By using ECSS site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
  • Home
  • International Relations
    International Relations
    Show More
    Top News
    Direct Messages: The Eighth Tripartite Summit of Mediterranean countries and Turkey’s role
    October 30, 2020
    Growing international rejection of the coup in Mali
    July 25, 2021
    Latent Escalation: Will Calm in the Eastern Mediterranean Last in 2022?
    January 20, 2022
    Latest News
    A historic role: Egypt and the Palestinian cause since 1948
    May 23, 2026
    Employing maritime corridors in conflicts: Lessons learned
    May 20, 2026
    Israel’s security and economic conundrum:How does Israel confront the challenges of a protracted war with Iran?
    May 2, 2026
    Reshaping the US position toward Israel: From the erosion of the old consensus to a new conflict across parties, state, and society
    April 23, 2026
  • Defense & Security
    Defense & Security
    Show More
    Top News
    Reasons and Ramifications of Al-Shabaab’s Retreat from its Positions
    January 30, 2023
    Reading into the Global Terrorism Index 2024: The Toll of Terrorist Activity and Most Lethal Groups (1)
    March 6, 2024
    Afghan Peace Process: Cautious Optimism
    August 17, 2020
    Latest News
    Between two camps: Reading into ISIS discourse on the US-Israeli war on Iran
    April 15, 2026
    Encrypted messages “Roaring Lion”: The hidden messages behind the name of the operation against Iran
    March 11, 2026
    Iran war developments
    March 9, 2026
    Manufacturing the enemy : Reframing terrorism in contemporary Western discourse
    March 7, 2026
  • Public Policy
    Public Policy
    Show More
    Top News
    The Law of General Average: Ever Given Compensation Crisis
    August 19, 2021
    Successive Increases: The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Rebar Prices in Egypt
    May 16, 2022
    Long Shadows: The impact of informality on economic recovery
    August 4, 2021
    Latest News
    US trade policy in 2026: International moves and strategic implications
    May 25, 2026
    Analysis| Egypt economic path and IMF negotiations amid escalating regional energy crisis
    May 11, 2026
    From global shock to Egypt’s economy: Analyzing the impact of the Iran war on energy security
    May 3, 2026
    Egypt as a balancing power: Why Cairo rejects the logic of wars in the Middle East
    April 30, 2026
  • Analysis
    • Opinion
    • Analysis
    • Situation Assessment
    • Readings
  • Activities
    • Conferences
    • ECSS Agenda
    • Panel Discussion
    • Seminar
    • Workshops
  • ECSS Shop
  • العربية
  • Defense & Security
  • International Relations
  • Public Policy
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022,
Reading: Fifty Years On: The Realities of the October War (2)
Share
Notification Show More
Latest News
US trade policy in 2026: International moves and strategic implications
Economic & Energy Studies
Scenarios for shaping international and regional influence in the Middle East after the war
Opinions Articles
A historic role: Egypt and the Palestinian cause since 1948
Palestinian & Israeli Studies
Employing maritime corridors in conflicts: Lessons learned
Arab & Regional Studies
Analysis| Egypt economic path and IMF negotiations amid escalating regional energy crisis
Economic & Energy Studies
Aa
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
Aa
  • اللغة العربية
  • International Relations
  • Defense & Security
  • Special Edition
  • Public Policy
  • Analysis
  • Activities & Events
  • Home
  • اللغة العربية
  • Categories
    • International Relations
    • Defense & Security
    • Public Policy
    • Analysis
    • Special Edition
    • Activities & Events
    • Opinions Articles
  • Bookmarks
Follow US
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022, Powered by EgyptYo Business Services.
Opinion

Fifty Years On: The Realities of the October War (2)

Khaled Okasha
Last updated: 2023/09/20 at 12:48 PM
Khaled Okasha
Share
9 Min Read
SHARE

In Tel Aviv, Golda Meir, the prime minister of Israel, found herself with only a limited number of ministers (three out of 18) when she received a call at six in the morning on 6 October 1973 informing her of the confirmed Egyptian-Syrian attack later that day.

Most of the Israeli ministers had already left for their farms or resorts on the evening of 5 October to spend the Yom Kippur holiday with their families, reassured by the Israeli cabinet’s dismissal of the possibility of an imminent attack.

About two hours before the call to Meir, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli defence minister, was awakened at four in the morning by a telephone call at his home in Tzahala. The call was from somebody who told the minister that there was no doubt about the accuracy of the information: war was certain.

A meeting was held that morning at 7 am with the prime minister in her office. In attendance, apart from the defence minister, who had conveyed the information to Meir, were Israeli chief of staff David Elazar and head of Military Intelligence Eli Zeira.

The chief of staff informed the prime minister that the Israeli Air Force had been on alert since the eve of Yom Kippur and was capable of launching a pre-emptive strike on both fronts. Elazar also proposed the immediate declaration of the general mobilisation of all the country’s military forces, but the prime minister sided with the defence minister, saying that Israel should not initiate the war.

During this meeting, Meir and Dayan rejected the mobilisation resolution, and the defence minister assured her that the regular forces deployed on the two fronts were capable of holding them until reserves arrived, hence the belief in the need for just a “quiet mobilisation” at this stage.

