the Libyan public, parties of and leadership, which confirms the importance of continuing the Egyptian efforts and expanding the Egyptian fields of action in this crisis in the political, economic and security fields, as Libya is of supreme importance to Egypt’s national security.

Second: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

It is no longer surprising that the years-long negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have yielded no results, although they have recently resumed. The justifications given by some parties for not reaching acceptable solutions are now flimsy and illogical and they cannot put an end to the problem that the international community, whether intentionally or not, is still far from realizing its depth, vitality, and seriousness.

Sudan’s position is in line with Egypt’s. It is clear that Ethiopia is still adopting a strict and evasive approach and adhering to the same old and repeated positions. Moreover, Addis Ababa laid responsibility on Egypt and later interfered in Egypt’s internal affairs. This urged the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon the Ethiopian ambassador in Cairo to protest against the irresponsible recent statements made by the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dina Mufti. 

In spite of the events that have taken place in Ethiopia in recent weeks, in particular the developments in the situation in the Tigray region, Ethiopian leaders have been eager to assert that these events have not had a negative impact on the progress of the construction of the GERD and asserted that the second filling of the dam will be completed on schedule, in July 2021.

The negotiations led by the African Union several months ago on the GERD and the successive meetings it held with the three parties did not lead to a noticeable progress. At the same time that Egypt affirms Ethiopia’s right to development, provided that it does not affect Egyptian water rights and interests, and that all that Egypt aims at is to reach a fair, binding, balanced agreement that would achieve the common interests of the three countries.

There is no evidence so far that the African Union can succeed in reaching an acceptable settlement to this crisis, consequently, the issue may return to the Security Council, which is not expected to adopt any resolution. The Security Council may refer to the African Union again, which clearly has no possibility of resolving this crisis.

Thus, Egypt has no way out but pursuing more bilateral coordination with Sudan on the one hand, and more collective coordination with other countries and parties on the other, in order to pressure Ethiopia to accept a binding and fair agreement for all parties. In any case, Egypt has to stick to its stated decisive position that water for Egypt is a matter of life and death, and that Egyptians will not allow anyone to deprive them from their share of water, and that Egypt has every right to defend its vital interests.

Third: The Palestinian cause 

Progress on the Palestinian issue may not be raised in the foreseeable future, especially given the continuing internal obstacles to ending the split, the long-stalled political negotiations, and Israel’s will not to move the peace process.

President Trump’s unfair “deal of the century” ended any hopes for progress on this pivotal Arab issue. This plan merely shifted the US position from being a full partner to the role of the party biased towards Israel in an unprecedented way. 

Egypt, through its bilateral communication with the Palestinian Authority or with other relevant parties, is trying to find appropriate ways to resume the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. This effort may be helped by a relatively moderate attitude by the new US administration headed by Biden that contributes to reviving the peace process.

In a great development to the Palestinian cause, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas welcomed, on 2 January 2020, Islamic Hamas movement’s letter on ending internal Palestinian division and holding general elections in the Palestinian territories.

The message of the Palestinian presidency emphasized the importance of building strategic partnership through democratic elections with full proportional representation, and holding legislative, presidential and national elections in succession and interdependence, which could lead to positive results in reconciliation in case there is a political will of all parties, especially Hamas.

Egypt will always be the strongest and most important Arab country that is keen to move seriously and continuously in order to establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. 

On 6 January 2020, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry discussed in a phone call with his Israeli counterpart, Gabi Ashkenazi, means to coordinate the next meeting for the quartet group, which comprises Egypt, Germany, France, and Jordan, to revive the Palestinian peace process, in coordination with the US and all parties involved.

Fourth: Israel’s regional policy 

At no stage has Israel stopped carrying out all settlement measures that increase its control on the ground, especially in Jerusalem. Israel also still has a strict attitude toward the peace process. This is helped by the increase of extreme right-wing trends in Israeli society that block the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. 2021 may be the year Israel declares the annexation of the Jordan Valley region unless serious political negotiations stop it. 

It should be noted that, despite the COVID-19 crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in his fifth term, succeeded to sign unprecedented agreements to normalize Israeli relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Other Arab and Islamic countries shall follow, as President Joe Biden’s administration will be keen to continue this trend; however, it can take place at a slower pace.

The Israeli internal situation saw a new development during the last days, which is voting on dissolving the current Knesset and agreeing on the date of parliamentary elections on 23 March to be the fourth elections in two years. This shall have some negative consequences. The most important of which is the further bloc of the right and the extreme right in the face of the left and the center left, in addition to postponing any moves in the peace process in the Middle East until a new Israeli government is formed.

Fifth: The Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean region is still swinging between stability and tension, especially as each party tries to benefit from gas discoveries and agreements as a basis for further strengthening its regional position. This suggests that this region will be one of the most important zones of conflict and regional and international competition during the next phase.

Turkey seeks to have an effective role in the Eastern Mediterranean, regardless of the nature of such movements, whether legitimate or illegal, especially in the exclusive economic zone of Greece and Cyprus. 

Turkey also seeks to enjoy the biggest regional weight in the field of gas transport and exports to Europe. Ankara also continues carrying out some military exercises in an attempt to stabilize its presence in this region, and assert that it possesses the elements of power that allow it to be illegitimately present by force in some areas.

