As the Yemeni crisis enters its ninth year, many changes have taken place on the scene that have given the impression that the crisis may take a different turn as a result of the stepped-up efforts to end it.
The prolonged crisis is the result of years of uncertainty caused by the intertwining interests of internal actors and external parties, and the failure of all efforts to reach a consensus that would lead to disengaging the components of the scene and restoring stability, which has been missing ever since the Houthis seized power in Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, in September 2014.
Influential Factors
Several indicators suggest that there have been shifts in the Yemeni crisis that could eventually lead to a scene breakthrough or, at the very least, stabilize the front lines so that they aren’t drawn into the military escalation. Among these indicators are the following:
1. Silencing Guns: The military situation is still controlled by something akin to a truce between the two parties, despite the Houthi militia’s military operations continuing on a number of fronts, including Taizz, Marib, Lahij, and others. While tensions have increased, the Houthi militia and the Yemeni army have not yet engaged in open or sharp confrontations as they had earlier in the crisis. Over the course of more than a year, Houthi attacks and strikes against Saudi Arabia diminished, both domestically and abroad. While the Houthis’ intransigence prevented the armistice from being extended and prevented its continuation by placing obstacles and restrictions before accepting it, the armistice between the two parties—which lasted for six months between April and October 2022—did not cause the military situation to escalate. Instead, the two sides have been in a state resembling an unannounced truce for the past year.
According to a report released by the United Nations Armed Conflict Data Project in April 2023, the sound of guns was muffled and violence rates decreased to their lowest levels since the crisis’ inception. This led a number of parties and external powers to move forward with using the field stalemate to discuss ways to extend the truce as an introduction to discussing peace opportunities.
2. Betting on Regional Consensus: After successfully ending the diplomatic dispute and estrangement between Tehran and Riyadh, China has used the “regional moment” and the efforts of the countries of the region to test opportunities for regional de-escalation and discuss ways of consensus in bringing about the largest political and diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East in recent years.
Given the two parties’ obvious involvement in the Yemeni crisis and their capacity to exert control, the Chinese mediation between the two countries in March 2022 would give interactions in the Yemeni scene more momentum. The Chinese mediation between the two countries in March 2022 would add more momentum to interactions on the Yemeni scene, given the clear involvement of the two parties in the Yemen crisis and their capacity to control the situation. Moreover, as a result of the interdependence between the two parties to the conflict and both Riyadh and Tehran, the likelihood that Riyadh and Tehran will be able to exert influence over the Yemeni parties and encourage them to engage in dialogue leading to a political solution has increased. Following the signing of the accord, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the accord could be a factor in resolving the Yemeni crisis. In addition, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (UN) anticipates that the resumption of political relations between the two countries will expedite the achievement of a ceasefire in Yemen. Accordingly, this consensus can help to create a favorable environment that is motivating and conducive to fostering trust between the parties involved in the Yemen conflict so that they can talk about how to resolve it or at the very least prevent it from resurgence.
3. Stepping up Confidence-Building Initiatives: The parties to the crisis have exhibited remarkable movement and interaction over the past period, as evidenced by the holding of a number of meetings and consultations to find common ground that would allow the crisis to move forward. As tensions in the region began to subside as a result of Chinese mediation, Oman stepped up its efforts to take advantage of the situation by sponsoring talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which focused primarily on a cease-fire, the reopening of the ports under the Houthis’ control, and the return of normal movement to Sana’a airport. The Saudi delegation’s trip to Sana’a in April to meet with Houthi leaders was the first direct interaction between the two sides in Yemen since 2015. This, along with a similar meeting between the Saudi delegation and Rashad Al-Alimi, the chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, and consultations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to reach agreements to stabilize the ceasefire, may indicate a degree of openness and a clear desire to resolve the current situation and discuss ways to foster trust.
The March negotiations in Geneva between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, facilitated by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, are along these lines. The negotiations resulted in the second largest exchange of prisoners between the two parties since the outbreak of the conflict, with the parties agreeing to exchange approximately 887 prisoners, including approximately 706 Houthi prisoners and 182 Yemeni government prisoners. The tour that the US envoy to Yemen made to a number of countries and parties involved in the Yemeni crisis at the beginning of May 2023 cannot be disentangled from this growing momentum.
One could argue that the two objectives of all regional and international efforts are to 1) consolidate the cease-fire and talk about extending the armistice and 2) increase trust between the parties to the crisis in order to develop a comprehensive solution and a clear understanding of the pillars upon which the anticipated settlement can be built.
The Long-Awaited Settlement
In tandem with these promising signs and determinants, multiple credible sources have revealed that they have been working on a comprehensive peace plan to present to the parties to the crisis. The initial elements of the plan point to a staged approach to dealing with the political track. The first phase begins with a cease-fire, the opening of land, sea, and air ports, and the exchange of prisoners based on the all-for-all principle. The goal of this phase is to boost trust between the crisis parties, as the files being discussed at this point are relatively straightforward. This encourages the move to stage two, which concentrates on creating a specific framework for a Yemeni dialogue on the structure of the state, the makeup of the political system, and the allocation of authority and responsibility, leading to a transitional period that could last two or three years, depending on the outcomes of the negotiations.
1. The Persistent U-Turning of Settlements: Since the Houthis took over Sana’a, all attempts to end the crisis have run afoul of the militia’s intransigence and constant reneging on all political understandings and agreements. The Houthis’ past interactions with all consultations with the legitimate government of Yemen show that they are not guaranteed to adhere to the anticipated settlement once it is reached. This is demonstrated by their rejection of the National Dialogue Conference’s outcomes, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, and the Dhahran Al-Janoub Agreement, as well as their uprising against the Kuwait and Geneva talks, and finally the 2018 Stockholm Agreement.
