It has become fairly obvious that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations don’t seem to move forward. The latest outcomes of the long-running negotiations have made every close observer come to one inevitable conclusion: there hasn’t appeared any game changer that would lead to a definitive resolution of this decade-old crisis that started on 4 April 2011 with Ethiopia beginning the construction of dam.
The tripartite negotiations that brought together the three concerned countries – particularly those subsequent to the Declaration of Principles on the GERD on 23 March 2015, followed by mediation efforts by the US and World Bank starting on 6 November 2019, and the recent mediation by the African Union – have reached a deadlock, with Ethiopia looking the other way and unilaterally deciding to fill the dam’s reservoir mid-2020 with 4.9 billion cubic meters, without reaching a legally binding agreement with Egypt and Sudan.
And just as Ethiopia’s behavior caused current negotiations on the GERD to reach an impasse and blocked any progress, after the unsuccessful mediation by the African Union during the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, Ethiopia seems to be heading down a not very dissimilar path as is evidenced by its unilateral announcement of filling the dam for the second time with 13 billion cubic meters within the few upcoming months, ending having 18 billion cubic meters behind the dam, playing fast and loose without any agreement with Egypt and Sudan.
Against this background, a fundamental question is brought to the forefront: what measures will Egypt and Sudan, jointly or separately, take if Ethiopia kept digging in and maintained its intransigent stance? And how to level the playing field to reach the desired solution, namely, reaching a comprehensive binding agreement on rules for filling and operating the dam pursuant to the binding Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum six years ago which Ethiopia is interpreting to its favor electing of its articles what it sees fit (ignoring, for instance, Article 5 on the Principle of Cooperation in Filling and Management of the Dam)?
While many see the recent events bring no new changes, I do have a different opinion and wouldn’t be making a mountain out of a molehill if I said there do exist new important variables that –if taken advantage of – could press Ethiopia hard to show flexibility in its negotiating position and respond to the Egyptian and Sudanese demands so as to overcome this critical crisis that – if continued to exist – will be a dire threat to regional security and stability.
Now, without going into the technical and legal aspects, I would like to highlight three major factors that affect the dam’s crisis trajectory. These factors primarily relates to the positions and policies articulated by officials from Egypt and Sudan including:
- Factor one: The Egyptian political leadership’s firming up on negotiations as the ideal way to resolve this crisis, and reiterating the necessity of reaching a legal and binding agreement before the next wet season securing the downstream countries’ share in the Nile water. However, the Egyptian leadership confirmed decisively that negotiations can’t continue forever, meaning there is a time limit that shouldn’t be exceeded.
- Factor two: The positive unprecedented about-turn in the Sudanese position. Sudan came to see the second filling of the reservoir threatening to its national security and it also refuses Ethiopia’s policy of fait accompli.
- Factor three: The recent growing Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement and collaboration on the highest political, military, and economic levels and building a unified position on many strategic issues, particularly their unified position on the second filling of the dam’s reservoir without Ethiopia reaching an agreement with them.
Therefore, we have two peas in the dam’s pod, Egypt and Sudan, with a unified stance adopting a constructive political vision substantially favoring resumption of negotiations based on the eminently logical Sudanese proposal of forming an international mediation quartet comprising of the European Union, the United States, the United Nations, and the African Union (AU) under leadership of Felix Tshisekedi, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to chair and supervise negotiations.
And while Egypt and Sudan draw their line in the sand, Ethiopia’s position remains beyond logic. On one hand, Ethiopia wasn’t any ready to give concessions after dozens of negotiation sessions and rejects any intermediate solutions put forward by Egypt, Sudan, or mediators particularly the US and the International Bank. On the other hand, it objects to Sudan’s proposal of new mediation quartet, showing preference in presumption of AU mediation only, a mediator who – I believe – isn’t capable of achieving the intended outcomes, without, of course, giving short shrift to the African contributions.
Strangely enough, Ethiopia finds no abuse in its position and believes it can continue to use carte blanche to impose fait accompli policy, challenging, by this, not only Egypt and Sudan but the entire international community as well. Worse, Ethiopia is looking the other way as to the impacts of this crisis on the regional stability as well as world peace and isn’t taking the consequences quite seriously.
Hence, I call on the Ethiopian side to calmly re-evaluate their position and to be aware that overcoming this crisis is quite possible if Ethiopia doesn’t stick to this obstinate and unjustifiable refusal as negotiations can’t be taken as a face value when dealing with an existential dilemma related to the destiny of Egyptian and Sudanese future generations. When we talk about an existential dilemma, we can’t rule out any possibility.
I also ask the Ethiopian side to examine closely President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s declaration confirming that the Nile should be a source of coexistence, development, and cooperation not conflict. The Ethiopian regime should be aware that Egypt doesn’t stand against the Ethiopian economic development nor its construction of the dam but this shall be without impinging on the water rights of Egypt, a country whose 95% of its water supply comes from the Nile.
Given these circumstances, we are entering a risky stage, for which the countdown has started with Ethiopia pressing ahead with the second filling of the dam’s reservoir, turning a deaf ear to the legitimate demands of the two downstream countries. Egypt and Sudan no longer demand resumption of negotiations only but they further unified their position confirming that the second filling of the dam represent a direct threat to their national security which leaves Ethiopia with no choice but to settle this issue before the wet season that hopefully will bring more agreement not more tension that would eventually explode if no satisfactory solution that guarantees the interests of all parties is reached.
The time factor remains very critical, after all, particularly if we took into consideration that Ethiopia’s wet season lasts from June until September 2021, and Ethiopia plans to start the second filling of the reservoir next July; so, efforts should be focused on the following:
- Further strengthening the Egyptian-Sudanese coordination on their position on the GERD to bring about a unified stance as to the measures the two countries will take within the next few weeks before Ethiopia proceeds with the second filling of the reservoir. Such coordination shall go hand in hand with efforts to raise the issue regionally and internationally and confirming openness to negotiations.
- Calling for immediate and urgent international intervention for a new mediation to resume negotiations which Egypt and Sudan still prioritize for the stability of the region whiling backing the Sudanese proposal of forming an international mediation quartet. This position comes despite Ethiopia’s refusal of all outcomes of previous rounds of talks particularly the Washington Agreement where it left Egypt as its only signatory in February 2020.
Against this background, and given the limited time available before the wet season, Ethiopia needs to address the crisis differently taking into consideration three key points: not to take the risk and start the second filling of the reservoir; second, not to take Egypt’s and Sudan’s constructive position and their favoring of negotiations for granted; not to address the Renaissance Dam issue in the same way it addresses its internal affairs since the implications in both cases aren’t in the same ballpark.
