As a counter to the Russian “special operation” banner for the conflict in Ukraine, Kiev is now essentially using the same term in light of the ineffectiveness of the “counteroffensive” carried out by Ukrainian forces on Russian-controlled sites. As a result, Ukraine’s special operation serves as a suitable temporary replacement for the Kiev plan that aims to bomb far-off strategic targets that may also be a source of vulnerability for Moscow, given the launch of repeated attacks on the vital Kerch Bridge, which serves as the main Russian military supply line from the southern area of operations to the area of operations in Ukraine, in addition to attacks on other locations deep within Russia, including Belgorod and the capital, Moscow.
Moscow, on the other hand, is executing an equivalent strategy, attacking distant Ukrainian targets like the Odessa region after the decision to close the Black Sea and halt the grain deal in an effort to increase the cost of the Ukrainian attacks on Crimea in retaliation. That said, neither Russia nor Ukraine are thought to be able to cross the current lines of control: Ukraine cannot restore Crimea with these strikes, which realistically justifies its choice to target the Kerch Bridge as a crucial military target given its involvement in the conflict, and Russia cannot deploy ground forces further to Odessa, but it is using blockade as a leverage against Ukraine.
Will Ukraine Abandon the Counteroffensive Option?
Despite the slim chances of a Ukrainian counteroffensive due to the limitations that Ukraine faces as a result of armament issues, particularly air armament, Ukraine did not rule out this option. A few points can be clarified in this context:
Controversial Predictions of Counteroffensive Success: The United States appears to disagree with the view that claims the limitations of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. According to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Kiev was able to retake nearly half of the territory that Russia had held since the start of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2023 thanks to the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The US Institute for the Study of War (ISW) shares this view. On 24 July, a day after Blinken’s comments, the ISW announced the creation of a mechanism that uses field deployment maps, suggesting that the Ukrainians had regained control of roughly 53 percent of the territory. In effect, it is challenging to accept the accuracy of these assertions and projections. Jens Seltenberg, the secretary-general of NATO, spoke about the difficulties the counteroffensive faces in an interview with Politico on 6 July before the NATO summit in Lithuania this summer.
Counter-Offensive Tactic: Most likely, and in the best-case scenarios for the reality of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it can be said that Ukraine employs the counter-offensive strategy as it moves along three main axes, namely the Bakhmut axis, which was seized by the Wagner forces at the start of summer, the Zaporizhia axis, and the Kherson axis. Obviously, the Ukrainian forces were unable to advance on ground along all of these axes. For instance, the Russian forces are preventing the Ukrainian forces from crossing the Antonivskyi Bridge, which spans the Dnieper River and connects Kherson’s eastern and western halves. As a result, the Russian force continues to hold this territory while being airstriked from the opposing bank. It is advancing in Zaporizhzhia using this tactic to a depth of 10 km. Along with this, Russian forces are working to nibble at small patches of land in the Svatove region in an effort to advance on the Kreminna strategic axis, which they have been battling to control for more than a year.
Expectation of an Arms Quantum Leap: The US cluster bomb deal was the most controversial deal for Ukraine in July. Allies of Ukraine, however, overcame this debate, and Ukraine has already begun using them. According to Russian reports, Ukraine has begun deploying these bombs in Belgorod, as part of its notification of the special operation.
However, it is conceivable that Ukraine will not focus solely on this region as Russian trenches and armored vehicles in the Donbass and along the front lines may be prime targets for these bombs. It is crucial to note that this controversy over cluster bombs –which are internationally banned– is concealing a more significant deal, including the arming of Patriot ammunition, for example, which means that the system that Moscow targeted in mid-May has been repaired, resulting in an increase of four NASAMS systems and HIMARS ammunition in Ukrainian armament.
Effectiveness of Ukraine’s Special Operation
Ukraine’s use of missiles and drones may be more successful in draining Russia and compromising the rapid response system for defense in the areas of deployment due to the limited military supplies available each time Kerch is targeted. Ukraine is not thought to be able to completely destroy the Bridge and permanently remove it from service. Therefore, the strikes act as a temporary impediment. Additionally, the Ukrainian strikes’ range did not extend beyond Belgorod, forcing Ukraine to expand its space for distant targets. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has requested long-range weapons from the United States, but Washington has expressed concern over this request. In order to develop targets for the special operation, Ukraine hinted that it could target Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea following the decision to close the Black Sea and the Russian attacks on Odessa. On the other hand, it cannot be disregarded that the Russian naval force could respond to an operation of this nature with superior counterstrikes in the Ukrainian sea depths, and such strikes have already been launched.
Formally speaking, it is conceivable that the special operation’s actual effectiveness is also constrained. But this could diminish other factors in the calculations of this operation, such as, for instance, the possibility that the success of distant targeting could contribute to shaking the military image and moral factor of the Russian side. Targeting Kerch, for instance, could have a more significant effect than advancing in the Donbas to a depth of about 10-15 km. Additionally, the operation has significant political components. The attack on the Kerch Bridge revealed Russia’s political vulnerability after Moscow promised in October 2022 to secure the Bridge that Ukraine had previously targeted. The time that passed between the first targeting and second one (which were more than eight months apart) should have been enough to complete the defensive coverage process.
In addition to the aforementioned, there is a declining level of national support for the war in Russia, particularly among retired military personnel. Igor Girkin is a recent case in point, not only is he opposed to the war, but he also tried to make a statement against it. With the war dragging on, the Kremlin has no incentive to gamble on adequate support, especially in light of the discussion surrounding the difficulties Russian forces face in maintaining their hold over parts of Ukraine.
No matter how slowly it proceeds, the Ukrainian counteroffensive cannot be written off as a failure, as Russia advocates. Additionally, the Kremlin has not yet fully recovered from the Wagner rebellion crisis, and the transfer of its leader to Belarus could present new difficulties for Moscow. While Wagner will not, of course, reengage in the Russian war in Ukraine, it is believed that its role in bolstering Belarus’ position in the equation or in the face of its adversary, Poland, could divert the Kremlin’s battle to a side road.
In conclusion, the Ukrainian special operation does not represent a long-term substitute for the limited-effective counteroffensive option, but rather a stopgap measure until the counteroffensive situation is improved, which may push back the process of entering the battlefield until next spring. Despite the increasing military and political difficulties that Russia faces in the Ukraine conflict, it remains exceedingly difficult to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Consequently, the conundrum of a military victory for either side persists.
