Over the course of a decade, Western countries dominated security policies in the Sahel countries, while China maintained close ties with these countries through trade, financial assistance, infrastructure development, and expanding cultural exchange programmes.
Beijing’s involvement was motivated primarily by economic factors, particularly the pursuit of mineral and resource extraction opportunities. Nonetheless, its need to protect its interests compelled it to engage in security affairs through military exchange and training programmes and contribute to United Nations missions, and to increase arms sales. Add to this its active efforts in resolving numerous crises, as evidenced by the September 5 announcement by the Chinese Ambassador to Niger, Jiang Feng, of China’s desire to mediate in resolving the Niger crisis, considering the complexity of the crisis, the divergent objectives of the parties involved, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the tense relationship between Niamey and Paris, and the regional clout of the military juntas in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
I. Why Is the Sahel Significant to Beijing?
China’s interest in West Africa and the Sahel in particular stems from a number of factors, the most important of which is the protection of its fundamental interests, which include mining lithium in Mali, fishing in Mauritania, oil exploration in Chad, and securing trade routes and access to oil and gas sources in Nigeria and Angola. Chinese businesses have been able to expand their presence in the region through joint projects, and their business engagement has changed to reflect the regional contexts on the ground. These economic interests are intertwined with other strategic dimensions associated with Chinese ambitions to establish a military base on the Atlantic coast, thereby endangering American and European interests in this region, in light of the worsening problems of illegal immigration, transnational organised crime, the escalation of terrorist group activities, and the wave of political instability caused by the spread of the coup contagion.
As a sign of a change in strategy, Beijing has increased its share of arms sales to the Sahel and revised its objectives in terms of forging new alliances and expanding its influence, especially in light of the decline of French influence in this region. Beijing endeavoured to achieve this through changes within the scope of its role in enhancing the military dimension, whether through the presence of private security companies or arms sales, especially with Senegal hosting the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2021, where security and defence issues were among the conference’s primary topics and numerous African countries requested China’s assistance and proactive participation in the Sahel’s fight against terrorism and organised cross-crime.
II. Indications of China’s Presence in the Sahel
Since countries in the Sahel possess a wide range of natural resources and wealth, Chinese influence in the region has taken many forms in order to guarantee access to these resources. Crude oil is Chad’s main export, and it goes to China, and since 2003, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been in charge of the country’s oil production and management. China has made significant investments in Niger’s oil sector and established the $4 billion Agadem-Cotonou oil pipeline project with the support of the PetroChina company. The project, which will connect the Agadem oil field in southern Niger with the Port of Cotonou in Benin, is thought to be both the longest crude oil pipeline to cross international borders between African countries and the country’s largest investment since its independence from France in 1960. The project’s primary objective is to reduce the logistical and security risks associated with transportation in the region. The pipeline, which is already more than 75 percent complete, was expected to begin commercial oil transport in late 2023 and process up to 300,000 tonnes of cargo, with a daily capacity of 90,000 barrels.
Additionally, China has started a number of infrastructure initiatives connected to uranium mining in Niger. For instance, the Nigerian government and the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) jointly manage a project in the Aziliq mine. Moreover, the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium recognised the critical need for lithium in the development of rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles and spent $130 million to acquire half of Mali’s Goulamina Lithium Project in 2021. Poly Hong Dong, a Chinese firm, is investing heavily in the Mauritian fishing industry and have funded a $200 million fish processing plant in the city of Nouadhibou.
China has also implemented projects to support local development in the interior of Sahel countries, including the Chad Diffa-N’Guigmi highway renewal project connecting Niger and Chad. Beijing has awarded Mali contracts worth over $11 billion to finance two significant railway projects. Additionally, the hydroelectric Kandadji Dam in Niger was constructed by Gezhouba Group Ltd., a Chinese firm. Moreover, China has participated in anti-terrorism efforts, contributing $45.56 million to the G5 Sahel’s (Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania) anti-terrorism operations in 2019. It provided Mali with military hardware worth over $9 million as part of the memorandum of understanding that the two countries signed in 2021, including weapons, ammunition, trucks, and transportation and security equipment.
III- Challenges China Faces
Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative is widely viewed favourably in the Sahel, it faces significant opposition due to Chinese companies’ lacklustre commitment to environmental sustainability standards and their continued engagement in environmentally damaging activities such as the expansion of illegal fishing, pollution of coastal areas, and the intensive exploration of rare earth minerals. Additionally, Chinese businesses do not demonstrate a strong commitment to social sustainability standards, which is resulting in conflicts with local communities in Sahel countries. There are also significant political dimensions that come to light, such as the long-term effects of Chinese companies’ participation in massive infrastructure projects, some of which provide a cover for corrupt practises while substantially increasing African countries’ already-heavy levels of debt.
In conclusion, it can be said that China was able to increase its presence in the Sahel by expanding its areas of collaboration with countries of the region in a way that served its fundamental interests in obtaining rare mineral resources and taking advantage of France’s departure by advancing its security strategy in light of the escalation of converging threats and the deteriorating insecurity. However, China still faces a number of challenges in the region, and the risks and instability associated with its investments and interests are high.
