The two statements issued last Friday by the Presidential Council and the Libyan Parliament announcing the cessation of military operations in all Libyan territories were widely welcomed by all concerned parties. Perhaps, this is the first time that the reaction towards a step related to the Libyan crisis was compatible in this way. Undoubtedly, this represents a positive feature, but at the same time it raises many questions. You will not stop at the point of being surprised by this celebration of a long-awaited “step”, despite the clarity of the causes that have been preventing it from happening, in addition to knowing the parties that represented the obstructing side of that constitutive step. In this case, talking about a political consensus without achieving it seems absurd and appears as a case of spin in place.
Therefore, despite the fact that the article is concerned with “what comes after”, as its title states, the reference is to the necessity of disclosure in identifying the party that prevented and impedes access to a security equation under which the initial launch can be made to discuss the system of government, elections, the constitution, and many institutional work structures which many are now working hard on.
There is a clear text in the Al-Wefaq government’s statement talking about the exit of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya, and here a dense fog begins surrounding the lines of “after” recognition of this kind. If Fayez Al-Sarraj thinks that others can accept any meaning of this proposition except that the Turkish forces are the ones realistically intended by “foreign forces”, and that the “mercenaries” are those who were brought from Syria and recently from Somalia with the knowledge of Turkey and Qatar, and are stationed in more than one location in the west of Libya, including the capital, Tripoli, which, hours before the aforementioned Al-Wefaq statement, witnessed youth demonstrations in yellow vests expressing their protest and distress from the growing foreign elements capturing the capital from its Libyan people.
Then, there will be a synthesis of an “absurd situation”, if it appears in the future, after Al-Wefaq’s statement, as a reproduction of its accusations against the other party with the same accusation that was revealed to be insignificant and that had no single evidence. At a time when international news agencies report the visits of the Turkish Minister of War in the military camps and bases that Al-Wefaq has bounded itself by allowing them to exist. With the Turkish Minister accompanying his Qatari counterpart on his last visit, the matter moved to be mere plans to develop this presence and arrange a new mechanism to cover its expenses, and to start to discuss and inspect the expansion of the acquisition of “coastal foundations” in particular.
These details did not stop at the point of domestic popular anger only. Rather, the German Minister, Heiko Maas, spoke about them on his recent visit to Tripoli, indicating that the situation in this way appears to be dangerous and destructive to any international efforts towards the paths of a future solution. Here the fog returns to intensify about the dimensions of the Turkish-Qatari grand plan, which is being carried out in full swing in the western Libyan region without being concerned with these variables. This matter raises a logical question about the meaning and real motive for the issuance of the Al-Wefaq statement days after the departure of the German Foreign Minister. Did the release of the statement come as a form of relieving the pressures that Al-Wefaq began to feel serious from international parties that it cannot manoeuvre with? For there is also American pressure on Tripoli assuring that there is no escape from engaging in the political process, and that the Egyptian Initiative is the closest and most mature to interact with. In addition, the Egyptian red lines that were announced were subjected to an American assessment that entailed that an armed clash between Egypt and Turkey in Libya is enough to abort and add to the confusion of the fragile security equation in North Africa and the Mediterranean waters. This prompted the United States to enforce some of its influential envoys on the eve of the issuance of these statements, to conduct a series of meetings, which certainly contributed to extracting this statement from Al-Wefaq accepting the ceasefire.
Optimists see what was stated in the Al-Wefaq statement as a proposal that represents a viewpoint converging in part with an American vision that was tested weeks ago regarding the demilitarized city of Sirte as a preliminary step. At a time when realists, and many from inside Libya, have read what was stated in the statement as conditions that facilitate Al-Wefaq’s abrogation of its commitment to stop military operations, or allow the exit the mercenaries, as soon as the other side refuses the position of “Sirte” according to this formula. Along the line of that reading, the statement appears actual at this time and represents a “mobilizing pause” that allows the Turkish ally to keep the gains it made in the West, and gives it a time until next March to complete the Libyan coast bases project, and the acquisition of ports that began years ago and needs to be legalized with seemingly legal agreements, enabling it to keep them in light of the upcoming settlements. Options and alternatives of this kind are not unobserved by many, including Cairo which is quite aware of the size of Turkish ambitions and plans, and its launch of its extended red lines until now was a response readily facing this destructive Ottoman project for the future of Libya, which is betting today on the possibility of pushing the matter again to division and keeping its gains in the West, where it invests time in tightening its soft grip on the area, respectively. In this way, the leaders of Al-Wefaq, in light of the competition that is now taking place among them, have let the West as a whole start an adventure with insecure consequences, the matter that brings the scene back to square one.
A dense fog envelops the Libyan scene, perhaps more difficult than the many stages it has gone through before. Today, there are those who think that what is next is the station of the last meters, which requires investment to reap the gains and areas of influence, without considering the areas of danger and threat and the mines lurking in the sides and details of a very complex regional scene. So far, no one has experienced the collection of oil revenues and how to distribute them. At the same time, the answer has not yet been formed about the tens of thousands of militants and where they will go. Moreover, the main equation of regional balance remains that no one will ever accept that Turkey be on the other side capturing half of the promised Libya in its grip.
A version of this article appeared in print in the August 24, 2020 edition of Al-Watan newspaper.
