Over the past few days, there has been a marked increase in the intensity and scope of Israel’s actions in Syria, manifesting in multiple dimensions. These include provocative remarks by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich of Israel’s hardline right-wing government, who indicated that the war in Gaza would continue until “Syria is dismantled,” alongside Israeli attacks on locations close to the Presidential Palace in Damascus, and claims of operations to safeguard the Druze community in Syria.
These developments have raised questions about underlying goals of Israel’s heightened aggression and how far it relates to the Turkish-Israeli competition for influence in shaping Syria’s future.
I. The Nature and Context of Israel’s Recent Escalation
Numerous critical signs have recently surfaced, collectively pointing to a major and perhaps unprecedented escalation by Israel on the Syrian front, particularly since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar Assad. Within this context, Israel has been advancing several narratives to legitimize its strikes on Syrian soil, including preventing “weapons” from falling into the hands of “radicals,” “safeguarding its borders,” “protecting and nurturing the Druze community,” and voicing apprehension about Turkey’s expanding influence. The key markers of Israel’s recent escalation can be summarized as follows:
1. Pursuit of Syria’s Fragmentation: Israeli Finance Minister and leader of the Religious Zionist Party, Bezalel Smotrich, stated days ago that Israel “will end this campaign when Syria is dismantled, Hezbollah is severely beaten, Iran is stripped of its nuclear threat, Gaza is cleansed of Hamas and hundreds of thousands of Gazans are on their way out of it to other countries, our hostages are returned, some to their homes and some to the graves of Israel.” Smotrich added that Israel must come out of this phase “stronger and more thriving,” to use his words.
It is important to highlight that the notion of “dividing Syria” is a longstanding, recurring theme in Israeli political thought. Israeli visions for Syria’s partition have consistently linked geographic boundaries with ethnic and racial minorities, especially the Kurdish and Druze communities. This approach may stem from the peculiarity of Israel as a state where political-geographic and cultural boundaries intersect. Numerous studies on the origins of the Israeli occupation argue that Israel established its ethnic boundaries before its political-geographic ones, rooted in Torah-based claims about the Land of Israel and Greater Israel, alongside pragmatic considerations driven by global power balances and the shifting dynamics of the Palestinian conflict. This gave rise to Israel’s adoption of the “ethnic borders” concept decades ago.
A clear indication of how firmly the idea of Syria’s partition is rooted in Israeli strategic thinking is Israel’s apparent conclusion, since 2011, that a fragmented Syria better aligns with its goals and aspirations than a unified one. This view was underscored in a 2015 study by the Institute for National Security Studies (a think tank with close ties to Israeli security apparatus), authored by Gideon Sa’ar (now Israel’s Foreign Minister) and Gabi Siboni. They indicated that fallout from Syria’s civil war had made the Syria known for decades a thing of the past, that reunification was no longer possible, and that partition was not only inevitable but also beneficial to all key players in the Syrian arena—including as a means to curtail the influence of Daesh.
2. Major Israeli Military Escalation: Starting on the night of May 2, the Israeli military has adopted diverse forms of escalation in Syria. It announced airstrikes on an area near the Presidential Palace in Damascus, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating on the same day that Israel targeted a site close to the Palace, renewing his pledge to protect the Druze minority. As part of this military escalation, Syria TV reported on May 2, that an Israeli drone killed four people in as-Suwayda governorate after they attempted to shoot it down. That same night, multiple Israeli airstrikes hit various Syrian regions, with some reports counting 18 strikes, eight of which targeted the capital, Damascus. On May 3, the Israeli military announced it was “deployed in southern Syria” and prepared to prevent what it described as “hostile forces” from entering or operating in southern regions.
These military maneuvers carry several significant signals. First, the airstrikes were markedly more intense than comparable Israeli operations over the preceding two months. Second, they seemed to prioritize political messaging over strictly military or security goals. Third, the strikes coincided with plans by Jaramana residents to hold a demonstration condemning Israel’s recent attacks on their city, indicating Israel’s simultaneous effort to project messages aimed at suppressing any resistance, even popular protests, against its military actions.
3. Heightened Israeli Exploitation of the Druze Narrative: The Druze minority has taken center stage in Israel’s discourse over the past few days, evident in several striking indicators. These include protests in Israel demanding protection for the Druze community in Syria, as well as a series of meetings and communications led by Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Druze in Israel, with Israeli officials. Notably, Tarif held an urgent security meeting with the commander of Israel’s Northern Command, pressing for guarantees of the “rights and dignity” of the Druze in Syria.
Additionally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a joint statement with Defense Minister Israel Katz, declared that “Israel will not allow (Syrian) forces to deploy south of Damascus or pose any threat to the Druze,” asserting that recent Israeli attacks were aimed at “protecting the Druze community.” During a security assessment session on the situation in Syria, attended by Netanyahu, Katz, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, Strategic Affairs of Israel Ron Dermer, director of the Israeli Security Agency (Shabak) Ronen Bar, and senior security officials, Tel Aviv decided to keep the Syrian front a top priority on its regional security agenda. The session discussed multiple plans to counter what Israel described as activities by hostile organizations threatening its military units in Syria and the border area, alongside strategies to ensure the protection of Syria’s Druze. Furthermore, Israel’s mini-security cabinet approved opening the border to allow injured Druze to receive treatment in Israeli hospitals, with 11 injured Druze transferred to Ziv Medical Center in Safed for medical care within 24 hours. These developments collectively reveal a sharp escalation in Israel’s leveraging of the Druze issue as a key justification for its operations and movements in Syria.
