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African Studies

Breaking Isolation: Sudan Following Al-Burhan’s Tours and Hemedti’s Initiative

Shaimaa Al-Baksh
Last updated: 2023/09/14 at 3:30 PM
Shaimaa Al-Baksh
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For the first time since the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) broke out on 15 April, the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan (TSC), General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, departed Khartoum for a domestic tour. The tour had political and diplomatic overtones, and some saw it as a deal that could lead to the end of the war, notably in light of the preceding diplomatic movement, which included civil, regional, and international forces attempting to mediate between the warring parties. Al-Burhan will follow his domestic tours with a regional trip, his first abroad since the outbreak of the conflict.

Contents
Breaking IsolationStating TermsPertinent Context  

This move came at the same time that the Commander Hemedti of the RSF launched an initiative, the text of which was shared on social media, outlining his views on the terms and structure of a political agreement that could result in him stopping the fighting.

Clashes between the SAF and RSF are ongoing in all three capital cities, particularly in southern Khartoum and Omdurman, where they became more intense in early August, with fighting continuing on other fronts in Kordofan and Darfur as well. 

This begs the question of whether there is an opportunity for these movements to bring about a breakthrough on the battlefield or pave the way for the two sides of the conflict to engage in dialogue.

Breaking Isolation

Al-Burhan made his first appearance outside of Khartoum after spending the previous months stationed at the General Command headquarters there. While in Omdurman, al-Burhan inspected the military installations and bases amid the ongoing fighting. On 24 August, he left Omdurman for the city of Atbara in the Nile River State in the north, where he met with military officials, looked at the war casualties inside a military hospital, and paid the artillery corps a visit.

In his speech to the soldiers, al-Burhan flatly rejected the idea that he had left Khartoum as part of a deal or agreement and emphasized that the fighting would continue until the very end in order to face the relics and put an end to the rebellion, especially given that they did not initiate the conflict and thus have the right to protect the country until the end. Al-Burhan emphasized that his exit was the outcome of a thorough military operation involving the air, land, and naval forces, and that this departure was marked by intense combat that resulted in the deaths of two naval forces martyrs.

On Monday, 28 August, he traveled to eastern Sudan, where he spoke to the Red Sea area forces at the Flamingo Naval Military Base and commended them for their work in securing the Red Sea and all of Sudan’s maritime borders. Al-Burhan reiterated that no agreement would be reached with the RSF, that the SAF would not put their hands in the rebels’ hands, and that they would concentrate their efforts on being decisive and putting an end to the rebellion.

This speech was delivered in response to the initiative taken by Hemedti the day before he [al-Burhan] arrived in Port Sudan. In conjunction with his visit to Port Sudan, al-Burhan received a phone call from South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, during which Kiir reaffirmed his support for initiatives aimed at ending the country’s ongoing war.

Some believe that the current situation marks the beginning of reviving efforts to hold direct talks between the opposing sides of the conflict and that it represents al-Burhan’s movement toward diplomatic solutions and political openness, which may open the door for the two sides to agree to sit down for talks, especially given that al-Burhan’s internal movements were followed by his one and only trip outside of Sudan since the war began on 29 August, when he traveled to Egypt for a day. 

These actions follow the gatherings of foreign ministers of Sudan’s neighboring states in Chad on 7 August and are based on the outcomes of the first Sudan Neighboring States summit, which took place in Cairo on July 13, which might be an indication that South Sudan and Egypt will continue their efforts to engage in dialogue with all parties involved in the conflict.

Stating Terms

Al-Burhan’s movements took place around the same time that Hemedti, on Sunday, 27 August, proposed an initiative that included the RSF’s position for a comprehensive solution in Sudan and its vision for establishing a new foundation for the Sudanese state. Hemedti argued that the most suitable form of government for Sudan is asymmetric federalism, in which the nature and scope of the powers enjoyed by the federal union’s constituent units vary. He demanded that the state stop using violence against its citizens, particularly in the outlying areas, and that a Sudan based on social justice, tolerance, and peace be established. According to Hemedti,  the country’s ongoing war is a symptom of the state’s crisis that needs to be resolved in order to establish a democratic, civil system of government based on fair and free elections, with the participation of the broadest and most inclusive group of political parties, civil society organizations, women, and youth, as well as the necessity of creating and fortifying a new, professional, and national SAF from the existing forces.

