The expanded emergency government formed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 11 October resulted in the formation of a small war cabinet. However, this cabinet didn’t include the extreme far-right ministers, as Yair Lapid, the leader of the Yesh Atid party, declined to join on account of the cabinet’s inclusion of extreme far-right ministers.
Benny Gantz, the State Camp chairman and former minister of defense, agreed to join it, but only if a mini-war council was established, of which these ministers would not be members. This prompted these ministers, particularly Bezalel Smotrich, the leader of the Religious Zionist Party, and Itamar Ben-Gvir, the head of the Otzma Yehudit party, who is the minister of national security, to go against the War Council policy and prepare for the post-Aqsa political environment.
Opposition Policies
In response to their exclusion from the downsized war government, the right-wing ministers in the Israeli government—particularly the more extreme far-right ones like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich—resorted to a series of policies and procedures that they used as a diversion from the government’s work and without consulting it. These included the following:
Embarrassing the Government: The main objective of the actions made by the ministers who were not part of the Israeli war government was to discomfit the government both domestically and internationally. These movements took several paths, the first of which was initiated by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, who launched a campaign to facilitate the issuance of weapons licenses and arming of settlers in the West Bank under the guise of protecting themselves following the 7 October attack. As of November 8, approximately 180,000 settlers had applied for a weapons license. Further exacerbating the situation was his declaration on October 11 that he had issued directives to prepare for “Operation Defensive Shield 2”, which alluded to the occupation forces’ 2002 invasion of the West Bank in an effort to put an end to the second Palestinian intifada. He re-presented the idea of launching the Defensice Shield operation to the downsized cabinet (as a preventive measure to form an emergency government, which he said he supports without excluding any party).
The second of these paths was Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s decision to stop transferring Israeli tax funds to the Palestinian Authority on the grounds that it supports terrorism. Ben-Gvir endorsed this decision, saying that it is imperative to destroy the notion that the Palestinian Authority is distinct from Hamas. The third course of action was to cast doubt on the downsized war cabinet’s capacity to effectively administer the conflict, given that its entire membership consists of individuals Ben-Gvir referred to as “concept camp” prisoners, in reference to their claim that the Hamas movement is deterred, which ultimately precipitated the October attack.
As a result, on 23 October, Ben-Gvir issued a call to fill out the war cabinet with a new minister who could not belong to the State Camp or the Likud. The fourth path was what is known as “tweeting outside the flock”, as demonstrated by Ben-Gvir’s remarks about the need to refrain from delivering humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu’s remarks about dropping a nuclear bomb on the Gaza Strip. Both men belong to Ben-Gvir’s party.
These paths partially accomplished their objective of discomfiting the war government, particularly on an international scale. Parts of the discussions surrounding Israel’s acquisition of new American M16 rifles were made more complicated by scenes showing Ben-Gvir presiding over a ceremony to disperse weapons to settlers. According to US and Israeli sources, Washington refrained from endorsing this agreement until it was certain that the weapons would not be given to the settlers. This is highly atypical and a reflection of the repercussions of Ben-Gvir’s policy, which has led to an increase in settlers’ violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and has been subject to numerous international condemnations. Furthermore, because the suspension of the transfer of funds to the Palestinian Authority would intensify the escalation in the West Bank, the Biden administration has asked Israel for clarification on this decision. Add to this the severe criticism leveled at the Israeli government following Israel’s Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu’s “nuclear bomb” statement, which compelled Netanyahu to declare that Eliyahu would no longer be attending government sessions (which Ben-Gvir managed to obstruct). Even Netanyahu acknowledged that these actions “cause major international harm”, particularly the violence committed by settlers in the West Bank.
Capitalizing on Authority: Even though extreme far-right ministers were excluded from the downsized war government, they continued to serve in the expanded emergency government as ministers, with Ben-Gvir taking over the Ministry of National Security and Bezalel Smotrich taking over the Ministry of Finance and a supervisory role in the Defence Ministry for the West Bank civil administration and settlement affairs. As a result, these ministers made an effort to use the power vested in them—regardless of the constraints imposed by the war—to achieve their individual goals that could impact the political environment following the conflict.
This is demonstrated by a number of issues, the most significant of which has to do with making it easier to obtain weapons licenses, arm settlers, and create reserve security units, the total number of which as of November 9 was approximately 700 units. These units are intended to improve individual security in emergency situations, particularly in areas near the border. This can be seen as a continuation of Ben-Gvir’s effort to create the National Guard forces, which encountered significant obstacles during implementation despite the government’s agreement to form the force in principle in April 2023. It is possible that he has discovered a suitable moment to execute them in practice without encountering any resistance. Add to this the efforts of both ministers to inflame the West Bank by increasing the rate of violence, preventing funds from being transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and preventing the Israeli Prison Service from transferring payments from the Palestinian Authority to the accounts of Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for increasing funds for extremist settlers and their settlements.
