The launch of Hamas’ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and Israel’s corresponding Operation Iron Swords have marked the onset of major regional changes. Although Israel’s stated aim is to eradicate Hamas, the majority of analytical outlooks focused on the involvement of other parties, such as Hizbullah, the Houthis, and pro-Iranian factions in Iraq and Syria.
Other analyses centred on the international dimension, highlighting the US’ unconditional political and military support for Israel. Meanwhile, other perspectives examined the economic consequences of the war, particularly its impact on the energy market. Some analyses explored scenarios regarding the future of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the invasion.
Very few have tackled the future of Hamas, especially in light of the difficulty of envisaging potential scenarios at this stage. Nonetheless, the future of Hamas remains a lynchpin in untangling this very complicated present.
Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant outlined the war in the Gaza Strip as consisting of three phases. The first focuses on dismantling Hamas and destroying its infrastructure. The second aims to eradicate the resistance. The third seeks to establish a new security system in Gaza and relieve Israel of its responsibility for the Strip’s daily affairs.
Undoubtedly, Israel’s defeat on 7 October will remain the catalyst driving its ground invasion of Gaza to crush Hamas. However, several questions remain. Are Israel’s objectives practical and achievable? Is Israel ready to handle the post-Hamas phase?
It will be no easy feat to eliminate Hamas. Israel’s mission is a highly complex challenge due to several factors. First, there is the difficulty of conducting military operations within the densely populated Gaza Strip, which is home to approximately 2.3 million people. Secondly, Hamas holds more than 200 Israeli hostages. Thirdly, Hamas uses a network of tunnels, which Israeli forces must penetrate deeply into the Strip to dismantle. Some of the movement’s leaders can’t be easily located, while others reside abroad.
Previous Israeli attempts to carry out ground operations in the Gaza Strip, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2009, aimed at stopping rocket attacks launched from the strip, have failed. In the long run, the resistance was able to resume its attacks. Similarly, Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in 2014 was initially declared as successful in weakening Hamas, but over time it became evident that it too had failed.
Regarding the vision for the future of the Gaza Strip in the event of Hamas’ elimination, Israel has not clearly articulated its plans. Statements from Israeli officials indicate a lack of any coherent vision for the post-Hamas period.
The overthrow of Hamas without the presence of a moderate Palestinian force to replace it, especially considering the declining popularity of the Palestinian Authority among Palestinians, could lead to a potential vacuum, resulting in a significant wave of chaos and instability.
It is important to note that eliminating Hamas does not necessarily guarantee the elimination of other resistance factions, which may continue their activities against the occupation forces.
If Israel assumes direct control of the Gaza Strip, this will not be its first time. Israel controlled Gaza from 1967 until 2005 when it withdrew due to significant security threats from Palestinian resistance factions. If Israel were to regain control of the Gaza Strip, that would probably strengthen Palestinian resistance and exacerbate divisions within Israel itself, considering the high cost that Israel would have to bear.
A study conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2017, titled “Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza,” addressed the conflict between Israel and Hamas from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 to the end of Operation Protective Edge in 2014. The study highlighted Israel’s military ability to eliminate Hamas, but cautioned that doing so could be more perilous than not. Eliminating Hamas may result in the rise of a more extreme movement or force Israel to assume direct responsibility for governing Gaza.
Given the intricacy of all these factors, several plausible scenarios can be anticipated regarding the future of Hamas. The first scenario involves the possibility of Israel undertaking a comprehensive ground operation that successfully achieves its goals and destroys Hamas. However, the feasibility of this scenario remains questionable, considering the aforementioned constraints. The second scenario involves the failure of a ground operation to achieve its objectives and eliminate Hamas, given the challenges of prolonged ground involvement in the Gaza Strip and the historical precedents that reflect this difficulty.
The third scenario centres around a strategy of partial resolution. It involves the Israeli occupation army entering the Gaza Strip with limited ground forces, avoiding a comprehensive ground engagement. Israel could then portray this operation as a significant achievement, aimed at restoring its reputation. Subsequently, a ceasefire could be implemented in response to international pressure and regional mediation efforts.
The scenario that will eventually play out depends on Hamas’ resilience and its ability to withstand military pressure, the level of support Israel receives from the US, the potential for a prisoner release agreement, and international pressure to effect a ceasefire. So far everything remains on the table.
This article first appeared on Ahram Online on November 1 and a version of it appeared in print in the November 2, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
