While the war Israel and the US launched against Iran has not included a “ground” component so far, if we exclude the US use of M142 HIMARS missiles launched from the Gulf countries close to Iran, recent developments point to two main trajectories.
The first is that the confrontation is likely to last considerably longer than the US and Israel had anticipated. The second is that the chances of some sort of US, or possibly joint US-Israeli, ground operation are increasingly serious.
A prospective US incursion into Iranian territory is connected to a crucial issue: freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Recent days have seen an intensification of US-Israeli bombardments of naval arms productions sites, wharfs, and vessels within major bases, especially in southern Iran.
This appears to be an attempt to limit Iran’s ability to block the strait. On the other hand, Iran can still directly control navigation in that waterway. Recent aerial imagery has revealed considerable movement of fast attack craft belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) between the Larak and Qeshm islands.
According to some analysts, the crews are acting as “toll collectors” from ships passing through the strait.
The IRGC’s continued activity in the strait, although largely attributable to Washington’s desire to prevent a complete obstruction of transit through it, may lead more countries to reach financial arrangements with Tehran to secure passage for their vessels.
Thailand is the latest country to announce that it has reached such an agreement, allowing its oil tankers to transit the Strait of Hormuz. It was preceded by Russia, India, Iraq, China, and Pakistan.
Nevertheless, these agreements do not fully guarantee safe passage. Several incidents have been recorded in which the IRGC temporarily turned back a couple of Chinese container ships, even though China has been listed among “friendly” countries. This suggests that Iran’s criteria for allowing passage are tied to the destination of the vessels and specifically whether they are bound for ports in the US or Israel.
Since launching their war, the US and Israel have directly targeted the IRGC’s naval capacities, from bases and equipment to senior personnel, most recently Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the IRGC Navy. The announcement of his death through statements issued simultaneously by US Central Command and the Israeli military is an indication of the close battlefield coordination and division of labour between Washington and Tel Aviv.
Tangsiri’s assassination delivered a double blow to the Iranian leadership. Not only was he a key military commander, but he was also influential in shaping strategic orientations, particularly with regard to regional policy and negotiating stances.
His death also had a significant psychological impact. Shortly before it, he had appeared in a televised interview aboard an Iranian naval vessel, vowing his readiness to close the Strait of Hormuz should he receive the orders to do so. His assassination, therefore, can be seen as part of the process of countering Iran’s ability to affect navigation in the strait.
The elimination of Tangsiri may be linked, if only indirectly, to a possible US ground operation aimed at seizing control of islands within the Strait of Hormuz, specifically Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa.
Abu Musa is likely to be the first island targeted in an initial phase. According to the available information, Iran has reinforced its military presence on these islands despite sustained airstrikes.
One of the reasons they are strategically important is because the shallow waters of the Gulf at that point force large oil tankers to pass between Greater Tunb and Abu Musa. Iranian sovereignty over these islands has long been contested by the UAE, which may soon again press its claims.
Kharg Island, located much deeper inside the Gulf, appears to be a prime objective for US attacks. The potential capture of this vital petroleum export hub has been described as a way to “share the revenues” from transit through the Strait of Hormuz, especially because Iran would probably shift its oil export operations from Kharg Island to Jask Port or other locations outside the strait, thereby giving Washington even more leverage.
Another significant island near Hormuz is Qeshm. Rising about 100 feet above sea level, it offers a horizon visibility of up to 12 miles. The island also faces the high mountainous Iranian mainland that overlooks the strait.
Just to the east of Qeshm lies Larak Island, which has not yet been struck, despite hosting IRGC naval bases. It contains port infrastructure and provides direct oversight of the Strait of Hormuz, while lying only 30 to 40 km from the Iranian mainland.
On the other hand, recent aerial imagery shows significant damage to Abu Musa, especially in the eastern sector, where many port facilities and supporting structures have been flattened.
Obstacles have also reportedly been placed on the island’s airstrip to prevent aircraft landings. The western sector, which includes a small harbour, remains largely intact.
