By using ECSS site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
  • Home
  • International Relations
    International Relations
    Show More
    Top News
    Mutual Benefits: The Egyptian-Greek Maritime Boundary Delimitation Deal
    August 23, 2020
    Egypt-Sudan Rapprochement in the Face of Major Challenges
    March 20, 2021
    The Economic Repercussions of Ethiopia’s Conflict
    October 9, 2021
    Latest News
    The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor: Political Drivers and Challenges
    September 25, 2023
    BRICS Plus and Africa: Challenges and Mutual Gains
    September 21, 2023
    Enhancing Readiness: Germany Leads NATO Exercises in the Baltic Sea
    September 19, 2023
    Breaking Isolation: Sudan Following Al-Burhan’s Tours and Hemedti’s Initiative
    September 14, 2023
  • Defense & Security
    Defense & Security
    Show More
    Top News
    Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood: A temporary refuge and alternative Havens
    October 1, 2020
    Assessing Deterrent Measures and the Prospects of War: US Military Movement in the Gulf to Confront Iran
    June 22, 2020
    A Habitual Trend: Terrorist Organizations’ Exploitation of Natural Disasters
    March 25, 2023
    Latest News
    Explaining the Rise of Daesh in Syria
    August 26, 2023
    Clashes in Tripoli: Do Rapid Developments in Libya Clash with the Road Map?
    August 22, 2023
    Ukraine’s Special Operation: A Stopgap
    August 1, 2023
    Why are Terrorist Organizations Increasingly Relying on Economic Jihad?
    July 27, 2023
  • Public Policy
    Public Policy
    Show More
    Top News
    Green economy: Egypt’s gateway to sustainable development
    March 27, 2021
    Promoting Social Protection: Egypt’s Commodity Subsidy System
    March 1, 2022
    International media and Egypt’s role in the Gaza ceasefire: The case of Qatar’s Al-Jazeera
    May 29, 2021
    Latest News
    Goals and Mechanisms: Integrating the Informal Economy into the Formal Economy
    September 23, 2023
    Playing the Pressure Card: The Ramifications of Boosting US-Taiwan Economic Relations for China
    September 17, 2023
    Egypt’s Long-Term Debt Rating Upgraded to Stable
    September 10, 2023
    Whither Inflation Rates in Egypt?
    August 24, 2023
  • Analysis
    • Opinion
    • Analysis
    • Situation Assessment
    • Readings
  • Activities
    • Conferences
    • ECSS Agenda
    • Panel Discussion
    • Seminar
    • Workshops
  • ECSS Library
    • Digital Editions
    • Periodicals
    • Special Editions
  • Shop
  • العربية
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022,
Reading: An Unprecedented Situation: France’s Legislative Elections and Venturing into Uncharted Waters
Share
Notification Show More
Latest News
The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor: Political Drivers and Challenges
Arab & Regional Studies
Goals and Mechanisms: Integrating the Informal Economy into the Formal Economy
Economic & Energy Studies
BRICS Plus and Africa: Challenges and Mutual Gains
African Studies
Fifty Years On: The Realities of the October War (2)
Opinion
Enhancing Readiness: Germany Leads NATO Exercises in the Baltic Sea
European Studies
Aa
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
Aa
  • اللغة العربية
  • International Relations
  • Defense & Security
  • Special Edition
  • Public Policy
  • Analysis
  • Activities & Events
  • Home
  • اللغة العربية
  • Categories
    • International Relations
    • Defense & Security
    • Public Policy
    • Analysis
    • Special Edition
    • Activities & Events
    • Opinions Articles
  • Bookmarks
Follow US
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022, Powered by EgyptYo Business Services.
International Relations

An Unprecedented Situation: France’s Legislative Elections and Venturing into Uncharted Waters

Dr. Tewfik Aclimandos
Last updated: 2022/07/06 at 1:27 PM
Dr. Tewfik Aclimandos
Share
17 Min Read
وضعٌ غير مسبوق: الانتخابات التشريعية في فرنسا والسير نحو المجهول
وضعٌ غير مسبوق: الانتخابات التشريعية في فرنسا والسير نحو المجهول
SHARE

“The antithesis of what France’s 1985 Constitution was designed to stifle” –this is how we can describe the unprecedented situation which France’s legislative elections gave rise to: a semi-parliamentary system with no parliamentary majority where chaos and standoff are potential scenarios.

In principle, De Gaulle’s constitution aimed at establishing a strong executive backed by a comfortable parliamentary majority. The legislator introduced a two-round single-member districts system, which, in a country like France, reduces the opportunities of forces –mostly extremist ones– that are struggling to forge alliances. Failure to build alliances means these forces will not be able to get votes of a rival candidate who lost the first round. In contrast, this system makes it easy to constitute a comfortable parliamentary majority without enjoying the support of the majority of the people. For example, a candidate who can get one-third of the votes in the first round and makes it to the second round can win because voters of the parties that did not qualify vote for him. One disadvantage of this constitutional and electoral system is that it isn’t indicative of the balance of power in the street, which perhaps explains the semi-permanent unrest and protests.