Right-Wing Mobilization: The extreme far-right wingers in the Israeli government use a three-pronged strategy to mobilize Israelis in support of their ideology by taking advantage of the 7 October attack. According to their strategy, peace will not be achieved for the Israelis through cooperation with the Palestinians. They contend that the basis for peace should be strength and the other party’s concern over potential retaliation for the attack on Israel, and that none of the Palestinian civilians are innocent; they are all hostile and must therefore be met with hostility. Such actions will inevitably provoke a violent Palestinian reaction, which these factions exploit to spread the notion that Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank is identical to that in Gaza, thereby advancing the settlement expansion and evacuating the West Bank’s urban areas.
Add to this the heightened security prosecution of anyone who speaks out against Israeli crimes, expresses empathy for Gaza’s civilian population, or tries to curry favor by suggesting that they are so patriotic that they were willing to accept being excluded from the war government even though their positions and ministries are vital, as well as promoting their anti-war policies as being solely concerned with the welfare of the people and not with any outside influences, much like Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid does by not joining the government but endorsing its policies, which helps them gain support from Israelis.
Future Wagers
The future trajectory of far-right parties in Israel following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent exclusion of their leaders from the downsized government tasked with overseeing the Gaza Strip conflict remains uncertain. Nonetheless, it is possible to say that these political parties are presently placing bets on the following in order to secure their political future in Israel:
Society’s Far-Rightness: The far-right parties are speculating that the Israelis’ need for vengeance was stoked by the shock they suffered in the October 7 attack, the disintegration of the security doctrine upon which Israel was established, and their sense of utter helplessness on this day. As described by Ben-Gvir, this will all push them to the extreme right, in accordance with the previously mentioned narrative that peace is impossible with the Palestinians and that “guns save lives”. Right-wing policies in their entirety now serve to reinforce this idea and the belief that Palestinians are Nazis who need to be opposed by all means possible.
According to Israeli estimations, Israeli society is ideologically shifting to the far right regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the wake of major events, particularly security-related ones like the Al-Aqsa Intifada and possibly also Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. This may potentially result in the oblivion of internal divisions that were noted in Israel during the months leading up to the judicial reform initiative and the subsequent convergence towards the aforementioned goal. The right-wing parties are cognizant of this and are implementing policies to change it from a shock-induced short-term trend to a long-term affiliation. This is because the settlers may be more affected than others, and they are the group that has historically supported the far-right parties in elections.
Demise of the Future of Netanyahu: Presumably, one of the wagers that drives the right-wing parties’ current trends is the conviction that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career is over due to the historic setback on 7 October. Thus, the right-wing ministers, particularly Ben-Gvir, joined the chorus denouncing Netanyahu’s attempts to shift blame for what transpired and place it on the shoulders of the security and military establishments. Consequently, these parties feel that there is little chance that the government coalition that Netanyahu formed with them will last after the war. This could be due to their decision to leave the coalition in response to Netanyahu excluding them from the war government or the fact that there is a prevailing sentiment that opposes Netanyahu continuing to lead the country after the war.
Numerous surveys conducted following the Al-Aqsa Flood revealed that a significant proportion of Israelis feel that Netanyahu will eventually have to step down as prime minister and that the leader of the State Camp, former Defense Minister and war government member Benny Gantz, will likely succeed him as prime minister. Thus, in an attempt to preserve their chances of winning elections, the far-right parties might try to topple the current war government. This is because, should the government be successful in its objectives, it will demonstrate the right-wing camp’s accountability for the failure, and Benny Gantz will profit greatly from having led the battle in his favor. Later, he might be able to form a new government with the support of the opposition and centrist parties.
Drawing from the foregoing, it can be concluded that the fate of the far-right nationalist parties in Israel that were left out of the downsized war government now depends on the outcome of the ongoing operations in the Gaza Strip and the degree to which this downsized government succeeds in realizing its stated objectives and appeasing the thirst for vengeance that has started to permeate Israeli society in the wake of the Al-Aqsa Flood. Nevertheless, forthcoming evidence from opinion polls suggests that the ruling coalition’s overall popularity is declining. This may suggest that, notwithstanding the efforts they are presently exerting to obstruct the government and advance their political objectives, it may prove challenging to absolve them of accountability for the 7 October failure. Consequently, despite the possibility of their absence from the postwar government, their policies and orientations will continue to exert significant influence, particularly in regards to the expansion of settlements.
