The ongoing conflict in Ethiopia, and its repercussions, cast doubt on Addis Ababa’s announcement that the intensity of fighting had decreased and that the entry of its forces to Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray Region, spells the end of war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The announcement was one-sided, coming from Addis Ababa alone. Tigray has become isolated since fighting broke out a month ago. Telephone and network communications, electricity and other basic services were cut off in Tigray. The TPLF headed to the mountains to preserve the lives of its field commanders and to avoid the destruction of the capital – a move the Ethiopian army was preparing for.
What supports this view is that TPLF leaders left behind some tanks and artillery pieces, while they were keen during the withdrawal to transfer all their light and medium weapons to the mountains. Moreover, hours before the TPLF exited Mekelle, it fired six missiles toward the Eritrean capital, Asmara. This offensive is the second of its kind on Eritrea. The first had hit Eritrea’s main airport a week after the fighting broke out.
These moves by the TPLF leaders explain some of the reasons for their retreat, for they reflect the TPLF conviction that this time it will not be facing the Ethiopian army alone, but Eritrea as well. Eritrea, on its side, has revealed its intention that it will ally with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, which was evident through the actions that proved Asmara’s involvement in the attack on the Tigray Region.
Eritrea allowed the Ethiopian army to carry out operations surrounding the region along its borders with Ethiopia. It also turned a blind eye to the Ethiopian army’s deliberate penetration on tens of kilometres into its land. In addition, Asmara’s hospitals were prepared to receive the wounded from the Ethiopian army alone, disregarding the wounded and displaced persons from the Tigray Region who numbered in the hundreds in a few days.
Ethiopia and Eritrea denied these moves in inconclusive statements. It is certain, however, that TPLF leaders left the capital, Mekelle, to escape from being trapped between the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces determined to destroy the front.
The Tigrayans know all too well the reasons for the Ethiopian-Eritrean cooperation. After all, they have become experts in reading between the lines of events going on on both sides of the borders. The Tigrayans were at the heart of the devastating conflicts in 1998 and 2000, when the two allies, the TPLF and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, turned against each other. Years earlier, the prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, and the president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, joined efforts to depose Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime in 1991, ending 17 years of conflicts.
Following this success, Afwerki’s share of the take was announcing the independence of Eritrea in 1991, with the regime pledging to commit to a number of obligations regarding security, defence, securing the use of Eritrean ports for the landlocked state, preferential agreements for trade and currency unification, and others.
Afwerki’s discussion of the problem of the demarcation of borders between the two countries ignited the withdrawal from previous obligations. Afwerki and Zenawi shifted to a new state of historical hostility. Zenawi reiterated that Eritrea had “stabbed” Ethiopia in the back. On the other hand, Ethiopian army officers at that time were whispering that the Ethiopian-Eritrean successive wars were nothing but a war between the Tigray and Zenawi on one hand, and Eritrea and Afwerki on the other.
For four years Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been claiming he has embarked on an approach of reform when his moves are a package of ethnic policies for the sake of revenge against the Tigray Region. This tendency was clearly evident when he dissolved the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, controlled by the TPLF, and replaced it with his newly-established Prosperity Party to stage a coup against the federal identity of multi-ethnic Ethiopia.
After the signing of the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July 2018, the political scene in Ethiopia changed, especially when Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize for forging the peace agreement. Moreover, a raft of international sanctions imposed on Eritrea since 2009 were lifted.
Many, including the Tigrayans, noted that since that time, a very informal and personal friendship started to emerge between Abiy Ahmed and Afwerki, while on an institutional level, the agreement did not contribute much to the relationship between the two countries.
There is no doubt that the Eritrean president holds a grudge against the Tigray Region. This grudge has been deepening in recent years, as the TPLF appeared as an obstacle against implementing the Peace Agreement and achieving progress in the demarcation of the border. The Afwerki regime has, therefore, refused to engage Tigrayan leaders, who already feel marginalized, in international border discussions. Furthermore, Afwerki views federalism as an “ethnic disorder” that works against decentralization.
This way, Ahmed and Afwerki’s views would not come from an ideological vacuum, but rather from what the Ethiopian interior felt, that the reforms of Ahmed were moving away from the promised multinational federation.
In this regard, other Ethiopian nationalities felt that their interests are at risk. They believed that the consensus of visions between the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders will ultimately destabilize the Horn of Africa region, that is already disturbed by ethnic divisions.
There are some who believe that while on the surface, Afwerki seems to be involved in these disputes due to his bias to Abiy Ahmed, deep inside, Afwerki seeks revenge through promoting the internal destruction of the whole state. This makes the future more dangerous and far blurrier than anyone could anticipate.
This article was first published in Al-Dostor newspaper on Wednesday, 9 December 2020.
