Nigeria is grappling with a renewed threat tied to the resurgence of the Lakurawa militia in the northern part of Kebbi State and the northwestern Sokoto State as of September 2024. After fading into the shadows following coordinated counterterrorism efforts by Nigerian and Nigerien forces in 2018, the group has roared back to life, launching a string of terrorist operations in late 2024 and early 2025. Hence, several key observations can be made regarding the origins of Lakurawa, the context of its activities, its human and logistical capabilities, and the associated security implications, which can be outlined as follows:
1. The Origins of the Lakurawa Militia: The Lakurawa militia was formed in 1997 in Niger under the command of Ibrahim Bare Mainassara. Its core mission was to safeguard pastoral communities from rampant cattle theft, especially in western Niger, where it effectively targeted armed bandits. Bare’s assassination in 1999, however, cast a shadow over the group’s future. When Mamadou Tandja took power, he attempted to sought to integrate Lakurawa into the National Guard of Niger (GNN), but internal political rifts derailed this plan.
The inability to integrate Lakurawa into the GNN prompted many of its members to establish autonomous armed factions. A pivotal moment came in 2012 when several Lakurawa fighters aligned with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), which had split from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2011. This marked a dramatic shift, turning former state-supported militiamen into terrorists and rebels.
When France initiated Operation Serval in early 2013 to drive terrorist organizations out of northern Mali, many MOJWA combatants, including ex-Lakurawa members, were uprooted. Compelled to flee, some headed south, crossing into Niger’s border areas before ultimately resettling in Nigeria’s northwest.
2. Lakurawa’s Shift to Nigeria’s Northwest: According to most accounts, local leaders in northwestern Nigeria called upon the Lakurawa militia in 2017 to tackle banditry and shield communities. At first, Lakurawa effectively thwarted bandit assaults. Over time, however, the militia betrayed the communities it was meant to protect, imposing its rigid ideology. It coerced herders into paying livestock taxes disguised as zakat, publicly whipped villagers for acts like dancing or playing music, and carried out assaults on local security forces.
This behavior triggered a coordinated crackdown by the Nigerian and Nigerien militaries in late 2018. Although Lakurawa members lingered in the area after the operations, they laid low, avoiding further attacks.
Their resurgence came in September 2021 in Sokoto State, fueled by growing tensions between bandits and the Yan Sakai vigilante groups (community-driven militias in northern Nigeria formed to defend against terrorist threats). On this occasion, bandits and Fulani communities enlisted Lakurawa to challenge the Yan Sakai, whose aggressive raids on Fulani herders had surged.
3. Key Drivers of Lakurawa’s Activities in Northwestern Nigeria: The surge of the Lakurawa militia in northwestern Nigeria is driven by factors similar to those that propelled Boko Haram’s ascent in the northeast. These include rampant poverty, limited access to education, and the growing influence of Salafi thought. Furthermore, the rural northwest suffers from a near-total absence of Nigerian security forces, as government institutions and infrastructure are heavily skewed toward urban centers, leaving countless villages with little to no state authority.
Compounding this is the collapse of security cooperation among Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members following a series of military coups in the Sahel region since 2020. The Nigerian military attributed Lakurawa’s resurgence in September 2024 to a breakdown in security coordination between Niger and Nigeria, triggered by the suspension of joint border patrols after the Nigerien coup in July 2023.
4. Human and Logistical Capabilities of the Lakurawa Militia: In 2017, the Lakurawa militia was estimated to have fewer than 50 members. However, a UN report from February 2025 indicated that its ranks had swelled to over 200 fighters, drawn from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, highlighting the ease of cross-border movement.
Generally, Lakurawa offers material incentives to attract recruits, including cash, seeds, farming tools, and irrigation equipment—items in high demand in a region severely impacted by climate change and the loss of agriculture-based livelihoods. The militia has also leveraged social media to spread extremist ideology and recruit unemployed youth.
In terms of logistical capabilities, Lakurawa possesses advanced weaponry alongside small arms, light weapons, and explosives. Additionally, it employs drones for surveillance of local communities and military formations across the regions where it operates.
5. Lakurawa’s Tactical Playbook: Tracking Lakurawa’s operations highlights a trio of core strategies. First, it infiltrated local communities. Lakurawa initially positioned itself as a guardian of northwestern Nigeria’s residents, tackling banditry, abductions, and livestock theft. After fulfilling this role, it lingered, forging marital ties with locals and recruiting members. Over time, it turned against the very communities it once defended.
Second, Lakurawa capitalized on chaos. The militia exploited ongoing tensions in northwestern Nigeria, where farmers and herders—particularly Hausa and Fulani—were locked in persistent conflict. The resulting disorder and escalating violence drove desperate local populations to seek any form of protection.
Third, it imported militant jihadists. Lakurawa tapped into the rising extremist rhetoric across the Sahel and West Africa, imposing its radical ideas. This bolstered its recruitment efforts and made it harder to counter. In this context, a February 2025 UN report suggested the possibility of Lakurawa’s affiliation with the Daesh in West Africa (DWF).
6. Security Fallout from Lakurawa’s Operations: Several terrorist groups are active in Nigeria, most notably DWF, the Boko Haram, the al-Qaeda-linked Ansaru, and Dar al-Salam, a Boko Haram offshoot. Additionally, Nigerian media reported on April 18 the rise of a new Salafi group called Mahmuda, which attacked residential areas around Kinji in north-central Nigeria.
Meanwhile, a fierce struggle persists in northeastern Nigeria between DWF and Boko Haram, driven byDWF’s efforts to seize territories under Boko Haram’s control. According to former fighters from both factions, since 2021, their internal battles have claimed more lives than their encounters with state security forces.
Additionally, in northwestern Nigeria, armed bandits wreak havoc on local communities through crimes like ransom kidnappings, asserting de facto dominance over large areas. Lakurawa’s activities intensify these mounting security challenges. Should Lakurawa expand its reach, forge alliances with bandits, or align with other terrorist organizations, the severity of the security threat could escalate dramatically, impacting Nigeria and potentially spilling over its borders.
7. Risks of Depending on Militias to Maintain Security: Lakurawa serves as a stark example of how state-sponsored militias can spiral out of control. Created to safeguard pastoral communities, it later splintered into autonomous combatants, some of whom joined terrorist groups. Its growing presence in northern Nigeria now exacerbates regional security challenges.
Broadly speaking, militias may initially provide temporary protection and support to the communities they emerge from or enter. Over time, however, they entrench their influence and adapt their methods, often transforming into rebel forces, merging with criminal networks, or aligning with other armed groups. This trajectory intensifies violence and fuels regional instability.
In sum, Nigeria faces escalating security challenges fueled by social, economic, and security dynamics. The Lakurawa militia emerges as a critical threat, owing to its agile tactics and ability to adapt. Without early intervention to curb its influence, it could transform into a regional terrorist organization. This demands ongoing security efforts to suppress the group, coupled with initiatives to address the socioeconomic conditions that primarily fuel its operations.