Yigal Allon, the deputy prime minister, who had recently become a permanent member of the “kitchen,” or the Ministry of Defence as it was informally called, was taken aback when he received news of the war alert at six o’clock that evening, remarking “6 pm! This is unreasonable. They need a few hours of daylight, and then they can take cover from the Air Force, perhaps at 4 pm.”

However, no one paid attention to this observation, which was recorded in the minutes of a fateful meeting that was attended later by Pinhas Sapir, the minister of finance.

“Al-Muhaddal” (The Shortfall), an Israeli book about the war translated into Arabic, recounts many details of what happened during the hours following this meeting. Meir did not leave her office before conducting several interviews. But most importantly, in a chapter entitled “They have eyes but they do not see,” the book provides an overview of the series of meetings held by the Israeli government before the war began, starting from its sensing what could be an imminent attack or at least significant changes in the positions and sizes of the forces on both the Sinai and Golan fronts.

The book also says that then Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s slogan “what is taken by force cannot be regained except by force” did not die with him. Rather, his successor in power in Egypt, former president Anwar Al-Sadat, adopted it and, more importantly, engaged in a deception operation that was unprecedented in history.

The slogan was softened, altered, and given new content to the extent that at one point Al-Sadat announced his readiness to make peace with Israel and acknowledge its right to exist.

In the three years between the 1970 ceasefire and the outbreak of the October 1973 War, Egypt and Syria dedicated all their resources to implementing Nasser’s slogan. “Al-Muhaddal” says that the first indications of the Israeli shortcomings and failures became clear in April and May 1973 and extended to the ten days leading up to the war.

From mid-April 1973 onwards, Israel began receiving sufficient information to arouse the general leadership and government ministers’ concern about an impending military build-up in Egypt, with extensive military movements behind the Egyptian front and the movement of forces towards the Suez Canal.

On 28 May 1973, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar reported that “the Egyptian Army is being transported day and night from Cairo to the Canal area. The highest state of readiness is being declared to make the army ready to face a fateful decision that could be issued at any moment.”

When Israel responded to these warnings by deploying its army in Sinai in a surprise manoeuvre, its main objective was to deter the enemy. However, there was no reaction from Egypt. The manoeuvre continued for two weeks and was observed by Egyptian forces stationed west of the canal, but Al-Sadat had no intention of starting the war at that time.

The Egyptian army was pursuing a strategy of deliberate deception. Its long preparations before the war had aimed to achieve two main goals: to verify the readiness and capabilities of division leaders and to test the speed of the Israeli response and its nature. This strategy played a decisive role in the general deception operation conducted by Egypt and was intended to keep the Israeli command nervous and compel it to put the Israeli military on alert periodically until it became accustomed to these kinds of manoeuvres and the heightened state of readiness.

Roles were distributed precisely. While Al-Sadat was heating up the atmosphere in the Middle East, mentioning in his April 1973 interview with the US magazine Newsweek that he intended to launch a military operation against Israel soon, there were always other parties within his administration, including in the military, working to streamline deceptive actions in order to create confusion inside Israel itself.

 Egypt’s remarkable success in this deception operation made Israel refuse to believe that the country was preparing for war, despite numerous confirmations, and caused it to lock itself into a state of doubt. It denied what it saw with its own eyes until the final moments before the gates of hell opened.

This article first appeared on Ahram Online on September 19 and a version of it appears in print in the September 21, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.

Related Posts

Scenarios for shaping international and regional influence in the Middle East after the war

A historic role: Egypt and the Palestinian cause since 1948

Egypt as a balancing power: Why Cairo rejects the logic of wars in the Middle East

Reshaping the US position toward Israel: From the erosion of the old consensus to a new conflict across parties, state, and society

TAGGED: Egypt, Israel
Khaled Okasha September 20, 2023
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp LinkedIn Telegram Email Copy Link Print
Khaled Okasha
By Khaled Okasha
General Manager

Stay Connected

Facebook Like
Twitter Follow
Instagram Follow
Youtube Subscribe

Latest Articles

The Security and Democracy Conundrum in West Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso
The Security and Democracy Conundrum in West Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso
International Relations March 17, 2022
Volunteering in Egypt: Towards a Paradigm Shift
Public Policy March 15, 2022
Widening the scope: Ethiopia’s diplomatic activity amid unrest
International Relations March 4, 2021
Debating Priorities: Reading into the Formation of the New French Government
International Relations June 2, 2022

Latest Tweets

//

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit think tank providing decision-makers by Policy alternatives, the center was established in 2018 and comprises a group of experts and researchers from different generations and scientific disciplines.

International Relations

  • African Studies
  • American Studies
  • Arab & Regional Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • European Studies
  • Palestinian & Israeli Studies

Defence & Security

  • Armament
  • Cyber Security
  • Extremism
  • Terrorism & Armed Conflict

Public Policies

  • Development & Society
  • Economic & Energy Studies
  • Egypt & World Stats
  • Media Studies
  • Public Opinion
  • Women & Family Studies

Who we are

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS) is an independent Egyptian think tank established in 2018. The Center adopts a national, scientific perspective in examining strategic issues and challenges at the local, regional, and international levels, particularly those related to Egypt’s national security and core national interests.

The Center’s output is geared toward addressing national priorities, offering anticipatory visions for policy and decision alternatives, and enhancing awareness of various transformations through diverse forms of scientific production and research activities.

All Rights Reserved to Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies - ECSS © 2023

Removed from reading list

Undo
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?