In 1995, during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, Arab countries managed to include a resolution calling for the creation of a Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as part of the NPT’s permanent extension. Thirty years on, however, this goal remains elusive. The process to rid the region of nuclear weapons has made no meaningful progress, leaving Arab states locked into a course of action that has proven fruitless. This demands a critical reevaluation and the adoption of new approaches.
Three Decades, No Forward Motion
The 1995 NPT Review Conference was a landmark event, as the NPT’s expiration loomed and global consensus leaned toward its indefinite extension. Arab states saw this as a chance to advance the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East on the conference’s agenda. They secured a “deal,” consenting to the NPT’s indefinite extension in return for a formal commitment to what came to be known as the “Resolution on the Middle East.” Supported by the depositary states—the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom—the resolution urged all Middle Eastern countries to accede to the NPT and abstain from developing or acquiring nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But while the intent was clear, one key name was absent: Israel, the region’s sole nuclear power, estimated to possess 80–200 nuclear warheads. Post-conference, non-signatory Arab states promptly joined the NPT, believing this would build international backing and pressure Israel, especially through the resolution’s sponsors, who committed to fostering a WMD-free zone.
By the 2000 Review Conference, every regional state except Israel had signed the NPT, leaving Israel unbound by any legal commitments. Arab states advocated for explicitly naming Israel in the final statement, calling for its NPT membership and the subjection of its facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The United States countered by demanding Iraq be cited for non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. Although Arab states considered naming Israel and adopting the “13 Practical Steps on Nonproliferation and Disarmament” as achievements, no concrete actions or implementation frameworks were established for the WMD-free zone.
A changing political context in 2005 derailed momentum. The Arab Group insisted that the Middle East Resolution be included as a separate item on the agenda, while major powers shifted focus toward Iran and North Korea’s proliferation challenges and sought to downplay earlier commitments made in 1995 and 2000. The resulting deadlock led to the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, which ended without a concluding document reflecting global agreement on nuclear proliferation.
In the 2010 Review Conference, Arab states reinvigorated the WMD-free zone initiative, gaining consensus to hold a dedicated Conference in 2012 with all Middle Eastern states and selecting a host country. The UN Secretary-General and sponsoring states were directed to appoint a facilitator to forge agreement on the Conference’s agenda and procedures. However, Israel, supported by the United States—a 1995 resolution sponsor—declined participation, citing an unfavorable regional security environment. Egypt responded by withdrawing from the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2013 Review Conference in Geneva, in protest against the continued failure to implement the 1995 and 2000 commitments.
During the 2015 Review Conference, Arab states resolved to convene the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ) sessions, within six months, with Russia proposing a deadline of March 1, 2016. But again, no consensus emerged. The 2015 Review Conference collapsed without a concluding document. Making matters worse, the United States presented a working paper at the subsequent prep meeting declaring that the NPT review conferences were not the right platform to address the WMD-free zone issue. This marked a major reversal by the United States, a co-sponsor of the 1995 resolution, after two decades of nominal support.
Facing this reversal, the Arab Group submitted a resolution to the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in 2018, calling on the Secretary-General to convene an annual conference tasked with drafting a legally binding treaty to establish a WMD-free zone. The resolution passed with 107 votes in favor, 71 abstentions, and opposition from the United States, Israel, and Micronesia. Israel, as anticipated, boycotted the effort, and the United States dismissed it as counterproductive, claiming it would undermine international efforts to establish a WMD-free Middle East.
At the most recent Review Conference in 2022 (postponed from 2020 due to Covid-19), Arab states sought backing for the MEWMDFZ conference sessions, but the Conference failed due to Russia’s objections to Ukraine war-related clauses, resulting in no final declaration for the second consecutive review.
Even though Israel and the United States persisted in boycotting the MEWMDFZ conference, Arab states pressed forward, convening five rounds of it, the most recent in November 2024, attended by Arab states, Iran, France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and specialized entities. Lacking leverage, Arab states could only urge “efforts to convince and encourage” Israel and the United States to join. In January 2024, the Arab Senior Officials Committee on Nuclear Weapons, convened in Cairo, proposed forming an open-membership contact group tasked with engaging both countries.
Will Review Conferences Ever Pave the Way to Middle East Denuclearization?