II. Dynamics of Israeli Calculations
Apart from Israel’s official narrative, which aims to provide justifications for its maneuvers and heightened escalation in Syria, it is clear that Israel’s recent actions signal the Syrian front’s gradual evolution into a central arena for its operations. These indicators also show that, following Assad’s overthrow, Israel has positioned itself as one of the foremost external players in the Syrian equation. It seems that Israel’s strategic motives in this arena currently hinge on several key considerations:
1. Preventing the Reconstruction of the Syrian State: Israel’s perspective on recent developments in Syria is rooted in the concept of “opportunity,” viewing these changes as a historic chance, despite the challenges they pose. It appears that Israel adopts an approach based on the idea that the longer Syria’s crises persist, the greater the fragmentation of the state, further weakening Syria and diminishing its capacity to engage in any systematic confrontation with Israel. Additionally, Israel seeks to create a state of incapacity within the new Syrian administration, hindering its ability to rebuild state institutions, in service of the same goal. It is evident that Israel seeks to replicate the Somalia model in Syria, perpetuating an endless war that leads to widespread chaos and keeps Syria entrenched among “failed states.”
2. A New Sykes–Picot in Syria: As highlighted earlier, the idea of dividing Syria is a long-standing, periodically revived Israeli ambition. The current circumstances in Syria, combined with the transformations following the overthrow of former President Assad, have opened substantial opportunities for Israel to pursue this goal. The Israeli vision seems to envision a Syria fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines, carved into four primary zones: an Alawite zone along the coast extending toward Damascus, a Sunni zone in the north and portions of the south, a Kurdish zone in the northeast, and a Druze-Israeli zone in the south. This scenario would yield numerous benefits for Israel, particularly by strengthening its foothold in Syria. It would also create weak regions incapable of challenging Israel or posing any threats against it, while enabling Israel to forge robust ties with certain Syrian factions. Israel is likely to leverage economic support, military assistance, and international recognition as tools to bolster these factions.
3. Neutralizing Security Threats from Syria: Despite the assurances from the new Syrian administration to the United States and the international community that its territory would not be used as a platform to threaten the security of other countries, as well as the positive messages directed specifically toward Israel on multiple occasions, Israel remains focused on neutralizing any potential security threats emanating from Syria. Israel’s primary security concerns include fears of Iran reestablishing its presence in Syria, the jihadist background of the new Syrian administration, and the proliferation of armed and terrorist groups, such as Daesh, within Syria. Consequently, Israel’s actions have primarily aimed at securing its northern borders by establishing a buffer zone free of any military threats. It appears that Israel is keen to avoid a scenario resembling Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon along the Golan Heights. In other words, Israel seeks a southern Syrian region completely demilitarized, devoid of rockets, artillery, or heavy military formations near its borders.
4. Competition for Influence with Turkey: Since the ousting of Assad, Israeli officials have openly expressed concerns about “Syria shifting from Iran’s sphere of influence to Turkey’s, with Turkey filling the vacuum left by Iran’s withdrawal.” Consequently, Israel has targeted several bases reportedly intended by the new Syrian administration to be managed with Turkish support. Despite talks between Turkish and Israeli officials in Azerbaijan aimed at establishing mechanisms to avoid clashes in Syria, Israel’s apprehensions about Turkish influence persist, driven by several key considerations.
First, Israel views Syria’s strategic and geopolitical significance as an opportunity to reshape the rules of engagement and influence in the broader regional landscape, particularly among neighboring states. Second, Israel hypothesizes that Turkey’s role in rehabilitating Syria, especially its security and military institutions, combined with the jihadist leanings of the new Syrian administration, could pose a long-term strategic threat to Israeli national security. Third, amid current and potential future tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations, Turkey might resort to proxy warfare against Israel by encouraging certain Syrian groups to launch attacks against the Jewish state. Fourth, the differing approaches of Tel Aviv and Ankara toward Syria exacerbate tensions: while Tel Aviv perceives Syria as a threat, Ankara—especially following the recent agreement between the current Syrian administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Syrian Democratic Forces under Mazloum Abdi—leans toward maintaining Syria as a unified region governed by a regime closely aligned with Ankara. This stance conflicts with Israel’s actions, which simultaneously seek to expand influence and control in southern Syria while encouraging separatist tendencies within the country. As a result, this dynamic fuels a geopolitical struggle for influence between the two sides.
In essence, Israel’s recent political and military moves in Syria reflect its bid to assert dominance in the Syrian landscape, taking advantage of the shifts that have occurred since the fall of former President Assad. These moves reveal Israel’s broader strategy toward Syria—one centered on advancing a vision of “partition.” To that end, Israel exploits the deepening ethnic and sectarian divisions within the country, which are compounded by the fraught path of transitional justice under the new regime in Damascus, alongside widespread institutional and security breakdowns and the lack of a cohesive national state structure.