Overall, Hemedti sought to negotiate with the SAF on a number of issues, including the establishment of a national professional army; transitional civil rule and the post-conflict period; a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace; transitional justice; the federal system, including its tiers, structures, and authority to allocate resources; and the significance of including in negotiations opposition committees, young people, women, and groups marginalized by the Bashir regime.

On 15 August, Malik Agar, the Deputy Chairman of the TSC, announced a similar initiative, outlining the scene’s characteristics and a road map that starts with a ceasefire, locating RSF assembly locations in preparation for implementing security arrangements, urging the UN to change the UN envoy, and emphasizing that elections are the only option available to reduce the possibility of disagreements between the two sides regarding the terms of the settlement and the cease-fire, given that the RSF imposes its political vision for the country’s future as a proactive step and a requirement for the ceasefire and additionally presents it as assuming the right to determine the future’s contours, despite the fact that all the proposed visions were previously addressed in the Juba Peace Agreement, which failed to establish peace, justice, and development in the country. The military establishment, for its part, labels the RSF as insurgents and argues that they should be subsumed under the SAF’s General command.

Pertinent Context  

These movements by the SAF and the RSF take place against the backdrop of Sudan’s tumultuous conditions, the most obvious signs of which are the two sides’ ongoing combat throughout August in the three cities of Khartoum and Omdurman, where fighting resumed near the Armoured Corps camp in southern Khartoum, with the RSF launching attacks on the area around the Armoured Corps Base over the course of a week. Violent clashes between the two sides occurred in the neighborhoods of Jabra, Al-Ashra, Al-LaMap, and Gaza, which are the surrounding regions of the Armored Corps base. On top of that, fighting broke out all over Omdurman and its surrounding areas, including the city’s historic districts and Um Badda to the west, as army artillery continued to target RSF positions there in an effort to halt the flow of supplies across the Shambat Bridge and into the RSF.

The RSF sites near Khartoum International Airport and the SAF General Command to the east of the capital were also targeted by the military air force. Riyadh, Burri, Garden City, and the areas north of Khartoum Bahri were also hit by air strikes. RSF air strikes continued in southern Khartoum and near Khartoum Sports City, the Campgrounds, and the al-Kalakla area. Parallel to the ongoing fighting in the Sudanese capital, the SAF successfully repelled an RSF attack on the West Kordofan State oil field of Zarqa Umm Hadid.

Despite international calls for a ceasefire, the humanitarian situation is getting worse as these battles continue.  It is noteworthy that the ongoing fighting over a five-month period caused 5,000 deaths and forced more than 4.6 million people to leave their homes. The US ambassador to Sudan, John Godfrey, expressed his displeasure with both sides of the conflict on Friday, 25 August, saying they “have demonstrated they are not fit to govern”, which caused the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs discontentment.

Reports and warnings from relief organizations and agencies detail a worsening humanitarian crisis. UNICEF reported on 4 August that 24 million people need food assistance, but that only 2.5 million of them have received it as a result of fighting, a lack of funding, and difficulties in getting aid workers into the country.  In addition to this, epidemic and famine-related threats also necessitate the provision of humanitarian aid and a ceasefire.

In conclusion, the recent developments offer preliminary signs that, if internal parties can agree, they may pave the way for a potential end to the conflict in Sudan. This does not, however, signal an end to the sharp divergence in positions between the two sides, which impedes regional mechanisms and mediation efforts to end the conflict and establish stable peace in Sudan.

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TAGGED: Sudan
Shaimaa Al-Baksh September 14, 2023
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