Escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa, together with internal upheavals within its states, are making room for external actors to influence political and security developments in this strategically vital region. Local crises are increasingly intertwined with the broader web of regional and international balance-of-power struggles. At the same time, the maritime linkage from the Suez Canal through the Bab Al-Mandeb has rendered Horn of Africa politics central to the security calculations of Arab countries.
In some respects, this pattern is reminiscent of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the Horn of Africa was viewed through a colonial lens. The focus was on this region’s unique geographic position at the juncture of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and on developing infrastructure for colonial expansion, such as the ports of Aden, Berbera and Mogadishu. Colonial engagement with the region tended to ignore existing geographic, political or tribal formations, playing political, tribal, ethnic, and religious groupings off against each other in order to consolidate strategic footholds and expand control. The definition of the Horn of Africa was thereby broadened to encompass a geographically vast and demographically diverse space.
Today, the region’s geopolitical significance extends beyond its major ports to large-scale infrastructure projects, international transport and communications networks, and shared resources that drive economic and political interaction. As regional and international powers have deepened their engagement, the Red Sea and its maritime chokepoints have become arenas of competition and tension, and platforms for economic and security cooperation. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea are inextricably intertwined, and so too are their prospects of security and stability.
Regional and international actors increasingly calibrate their positions on the internal conflicts within the Horn of Africa based on the risks that upheaval and possible state collapse pose to Red Sea shipping lanes and global trade networks and supply chains. In other words, for them the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations is informed less by principle than by pragmatic considerations of interest.
Amid a turbulent regional environment, Ethiopia’s escalatory discourse regarding access to the sea has added another dimension to the cross-border tensions. It raises the spectre of open confrontation with Eritrea, which Ethiopia accuses of intervening militarily in support of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Tensions are once again mounting between the TPLF and Addis Ababa, raising the prospect of a renewed confrontation within Ethiopia whose internal fault lines have cross-border extensions. Internal unrest in the Tigray, Amhara or Somali regions could spiral into a broader regional war.
This situation also overlaps with developments in the war in Sudan, which presents another set of regional and international dimensions. The support networks and alliances that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in particular, relies on, have raised concerns that the conflict might spill over into neighbouring states. For example, recent reports suggest that military training sites in Ethiopia’s Benishangul region are linked to the RSF. If the logistical operations of the Sudanese belligerents become more entangled with the Ethiopian arena, they will add yet another complicating factor to the geopolitical rivalry surrounding the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The same applies to the security situation in Somalia. Here, too, regional and international interests intersect with local developments – specifically as relates to terrorism and the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The recent controversy surrounding the restructuring of the African Union mission in the country and funding shortages for counterterrorism operations have heightened concerns over the ability to sustain the stability of the state in one of the region’s most geopolitically sensitive countries.
The emergent controversy surrounding the recognition of Somaliland has further complicated the Somali question. Israel’s widely condemned backing of the breakaway region not only jeopardises Somalia’s future stability and sovereignty, but also has far-reaching implications for the security balance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Unilateral recognition of Somaliland risks transforming an internal Somali political issue into a geopolitical pressure tool linked to ports, military bases, and maritime dominance. Further steps in this direction will both deepen internal Somali division and increase the tendency to instrumentalise Somalia’s internal fractures within the broader competition over the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Amid growing complexities in the Horn of Africa, regional security dynamics are increasingly influenced by strategic interests related to vital maritime routes and infrastructures stretching along the western coast of the Red Sea. Ports in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia have become the loci of rapidly shifting patterns of cooperation and competition among local, regional and international actors – often diverging from traditional alignments. At the same time, interventions by Middle East and global powers – often framed as efforts to promote stability – reflect the mounting polarisation.
Crucially, competition over the development and control of ports is no longer just economic. It has become increasingly militarised as rival powers vie with each other for building naval bases and logistical facilities. Such moves are part of the efforts of various regional powers to extend spheres of influence along the Red Sea, thereby strengthening their leverage in negotiating processes related to ongoing crises and future security arrangements in the region.
The recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland illustrates the link between interventions in internal Somali affairs and the competition over Red Sea security, ports, and maritime corridors. This was balanced by Mogadishu’s decision to readjust its relations with external partners in the development of port and maritime infrastructures. The move, which was framed as a step to strengthen national defence and sovereignty, opened the door for other regional powers to enhance their military and security cooperation with Mogadishu – reflecting the growing awareness of Somalia’s strategic weight in the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Turkey is among the main regional actors that has steadily developed a strong presence in Somalia, continuing with a strategy it has pursued since 2011. Starting from a platform of humanitarian assistance, Ankara gradually shifted to forging institutional partnerships with the Somali government with a focus on defence infrastructure, expanding to energy and maritime resources. In this context, Turkey’s dispatch of a drilling vessel to Somali deep waters was not merely an economic move but also a strategic one calculated to secure a firmer Turkish foothold in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea.
Despite the increasingly fierce competition over Red Sea routes and ports, the region has also seen diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing tensions from spiralling into open confrontation. However, these efforts face two immediate challenges. The first is the risk that Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions might escalate into direct confrontation and the second is that the Sudanese war might expand into neighbouring countries, generating widespread instability. A possible third challenge is a growing trend to recognise breakaway Somaliland. The repercussions of this could aggravate threats to Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.
The strategic yet volatile Horn of Africa appears to be in a delicate transitional phase in which de-escalation efforts struggle against the polarising dynamics of regional and international power struggles. The future of this region is contingent on the ability of regional and international actors to manage the precarious balance between cooperation and competition.