Take for example, Le Pen’s party that gets the support of at least one-fifth of the electorate yet managed to gain only six seats in Parliament out of 577 and sometimes it fails to get one seat. So, no matter what the party achieves in the first round of the legislative elections, it ends nowhere except to a dead end where it rarely manages to get the votes of candidates of other parties. 

If we set results of the first round of the 2017 Presidential elections against the formation of the National Assembly after the legislative elections that followed Macron’s winning a first term, we find that Macron received a little more than 24 percent of the votes where his party won 351, Marine Le Pen received 21 percent of the votes whereas her party got only 6 seats, and the Republicans won 20 percent of the votes and got 136 seats. The point is clear. Voters recognize these considerations; so, they usually don’t give their votes to a candidate that doesn’t have a reasonable chance to win the seat in the second round and tend to give their votes to the candidates of the President’s party to enable the President to rule (e.g. in the legislative elections, a Leftist voter may vote for a left-wing president coming from another left-wing party to empower this president).

This long prelude is integral to understand how severe is the earthquake that hit the political life in France with the announcement of the results of the second round of the legislative elections. On the one hand, Macron failed to obtain an absolute majority or even approached it. The pro-Macron parties managed to get only 245 seats (289 seats are needed for absolute majority). It is hard to imagine how it would be possible to form a strong coalition that guarantees a substantial majority for the president. The Republicans, the party ideologically close to the President, has justifiable rancor (Macron sought destroying it by all means) and has no interest in facilitating the President’s task for nothing. Furthermore, it forces the President to regress in some portfolios. On the other hand, negotiating with the President is supposedly based on the existence of a leadership that can speak on behalf of everyone and the Republican Party is without a Republican leadership now. Observers see that the call to work with the President does not enjoy acceptance within the party. Overall, while forms of alliance could possibly be developed in the medium or long term, the situation is much more complicated in the short term.

On the other hand, Marine Le Pen’s party achieved a great success, winning 89 seats compared to six seats in the previous Parliament. This was a roaring success not only in terms of “quantity” but also in terms of the significance of the collapse of the wall that limits obtaining votes of other parties. While the seats it gained still do not reflect its political weight on the street, this success represents a quantum leap and wasn’t expected although everyone noticed the increase of its voters since the first round. In the day that followed the elections, the president’s bloc and the leftist coalition threw plates at each other over the responsibility for “the collapse of the wall.” Observers believe that Mélenchon’s voters, motivated by their disapproval of the president, elected Le Pen’s candidates in the second round. They add that the party’s representatives are mostly of young and inexperienced women, but they are keen on the party’s image and reputation. They are courteous, humble, adept at concealing their extremism, and their different professions and social origins are a mirror of society (except the immigrant component). Speculations arise as their future path between maturity and extremism.

Despite the tact of French hard-left leader Mélenchon, the results of the elections were frustrating for voters of the left. The left-wing alliance’s share of votes did not increase. It gained 131 seats: 72 for La France Insoumise party (of Mélenchon), 24 for the Socialist Party, 23 for The Greens, and 12 for French Communist Party. There is a cloud of uncertainty over the future of the alliance. According to the alliance’s constituent agreement, each party is supposed to form its own parliamentary group. So, the question is: will there be one parliamentary group comprising the four of four groups? No sophistry here. The Leader of Opposition title as well as other titles are at stake. Which takes precedence: the alliance or Le Pen’s party? While the alliance’s seats outnumbers those of Le Pen’s party, the latter have leverage over each of the alliance’s separate components. Anyway, on the day following the elections, Mélenchon suggested the fusion of all these the components into one group but his suggestion was met by rejection.

Notably, The Republicans party, despite its candidate losing the election,  managed to capitalize on its strong presence in some regions to win 61 seats, a reasonable number that gives it  greater weight than that of its mass electorate. Perhaps Macron’s party may be in need of their support, even partially.

Here there is a need to emphasize that France is distinct from Germany and the United States. In Germany, power is distributed among several actors and there is a culture and mechanisms that value forging alliances, achieving consensus, and working out compromises. In France, powers are concentrated, the State is unitary and powerful, and the executive branch has substantial resources and capabilities. Therefore, whoever assumes presidency enjoys advantages that others do not, rendering those allying with the President no more than “servants”, notwithstanding their favors to the President. Additionally, there is no culture of compromise, even among traditional parties even in normal times. Beyond that, the country is experiencing an exceptional time: a president loathed by the public only elected because of being “the better of evils”, high visibility of two hardline parties (even by French standards), and a very critical financial, economic, and social situation. By contrast, in the United States, there are only two major parties to be reckoned with, the constitution established mechanisms that create balances, and there is a reasonable consensus on major issues, notwithstanding the drastic polarization.

The point here is that the situation brought about by the legislative elections in France is not similar to that of Germany. In Germany, the different political actors realize they have to forge alliances with one another and they are experienced at negotiating. In France, there are three major actors, each one hating the other two and the cake can’t be split fairly given the presidency’s weight.  Speaking of Macron, his temperament, obstinacy, perceptions of his powers, and authoritarian and monopolistic tendencies are a major part of the problem. 