One of the most important reasons for Turkey to expand its sphere of movement not only in the Eastern Mediterranean region, but also by the presence and interference in the affairs of many states in different regions, is that the European side has not yet been able to curb  Turkey’s ambitions by imposing sanctions on it. Moreover, President Trump’s sanctions on Turkey, particularly in the defense industry, are not sufficiently effective. In my opinion, there may be some severe changes in Washington’s policy toward Turkey under the new democratic US president’s administration, in case Turkey does not change its policies.

Sixth: The Gulf reconciliation

The Gulf reconciliation agreement, sealed at the Al-Ula summit held in Saudi Arabia on 5 January, represents an important step toward solving the disagreements between the Gulf countries on the one hand and Qatar on the other in the field of Gulf reunification and unity in the face of the dangers facing these countries, including the Iranian risks.

Egypt supports any Arab reconciliation, be it its main sponsor or one of its parties. Likewise, Egypt supports the Gulf reconciliation. 

Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry signed the Al-Ula agreement for Arab reconciliation with Qatar, which was signed by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states during the 41st GCC summit held on 5 January in Saudi Arabia. “This comes within the framework of Egypt’s constant keenness to achieve solidarity among the Arab Quartet states and in their orientation towards consolidating ranks and removing any disagreements among brotherly Arab nations,” the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Egypt will undoubtedly continue to pursue a balanced and moderate policy in its relations with all states at the regional and international levels, provided that such relations are based on the foundations of mutual respect and rejection of any interference from any state in Egypt’s internal affairs. Egypt will never compromise its security and sovereignty.

Seventh: The Iran conflict

Iran has stepped up its position vis-à-vis President Donald Trump’s administration since his withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Although the US imposed more sanctions on the Iranian regime, Tehran has recently decided to resume uranium enrichment by 20 percent at its underground Fordow nuclear facility. Furthermore, Iran uses its agents in the region, especially the Houthis in Yemen, who did not stop threatening the Saudi national security and launching missiles and drones against major Saudi targets.

Iran has tried to send a message to the new US administration that it is ready to cooperate with it in calming the situation in the region, especially as all indications point that President Biden’s administration will deal with Iran in a different way than Trump’s. Washington may return to the (conditional) involvement in the nuclear deal once again, which will affect the security of the entire region. 

In the first months of President Biden’s term, Iran will ensure that it does not launch provocative actions that will lead Washington to make stricter its response, and will anticipate the positive steps that the US can take toward it, particularly the unconditional return of the nuclear deal that it does not accept. Then, it will determine its policy in the light of the determinants of the US position toward it.

The new US administration and the situation in the region

The assumption of a new democratic administration in the United States is one of the major variables that has taken place during the recent period. This variable will have obvious effects in varying degrees on the crises, conflicts and situations of the region referred to during the next phase. In this area, it is important to clarify the following six points:

The first point is that the new US administration, whatever its concerns and priorities, will engage in the Middle East even through a step-by-step approach so that this region will not be left with more Russian and Chinese political, economic and military influence, given President Biden administration’s attention to terrorism and the situation in the Red Sea and Yemen.

The second point is that the situation in Iran and Turkey will be a priority for US concerns in the Middle East. The US will deal with Iran less sharply but its ultimate goal remains that Iran does not possess a nuclear weapon.

The third point is that President Biden’s administration will not leave Turkey moving with the same aspirations that it currently has in many parts of the world, and will seek to curb its influence through negotiations. 

The fourth point is that there will be crises that will see gradual US intervention in coordination with the concerned parties, the most important of which is the Libyan conflict, the GERD, the Palestinian cause. The Biden administration will make sure that it adopts its own path toward these crises, especially with regard to the Palestinian cause.

The fifth point is that the new US administration will be keen on supporting relations with the Gulf countries, and emphasizing the necessity of maintaining its security in the face of the Iranian threats, while continuing to support the recent Gulf reconciliation. Washington will also be keen to deal quietly at the beginning with any disagreements that may be raised with any Gulf country.

The sixth point is that the Biden administration will encourage Israel to sign normalization agreements with more Arab states. The US position against Israeli settlement policies will not change, while maintaining the main determinants of Israeli security.

Egyptian moves toward the region’s crises

With regard to the regional crises, Egypt is making its moves with the following in mind:

  • Egypt has a clear and specific map of regional interests and knows exactly how to deal with them in an appropriate and timely fashion.
  • Egypt carefully calculates its involvement in the region’s crises in order to preserve its vital interests.
  • Egypt has formulated the principles and foundations of its foreign policy based on the principle of balance in its regional relations, and it will continue to strongly reject, under any circumstances, any interference in its internal affairs or compromising its security.
  • Egypt holds firm and unchanging positions on the three main issues under its direct national security: the GERD, the Palestinian cause, and the Libyan conflict. Egypt will continue to move actively toward these issues in the next stage. The GERD will be the first and most urgent issue that Egypt will focus on resolving as soon as possible.

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TAGGED: Egypt, GERD, Gulf, Israel, Libya, Middle East, Palestine
Gen. Mohamed Eldewery January 14, 2021
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Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
By Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
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