In the 1980s and 1990s, NATO forces embraced the AirLand Battle strategy, which hinged on launching targeted tactical strikes with guided munitions to disrupt the enemy’s rear lines and destabilize their position. This was accomplished by concentrating on targeting communications and command centers, as well as by blocking the chain of command with guided munitions that allowed for a wide range of offensive maneuvers to attack in-depth the enemy’s forces.
This strategy effectively leveraged vulnerabilities in the Soviet strategy, encompassing the following:
Stagnation of Tactics: This stagnation was epitomized by the decision-making circle, which hinders any alteration of military orders or tactical phases of mission execution due to direct intervention from command centers in every aspect of missions, thereby constraining any form of innovation and advancement. This aids the adversary in forecasting the effectiveness of the military units operating in the designated area of combat.
Inadequate Performance by the Second-Line Forces: Once missions are established, reserve forces are summoned and a leadership structure is formed for them. These forces undergo specialized training tailored to their specific missions. Subsequently, they are typically deployed to the front lines of either defensive or offensive battles, which hinders their capacity to consistently launch attacks or achieve success in defensive operations.
Technical Vulnerability: Despite advancements spanning two decades, the Soviet systems were not on par with their Western counterparts, particularly in terms of the caliber of ammunition for artillery, tank systems, and aircraft.
However, Eastern adaptation has become increasingly prevalent since the early 2000s, particularly in light of the meticulous evaluation of NATO’s performance in the conflicts over Yugoslavia and Iraq. Consequently, a novel approach was developed, incorporating a fresh concept referred to as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). This significantly influenced the necessity for NATO to promptly modify its previous strategies and develop a new strategic concept starting in 2010. The strategic concept known as Air Sea Battle (ASB) emerged in 2013, focusing exclusively on air and sea operations. In 2015, this concept evolved into a more comprehensive framework called the Joint Access and Maneuver Concept for the Global Commons (JAM-GC) with the inclusion of the US Army.
These three concepts—the ASB Strategy, the JAM-GC Concept, and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)—are examined below.
I. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
Anti-Access (A2) refers to a strategy aimed at impeding the rapid deployment of friendly forces to a specific area or compelling them to operate from greater distances away from the main conflict zone than they would prefer. A2 affects movement in a theatre.
Area Denial (AD) refers to a strategic maneuver designed to hinder friendly maneuver operations within the operational theatre. AD affects maneuvers within a theatre.
To ensure the complete success of the new Eastern strategy (of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, etc.), some or all of the following capabilities must be present:
1. Holding the capability to incapacitate or impede NATO satellites utilized for navigation, munitions guidance, or reconnaissance.
2. Possessing sophisticated electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, including techniques such as obstruction, jamming, isolation, and eavesdropping on communications or radars.
3. Having access to a variety of long-range surveillance and reconnaissance tools, such as air, land, and marine systems.
4. Boasting tens of thousands of munitions and long-range, highly accurate guided missiles of diverse types that are launched from a multitude of air, sea, and land systems.
5. Possessing a keen interest in developing submarine weapons and improving their capacity to fire anti-ship and cruise missiles.
6. Having a tiered Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) or air defence that is backed by air defence fighters and air control and consists of mobile Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems to deal with close and far targets.
7. Dedicating efforts to the creation of command and control (C2) rooms that are outfitted with data links and optical fibers in order to synchronize air, ground, and sea formations.
8. Enhancing airborne command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities to facilitate offensive maneuvers like air combat and targeting.
9. Acquiring submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles equipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads designed for destruction.
10. Fortifying the maritime borders with tens of thousands of diverse mines.
The probability of achieving success for the forces implementing this strategy is higher if they commence with offensive operations. This poses a threat to the friendly forces stationed at the front lines or the allies who will be directly confronting the enemy forces at that moment. The primary objective of the enemy forces will be to hinder the support forces of the allies and potentially achieve significant successes through long-range attacks. Additionally, they will aim to gain the necessary combat momentum and succeed in dispersing the combat efforts of NATO forces by opening multiple fronts simultaneously.