This does not mean the situation is hopeless. Members of Macron’s party believe that they can make the grade and pass laws and legislation by negotiating either with the right or the wise left, on a case-by-case basis. This may take place in the running but it will wear actors out and disrupt government work. Some observers believe that allying with the right is possible and others see that the right-wing parties that have joined the pro-Macron bloc may manage to build a large right-wing bloc by allying with the Republicans, so that the right’s weight increases in a way that enhances its negotiating position. As far as I judge, this is currently unlikely, or too early to judge.

From a constitutional perspective, Macron has the right to dissolve the parliament, but psychologically he cannot do it now because the voters’ punishment would be cruel. Politically, he cannot do it before he could prove that the parliamentarians’ action is destructive, disruptive, and devastating. Perhaps, the dissolution threat may push the far right, the Republican right, Socialists, and the Greens to take responsibility but may also prove insufficient to restrain their desire to defeat and humiliate a hated president and may not also be enough to bring the actors’ positions closer, with each of them having a distinct vision on the future of France, globalization and the European project.

There would be no room for a detailed discussion of the reasons for the failure of Macron and the La République En Marche party, given the enormity and proliferation of mistakes of Macron and his government. Here, few examples would suffice. First, the French people were dissatisfied with his unilateral decision-making, his monopoly on the political scene, his arrogance, and authoritarian tendencies. After winning a second term, all opinion polls indicated that the French people do not want the President to have a parliamentary majority because he would misuse it but Macron overlooked these warning signs. Second, he spent three weeks reflecting on the formation of the cabinet and deciding the names of the candidates in his bloc, ensuring curbing and ruffling the feathers of his allies, which left a bad impact on them and on the public opinion. Then, he choose a competent technocrat prime minister who lacks the political experience, which created the impression that the president wants to reinforce the unilateral decision making and that the prime minister will be no more than his assistant. The formation of the government suggested that he was flirting with the radical left in a way that provoked the right. He appointed an efficient and honorable Minister of Education but he belongs to intellectual currents the right is not fond of. Events made it clear that flirting with the left was a grave mistake that caused him to lose a large amount of votes. Macron’s government management of the chaos that marred the Champions League and its insistence on a narrative full of lies enhanced Le Pen’s chances. Worse, Macron did not seem to care about supervising the electoral campaign, and this might have been commendable if the prime minister filled the void, which never happened. Although the date of the elections was known in advance, he went on a foreign tour the days preceding the second round, which strengthened the impression that he is ignoring his people.

Mélenchon’s mistakes played in the hand of Le Pen. He harshly criticized the police, heedless of the fact that it enjoys a good reputation in France and that the French see it as the last bulwark against crime. He also called on what he named the “fascist voters” to vote for him, a tongue slip that was revealing of his opinion of Le Pen’s voters.

Was the election just a mishap brought about by the poor management of the ruling team or a major milestone and a starting point for the rise of the extremists and the receding of the moderates given their inability to address the factions affected by globalization? Will the new situation urge actors to learn the art of negotiation and reach compromise or will it be a gateway to more polarization and chaos? We don’t know.  

Will Macron be able to manage this new situation? 

The answer is yet unknown.

Related Posts

The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor: Political Drivers and Challenges

BRICS Plus and Africa: Challenges and Mutual Gains

Enhancing Readiness: Germany Leads NATO Exercises in the Baltic Sea

Breaking Isolation: Sudan Following Al-Burhan’s Tours and Hemedti’s Initiative

TAGGED: Featured, France, legislative elections
Dr. Tewfik Aclimandos July 6, 2022
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp LinkedIn Telegram Email Copy Link Print
Avatar
By Dr. Tewfik Aclimandos
Chief of European studies unit

Stay Connected

Facebook Like
Twitter Follow
Instagram Follow
Youtube Subscribe

Latest Articles

What’s the Rush?
Opinions Articles April 10, 2020
Enhanced Role: Algeria and Regional Crises after Constitutional Amendments
International Relations February 2, 2021
Egyptian Startups: Reality and Prospects
Public Policy September 11, 2021
How Serious are Preparations to Face Iran?
Opinions Articles February 25, 2023

Latest Tweets

International Relations

  • African Studies
  • American Studies
  • Arab & Regional Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • European Studies
  • Palestinian & Israeli Studies

Defence & Security

  • Armament
  • Cyber Security
  • Extremism
  • Terrorism & Armed Conflict

Public Policies

  • Development & Society
  • Economic & Energy Studies
  • Egypt & World Stats
  • Media Studies
  • Public Opinion
  • Women & Family Studies

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit think tank, providing decisions-makers by Policy alternatives, the center was establised in 2018 and comprises a group of experts and researchers from diffrent generations and scientific desciplines. 

All Rights Reserved to Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies - ECSS © 2022

Removed from reading list

Undo
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?