It has been a recurring pattern in the Yemen crisis that the Houthi militia would agree to sit down and negotiate before quickly adopting escalatory and aggressive behavior that went above and beyond what had been agreed upon. The Houthis frequently turned to negotiations or short-term agreements in order to gather their military strength and recover from setbacks or defeats before resuming their military operations and war effort in Yemen on various fronts.
2. Inter-Houthi Rifts: Given the disagreement among the Houthi militia’s leaders and within the militia itself regarding the likelihood of a settlement, settlement efforts may stall or at the very least take longer. There are currently two factions within the Houthi Movement, one of which is in favor of sitting down and talking to the other side to find a solution, arguing that doing so will stop the bleeding and losses within the Movement and give it political gains by integrating it into the scene, and the other of which is unwilling to sit down and talk and prefers the military tool over dialogue.
However, some contend that what is occurring within the Houthi Movement does not deviate from being a structured process for exchanging roles and responsibilities between these opposing currents and that the difference between them is only a tactic, by virtue of which one side exhibits some flexibility and approaches negotiations in a way that suggests a desire for peace, while the other side rejects these understandings if they fall short of the goals and objectives set by the militia and its leaders.
3. Disputes on the Legitimate Front: While the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022 was intended to create a solid and united front against the Houthis and enable integrated collective engagement with any efforts that might result in a settlement by uniting ranks, there has been a great deal of disagreement within the legitimate front over the past year, leading to occasional clashes between its constituents. These disagreements can be traced back to fundamental differences in their respective positions, ideologies, and visions.
This can be deduced from the announcement that southern parties have signed the Southern National Pact (SNP), whose content is similar to that of the constitution. In the SNP, the signatories outline their vision for the future of South Yemen and the method for negotiating southern issues, so that they become an integral part of any future agreements. This situation could make settlement efforts more difficult because it will call for agreement in principle within the legitimate front regarding the structure of the state, the position of the south generally regarding the settlement, whether the pre-unity formulation will be revisited, and whether a federal system of government will be in place, among other things that can govern the relationship between the North and the South.
Future Scenarios
Interactions surrounding the Yemeni crisis point to the crisis transitioning into a new stage, necessitating monitoring of potential outcomes. In light of the aforementioned variables and potential obstacles and pitfalls in the settlement process, we can identify the following possible paths for the crisis:
1. Adoption of the Comprehensive Settlement Plan: This scenario assumes that the Yemeni parties will accept the elaborate plan that is being developed. This scenario is predicated on a number of hypotheses, including the two sides’ belief in the viability of the cease-fire in light of the difficulty of resolving the conflict militarily in the recent past and the potential for rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran and its ability to persuade the parties to the conflict to accept a settlement. In addition, there have been recent, concerted international efforts to encourage dialogue between the conflicting parties in order to forge a political compromise.
This scenario is supported by the stability of the ceasefire despite it is not being formally extended, the presence of China as a guarantee of improving relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which primarily manifests in understandings on Yemen, as well as potential efforts made by the United States in the upcoming periods through which it aims to achieve a breakthrough to be counted in its favor, particularly given that Yemen has been at the top of the White House’s priority list since President Joe Biden took office. Washington may therefore step up its efforts in this area to stop Beijing from seizing the chance and presenting itself as the region’s peacemaker. Moreover, Riyadh’s efforts to end the war in Yemen, and Tehran’s desire to break out of the isolation it has been placed in and invest in rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, even if only temporarily, could eventually lead to reaching that settlement.
2. Relieving the Crisis and Extending the Negotiation Period: This scenario assumes that the settlement efforts will be successful in getting both parties to agree to prolong the armistice and defuse the conflict while extending the negotiation process. This scenario is predicated on a number of assumptions, including the lack of trust between the parties to the crisis and the consequent difficulty in achieving a complete breakthrough in this regard. Both sides will need to gauge the other’s good faith and commitment to the negotiation process.
Beyond this, there are differences within each front. Before beginning the negotiations for the transitional phase, for instance, a consensus within the front of legitimacy must be reached, especially with regard to the status of the south. This may take more time to accomplish. Iran may be inclined to maintain its right to choose the appropriate course of action, be it a continuation of the pacification or a return to escalation, depending on the extent of the solidity or fragility of the agreement with Riyadh and the limits of what can be accomplished, as well as the difficulty of abandoning the Houthi card, with which it is adept at bargaining in a variety of other files.
3. Failure of Settlement Efforts and Return to Escalation: This scenario assumes that attempts to defuse the situation will fail and that the Houthi militia will take advantage of the ceasefire to bolster its military power before escalating the situation once more. This scenario is likely, especially if the Houthi militia believes that the potential benefits of the negotiations are incompatible with its aspirations for its continued presence on the Yemeni scene. International reports confirming Iran’s continued provision of weapons and military hardware to the Houthis, the Houthis’ ongoing efforts to mobilize their ranks, as well as a number of estimates suggesting the Houthis are not serious about peace, all lend support to this scenario.
In short, despite mounting political momentum, attempts to invest in regional pacification efforts, and the desire of the international community to make progress in the Yemen crisis, the interactions between the parties involved show that it is impossible to predict what the scene will look like in the future. The breakthrough will continue to be dependent on the boundaries of international consensus and the capacity of regional and international actors to pressure domestic parties to accept a settlement or to stop the escalation from spiraling out of control in the event that the parties to the crisis resort to escalation once more.
