On March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron sparked a strategic debate over whether France could extend its nuclear deterrent to protect its European allies, given the threats facing the continent from Russia. His remarks, delivered in a nationally broadcast address, were widely covered by European media, as the issue has become central to ongoing discussions about Europe’s defense and security autonomy.
By referring to “deterrence,” Macron was unmistakably alluding to France’s nuclear capabilities. This prompted Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to respond two days later in a speech before parliament, stating: “We would certainly be safer if we had our own nuclear arsenal.” Tusk justified his stance by pointing to “profound change of American geopolitics.”
The renowned British magazine The Economist described Donald Trump’s policies as a “diplomatic arson” and interpreted Tusk’s remarks not as an explicit call for Poland to acquire nuclear weapons, but rather as a reaction to a proposal by Friedrich Merz, leader of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Merz had urged urgent talks with France and Britain to introduce a “complementary force” to the US.
However, The Economist expressed skepticism about such ideas, arguing that the concept of “extended nuclear deterrence” is unrealistic. From a practical standpoint, it is highly unlikely that any country would commit to using its nuclear arsenal on behalf of another country. The magazine further explained that Europe has remained under the US nuclear umbrella for nearly 80 years, largely because Washington recognized the impracticality of relying on another state for nuclear protection, leading it to build and deploy a massive global nuclear arsenal of its own.
European concerns over security are not uniform, even within this collective strategic debate, both before and after the discussion initiated by the French president. Some countries see an imminent threat, viewing US policy shifts as a direct risk to their national security, while major powers are more cautious, despite sharing similar concerns. In general, these states are reluctant to step into areas where the strategic costs debated in European meetings could escalate into a hefty bill, leading to real and immediate security disruptions—rather than just lingering concerns sparked by an American administration that has yet to settle many of its policies.
Today, France remains the only nuclear power in the European Union following Britain’s exit from the bloc. Notably, Paris has never joined NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, which oversees nuclear policy and collective deterrence for NATO members. Instead, since the 1950s, France has opted for an independent nuclear deterrent, convinced that the US nuclear umbrella cannot be fully relied upon.
In its analysis of the current situation, The Economist recalled that in 1995, Britain and France agreed that the “the vital interests of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk”—a subtle expansion of the horizon of French deterrence. However, President Emmanuel Macron has been unequivocal in asserting that France’s nuclear deterrent is a “sovereign weapon,” exclusively French from beginning to end.
However, the search for ideas to strengthen Europe’s security framework is not limited to the complex legal and operational challenges of nuclear deterrence. On the other side of the Atlantic, questions are also being raised from a different perspective. The Wall Street Journal recently published a significant report under the direct and provocative headline: “How Europe’s Military Stacks Up Against Russia Without U.S. Support.” The report acknowledged that while Europe collectively possesses a strong and well-equipped military force, it still remains heavily reliant on American support in critical areas such as vital intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, transport aircraft and command-and-control.
The report highlighted key statistics on Europe’s combined military strength, describing it as immense when compared to Russia. It acknowledged that while the Russian military has been weakened by the war in Ukraine, its ability to quickly rebuild poses a long-term strategic threat. According to the report, Europe has a larger standing military, with 1.97 million troops, compared to Russia’s 1.34 million. The continent also holds a major advantage in key military assets, possessing 32,700 armored vehicles, compared to Russia’s 10,700. In artillery, Europe has 2,200 units, outpacing Russia’s 1,400. The gap is most pronounced in air power, with Europe maintaining 2,100 combat aircraft, while Russia, at best, has only 1,100.
The US side does not seem to regard this numerical superiority as a decisive factor in ensuring a stable European security equation. Instead, it sees Europe’s dependence on the US for air defense systems and intelligence as the primary challenge and its weakest link. This concern has led NATO to focus its recent military exercises on addressing these vulnerabilities by ramping up collective defense programs—an effort led by US military officials to boost European forces’ preparedness. However, a major hurdle remains—Europe’s defense industry is still too small, fragmented, and slow, as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte recently warned when discussing the shortfall in military equipment. European leaders now face the urgent task of finding immediate alternatives to strengthen their defense capabilities with greater autonomy. Closing these military gaps would require massive investments and time, luxuries that Europe cannot afford to wait for.