The damage inflicted on Greater Tunb appears far more extensive, with strikes targeting fortified shelters in the centre of the island, support buildings near communications towers, and the eastern port, which has been completely demolished. Structures and aircraft at the island’s airport have also been destroyed.
A ground presence on these islands would appear to be essential if Washington is to achieve the strategic objective of controlling the strait and providing greater protection for vessels passing through it.
US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, despite their excellent air-defence capabilities, cannot provide continuous protection for transiting ships. The optimal long-term solution, therefore, is to deploy land-based air-defence systems that, combined with the destroyers, would establish an aerial defence zone over the strait.
While it is true that the majority of vessels targeted in the Gulf so far were anchored or stationary, it will still be crucial to be able to escort ships through it in any prolonged conflict. Here, the US may appeal to other parties to help with this process. But even if such cooperation does not materialise, the US can deploy additional destroyers to perform escort duty when necessary.
REOPENING THE STRAIT: Some US media outlets have recently circulated reports that Iran has laid at least 12 Maham-3 or Maham-7 mines in the Strait of Hormuz.
Both types are equipped with integrated magnetic and acoustic sensors and are quite powerful. The Maham-3 carries a 300-kg explosive charge and can be deployed at depths of up to 100 metres. It is triggered by magnetic and acoustic signatures without physical contact and includes a ship counter that can be programmed to allow a certain number of ships to pass before detonation.
It has a 365-day operational life. The Maham-7 poses a greater threat to commercial navigation with shallow drafts, as it can be deployed at depths of up to 35 metres. It also operates with acoustic and magnetic signatures and remains active for up to 365 days. Crucially, it can be laid by parachute from aircraft or helicopters, meaning that Iran does not need surface vessels to mine the strait.
No concrete evidence has emerged to confirm the alleged mine-deployment. But if confirmed, professional mine-clearing operations in that 39-km-wide waterway would take several weeks under ideal conditions and considerably longer under hostile conditions.
According to reports in the UK newspaper the Times, Britain would consider using unmanned MTXG systems to deal with these mines. In other words, any potential US ground operation through the strait would probably require a forcible mine-clearing operation in the shipping lanes.
At present, there is no confirmed information regarding the total number of US forces being sent to the Middle East as part of the recently deployed 82nd Airborne Division. Estimates vary from 1,000 to 3,000 troops.
These units will be supplemented by 3,000 to 4,000 troops from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which have recently arrived in the CENTCOM zone on board the amphibious assault ship Tripoli. A similar force is also expected to arrive aboard the amphibious landing ship Boxer in early April.
The buildup of these forces probably began earlier in March, a period that saw significant transport activity towards the Middle East. For example, since 12 March, at least 35 C-17 flights have flown from US airbases to three main locations: Ovda Air Base in Israel and the King Faisal Air Base and King Hussein International Airport in Jordan.
Analysts suggest that these forces – numbering at least 10,000 in total – might be tasked with seizing control of Iran’s enriched uranium sites. It is believed that large quantities of highly enriched uranium are stored in deep underground facilities in Isfahan, making the mission of securing them impossible to accomplish by air. The same applies to the task of neutralising Iran’s underground missile launch sites.
The likelihood of a ground operation has been reinforced by additional US deployments to the region, including a number of US Avenger air-defence systems, which have reportedly been transferred to CENTCOM headquarters at the MacDill Air Force Base.
These systems could be used against Iranian drones in any operation involving the seizure of Iranian islands in the Gulf. In addition, two more B-52 strategic bombers have been observed arriving at RAF Fairford in the UK, bringing the total number of US bombers currently stationed there to 23, including eight B-52s and 15 B-1B bombers.
If the US military succeeds in securing navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, controlling key islands, or securing Iran’s enriched uranium, then US President Donald Trump would be able to declare “victory”.
Iran would have lost its key leverage – the “Hormuz card” – allowing Trump to present negotiating terms from a stronger position.
Only days now remain until the last deadline Trump gave Iran expires and the US begins to strike Iranian electricity facilities. Carrying out this ultimatum would provide time and cover for the deployment of ground forces, which, in turn, would be decisive in shaping the trajectory of the war.
Published in cooperation between the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Weekly, and the English-language portal Ahram Online