The past thirty years have demonstrated that NPT Review Conferences are no longer a viable path for advancing the denuclearization of the Middle East. The pledges obtained by Arab states in prior conferences—in which Israel does not participate and which are heavily influenced by the prevailing political context—remain hollow decisions without enforcement mechanisms.
With persistent double standards, Review Conferences are not expected to make headway on a WMD-free Middle East. Report of the fifth session of the MEWMDFZ conference expressed “serious concern over the distortion of the original balance of the pillars of the NPT in favor of a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar, while simultaneously neglecting the pillars of peaceful use and disarmament.” This translates to blocking states from developing nuclear capabilities, limiting peaceful nuclear energy applications, and ignoring disarmament commitments.
In an environment marked by rising tensions and declining confidence in non-proliferation frameworks—evidenced by Russia’s nuclear threats post-Ukraine war and Gulf voices advocating for a nuclear deterrent against Iran’s nuclear advancements—Review Conferences are unlikely to yield progress.
Above all, a nuclear-free region cannot be achieved through a legal treaty crafted without the region’s sole nuclear power, Israel, and boycotted by the United States. Compounding this, the decision-making rules set in the first session of the MEWMDFZ conference mandate unanimous agreement from all regional states on procedural and substantive issues. And of course, it’s easy to predict what comes next: Israel will reject the treaty after years of Arab negotiations, and we’ll be right back at square one—trapped in another cycle of talks, while regional security remains in limbo.
Alternative Approach
Israel has long declined to join the NPT, arguing it is a small state facing existential threats from a hostile region and demanding resolution of regional conflicts before addressing denuclearization. It has also leveraged Iran’s nuclear program as a cover to sidestep efforts for a nuclear-free Middle East. Yet, since the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Israel’s cited threats have arguably waned with the fall of regimes in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the dismantling of their WMD programs, and the erosion of the military capabilities of “Axis of Resistance” groups in the region. Additionally, current negotiations on Iran’s nuclear file could lead to a settlement that undermines the threat narrative Israel has used to avoid discussions on a nuclear-free Middle East.
From this perspective, Arab states should gear up for this emerging phase and begin engaging the United States and other permanent Security Council members on the “post-Iran nuclear agreement” era. Within this framework, a new, phased strategy could be suggested, commencing with regional security dialogues as a transitional step to forge “security agreements” or confidence-building measures, setting the stage for subsequent talks on a WMD-free Middle East. The specifics of these agreements or measures, and their connection or separation from political issues like peace processes and normalization, can be addressed subsequently.
Analysts like Salik Naeem and Nir Hassid have advocated for introducing confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Middle East first, rather than immediately pursuing demands. Yet, their proposals centered on military capabilities, which I believe must be sidestepped in the early stages of security discussions to avoid replicating the unsuccessful Arms Control and Regional Security in the Midd (ACRS) talks following the 1991 Madrid Conference. One could argue that the mere initiation and continuation of such talks constitutes a CBM, reducing regional tensions regardless of outcomes, as military escalation typically occurs only when dialogue ceases.
Building on this, the following actions are recommended for the upcoming period:
- Declare the Arab states’ intention to block consensus at the upcoming Review Conference, ensuring no final document is adopted as long as regional concerns and the 1995 and 2000 resolutions are disregarded, positioning the conference as the third in a row to fail and jeopardizing the risk of unraveling non-proliferation and disarmament frameworks.
- Organize a meeting between Arab states and Iran to explore efforts for a WMD-free region in the post-Iran nuclear deal context, given Israel and the United States’ absence from Middle East Conference sessions.
- Engage in discussions with the United States and other permanent Security Council members (individually or collectively) to express regional concerns about implementing the Middle East Resolution and probe views on the next steps.
- Suggest launching regional security talks involving Arab states, Iran, and Israel, with backing from major powers, as a transitional phase to reach agreement on incremental measures that progress based on advancements made.
- Allow the parties to define the nature of these measures during discussions, ensuring they exclude military capabilities and are not predetermined or borrowed from other regions’ models.
- Transition from regional security talks to negotiations on a WMD-free zone once sufficient progress, as deemed necessary by regional states, is made to address the security dilemma.
In short, three decades after the 1995 NPT Review Conference envisioned a nuclear-free Middle East, progress remains stalled. A shift to pragmatic, phased regional security dialogues—especially involving Iran, Israel, and major powers—could foster trust and lay the groundwork for inclusive disarmament.
