Those familiar with the inner workings of the Russian regime and the global visions of its leaders were not surprised by the news of the – likely meditated – deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, the leaders of Wagner. On the one hand, the Russian president has often stated that while he is capable of forgiving, he cannot forgive betrayal. On the other hand, everyone in Russia and abroad was aware that Prigozhin’s survival would have been seen as a clear indication of the weakness of the Russian President, who on 24 June referred to Prigozhin as a “betrayer” before engaging in negotiations with him. But in the end, Putin had to dispel the impression of his frailty, regain his stature, and make Prigozhin realize his mistake.
There is a lack of consensus among Western experts on how the plane was shot down. European investigations based on initial video evidence that went viral on the first day concluded that a surface-to-air missile launch was responsible for the crash. However, the US command, which keeps tabs on Russia via satellite, has said that this analysis is “inaccurate” and that it has seen no evidence of this, instead favoring the alternative scenario that a small bomb was planted on board the plane or that the fuel was tampered with. It may seem unjustified to concentrate on the shooting’s execution, but it is crucial to identify the party and officials who were in charge of the operation and thus understand the inner workings of the regime. Was it the air force or the intelligence service? Both of them had a grudge against Prigozhin, who criticized the way the war was conducted, regularly insulted the commanders, made fun of how the command was informed, and had his men kill several soldiers and pilots during the mutiny, among other things.
Most Western experts were taken aback by the fact that Prigozhin and Utkin were on the same flight, as this goes against the ABCs of security protocols and measures, but a French expert offered an explanation that makes sense to me. According to the French expert, Wagner figures and the regime simply do not trust each other. This line of thinking suggests that Prigozhin was worried that President Putin would be able to bribe or otherwise entice away one of his men. Therefore, their presence together on the plane indicates that they will all refrain from detonating it, and their presence anywhere together raises the price of his elimination.
Since time, speed of reaction, and physical presence on the ground are all necessary for such an operation to be successful, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine was responsible for it. It also does not make any sense for Kiev to assist Putin in solving the Prigozhin problem, which was a major headache for the Russian regime. Regarding the Western services, we can infer that they might be motivated by the desire to eliminate the biggest threat to their interests in Africa by killing Prigozhin, but we simply cannot fathom how they will be able to organize and carry out this operation. Another reason to rule this possibility out is the fact that the plane was not traveling along a route that was typical for flights between Moscow and St. Petersburg. This suggests that air traffic controllers moved the plane away from other aircraft on purpose to make sure that no other aircraft were hit. Naturally, we do not see any justification for the pilot to select an unusual route without controller approval.
It is also possible to dismiss the claim made on some Russian websites that an erroneous missile launch caused the crash. On the one hand, a drone can be easily distinguished from a regular civilian aircraft. On the other hand, the quickness of the official Russian media’s responses suggests that the country’s leaders were not taken aback and that the coverage followed a predetermined script: first, there was official silence, followed by brief statements that let Kremlin supporters’ speculation run wild and presented a plethora of confusing scenarios. Furthermore, a review of the Kremlin’s speech in the days that followed the incident reveals that it combined an effort to placate and please the militias and movements that love Prigozhin and work with him in concert or under his leadership with the delivery of an explicit and implicitly threatening message to the ruling elites of Russia.
As we have already mentioned, Prigozhin had many adversaries among the elites. They found his speech to be scandalous. We cannot rule out the possibility that there were strong, urgent calls for his death or revenge. I take note here of the repeated claims that the president only hosted Prigozhin after the uprising but not the victims’ families and friends. This is understandable given that their reception keeps the internal rebellion at the forefront of news.
A few hours prior to the passing of Prigozhin, General Sergey Surovikin was relieved of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Observers regarded him as Prigozhin’s most influential supporter in the military establishment, and he was credited with reorganizing the Russian defensive lines during the special military operation in Ukraine. In addition, the regime detained Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, a former officer who is regarded as one of the most significant milbloggers, and in recent weeks, there has been speculation about the whereabouts of Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin’s official spokesman, who has been missing for days. It was unclear whether his disappearance was temporary or permanent, what led to it, whether it had anything to do with his dismissal of presidential elections as a waste of time and money because the outcome is already known, or if there was some other factor at play. However, Peskov made a comeback, and the attention of the Western media shifted to other topics.
We take note of the fact that some Western observers highlighted the incident’s symbolic significance. The killing, if there was one, which is highly likely, happened in the open during the daytime, close to where Prigozhin was born, sending a clear message to the Russian ruling class, the public, and the outside world.