II. ASB Strategy
From NATO’s perspective, this novel strategic notion is the optimal response to the eastern strategy, through the integration of the various branches of the army across all four dimensions (air, land, sea, and space), the development of interconnection capabilities, and the development of an attack-in-depth strategy that aims to disrupt adversary operations, destroy adversary measures, and defeat adversary weapons and tactics (D3), enabling allied forces to have unrestricted freedom to launch offensives, enter, and navigate within the theatre of operations.
This strategy is effective in attaining three primary objectives:
1. Disrupting the adversary’s command, control, reconnaissance, and monitoring capabilities (C4ISR).
2. Destroying adversary’s A2/AD capabilities
3. Defeating the adversary employed weapons and tactics
Figure 1: Components of ASB’s conceptual design “NIA/D3”
These objectives are accomplished through two primary steps:
Step 1: Commencement of Military Operations
This step involves the following:
- Enduring initial assaults on the forefront or rear positions of NATO or allied forces, while minimizing casualties through defensive measures or strategic movements.
- Engaging in retaliatory actions against pre-identified targets, such as command centers or critical objectives that have the potential to impede operations.
- Assaulting the offensive missile arsenal of the adversary, which is comprised of ballistic missiles.
- Commencing combat operations with the objective of regaining the upper hand in space, land, air, and sea.
Step 2: Supplementary Operations
The objective of this step is to generate more favorable alternatives in case of negotiations, with the aim of getting the most out of your opponent. This can be accomplished in the following ways:
- Extending military operations to maintain the lead on land, in the air, and at sea.
- Conducting siege operations, whether through military forces or economic sanctions
- Providing ongoing logistical support concurrently with combat operations.
- Ramping up military manufacturing, particularly with regard to precision weapons.
III. JAM-GC Concept
The JAM-GC concept, introduced in 2015, is an advancement of the ASB strategy and has the advantage of not being restricted to a particular adversary or operational area. It was the outcome of numerous military maneuvers executed by the United States Army and the electronic simulation of numerous scenarios.
The primary objective is to thwart the enemy’s fundamental strategy rather than solely disabling its A2/AD operational capabilities. This is achieved by utilizing both advanced and non-advanced technologies, depending on their availability in the theatre of operations. The approach is highly effective in combat and takes into consideration the cost factor.
The JAM-GC concept has incorporated fundamental specifications into NATO forces, enhancing their ability to achieve victory in combat. These specifications include:
- The capacity to effectively deploy, operate from various bases and subsidiary locations, and not only comply with fundamental regulations but also maintain the capability to strategically maneuver in order to generate the necessary combat momentum as needed.
- The capacity to promptly rebound from setbacks, arrange troops in formation, mount counteroffensive maneuvers, or maintain unity to minimize casualties.
- The capacity to modify any command structure, either temporarily or permanently, in order to fulfil diverse responsibilities. This advantage is obtained by undergoing extensive training on numerous missions, which equips fighters with the requisite expertise to operate effectively in various formations and with different equipment.
- Possessing an increased capacity to utilize and combine a variety of commercial or military equipment for multiple purposes. Instances of this commercial equipment encompass “drones.”
- Maintaining logistical capabilities in accordance with a schedule that is conducive to the execution of combat operations.
In short, combat adaptation serves as the overarching theme across all the aforementioned strategic concepts. Both the Western and Eastern camps have gained insights from experiences during the Cold War and the swift advancement of military technology. Through mutual observation, they have been working on developing new strategies that utilize all available resources to enforce the rules of engagement and ensure effective combat. Without a doubt, the ongoing development process will yield more potent and lethal weapon systems as time passes. Historically, such systems have been tested during sub-conflicts between allies rather than directly between the eastern and western camps. But is there a possibility of deviating from this norm now? Who knows?