What Happened and What Lies Ahead
Contrary to what the Western media claims, the operation’s delay is not unexpected in and of itself. It was necessary to dismantle Wagner’s forces and to neutralize, eliminate, or isolate Prigozhin’s elites and those who owed him personal loyalty. In order to achieve this, thousands were enlisted in the Russian army, others were exiled and left alone in Belarus, and some may have even joined other Russian militias. It appears that Russian security was eager to sever internal connections between the Wagner forces’ various parts, particularly those in Belarus.
It was necessary to plan how to take on Prigozhin’s military and economic empire, which stretches across the globe like an octopus’s tentacles and has the bulk of its influence in Africa. Whether it was decided to keep it together or break it up, whatever the decision, all of this takes time. I even believe that the Russian regime sped things up a bit for political reasons and that two months still would not have been long enough to fully subdue such an octopus and his men.
In light of the dearth of confirmed information, it appears that Russian military intelligence was tasked with overseeing the process of controlling or regaining control over Prigozhin’s kingdom, particularly in Africa. This explains the blatant presence of a cadre or cadres of military intelligence during the Russia-Africa summit activities and the frequent visits of Russian security officials to the continent. It also appears that Prigozhin made an effort to thwart and resist these attempts. Days before his death, he traveled to Africa, and it is possible that these attempts by him contributed to the quick execution of the operation before he could finish what he intended.
We will soon find out if the Russian military intelligence service is successful in neutralizing Prigozhin’s armed supporters and regaining control of his empire. I reiterate my skepticism regarding the likelihood of clenching the fist in two months. According to some Western experts, the issue is that it is challenging to find a replacement for Prigozhin who possesses charisma, strategic insight, business acumen, and a dependence on exaggerated brutal violence, and if such a person does exist, he or she will eventually pose a serious threat to the regime, like his predecessor.
Additionally, converting Prigozhin’s empire into a bureaucratic body that functions as a state apparatus or enjoys its supervision will not be a guarantee to ensure the loyalty of its fighters, considering how they combine national extremism, extreme brutality, and lack of respect for the leadership only if the leader possesses traits that are different from those of the “state” cadre, not to mention their loyalty and love for the killed leader, as well as the desire of some of them for retribution.
We will also watch to see if the Russian government changes its mind about the formal and practical requirements for the private militias that were founded by those close to the authorities. It will be interesting to see how the Wagner elements that have joined the army will be used. Will they be sent to Africa or Ukraine? Security-wise, sending them to Africa makes sense, but Russia needs to provide assistance to its forces in Ukraine, and it is obvious that the regime is uneasy and worries about how a general mobilization would affect public opinion.
Some worry that the Russian government will blame Ukraine for the incident in order to justify a new, serious escalation. According to my assessment, Russia does not require justifications because both those who are hostile to it and those who support it will continue to hold the same views even if it increases the intensity of its aggression.
Regarding the operation’s effects on the Putin’s control over the state and the ruling circles’ fidelity to him, it is apparent that the cost of the attempted coup against the leadership has increased significantly in the short and medium terms. This will silence many members of the second circle who believe the invasion of the Ukraine was a grave error. But in return, it will encourage those who want to act against him to continue and reject compromises, whether their goal is to overthrow him or force him to change his policies.
Some analysts predict that this operation will harm the flow of information and news to Putin, but I do not think things will necessarily get worse because reporting news is not the same as plotting to topple the regime. There are worries in Russia and hopes in the West that this operation will mark the beginning of efforts to remove Russia’s ruling men from power, particularly if there are no serious repercussions. Some in the West also think that the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons has temporarily decreased because the president no longer needs to demonstrate his power; this operation does so, if only momentarily.
The operation’s effect on public opinion will be negative. Given the current rules of the game, the majority of the public likely recognizes its necessity, though this does not necessarily translate into support. There are also be people who are seriously offended by it. In addition to being born into the world of Russian crime and becoming a successful businessman despite his illegal actions, Prigozhin was also a hero who was on the front lines, a kind leader to his men despite being incredibly cruel, and the one responsible for Bakhmut’s victory.
The positions of the military officers and Wagner’s squads of seasoned combatants will be crucial.
Dealing with public opinion is not an issue for the future. The regime must consider now how to arrange the funeral, who will attend, where it will be held, and whether to honor the man for his valiant contribution to Bakhmut and Soledar’s victories or not. If so, will he be buried as a traitor or as a hero?
Is it wiser to exercise caution, or is it preferable to close the file quickly? This is still debatable.
