The Horn of Africa is witnessing qualitative transformations that are reshaping its geopolitical features. Since July 2018, the balances established among its countries, notably Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, have not been resilient against the challenges facing the region. This became evident in the dissatisfied reactions of the Horn of Africa countries towards Ethiopian actions taken at the beginning of 2024, as they did not consider the interests of the region’s countries. Amid these transformations, questions arise about how the context that prevailed in 2018 differs from the current context at the beginning of 2024, and the signs of engineering a new regional alliance between the Horn of Africa countries led by Egypt.
Transformation in the Nature of Alliances
The nature of alliances that prevailed among the Horn of Africa countries since 2018 has undergone changes, which can be discussed as follows:
First: Emergence of the Tripartite Alliance
The ascension of Abiy Ahmed to power in Ethiopia in 2018 brought a wave of optimism, adopting a “zero problems” policy with neighboring countries. This was practically translated into the establishment of a tripartite alliance between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea, aiming to enhance economic and trade cooperation, develop infrastructure, bolster security and stability in the region, and strengthen regional cooperation. A number of mutual gains were achieved during the tripartite alliance period, which can be presented as follows:
- Political Gains: The alliance between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended a two-decade-long stalemate in relations, considered a chance to boost efforts towards cooperation and stability among regional countries. Cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia supported the approach of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, which was based on strengthening central authority at the expense of the federal states’ power.
- Military Gains: Several military cooperation agreements were signed between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia since 2018, contributing to the region’s security and stability, combating terrorism and extremist groups, and protecting the three countries’ mutual interests. The agreements include:
- Ethiopia-Eritrea Military Cooperation Agreement (2018): Ending the state of war between the two countries, opening mutual borders, exchanging intelligence information, and cooperating in counter-terrorism.
- Ethiopia-Somalia Military Cooperation Agreement (2020): Training Somali forces by Ethiopia and providing military assistance to Somalia in combating Al-Shabaab.
- Eritrea-Somalia Military Cooperation Agreement (2023): Exchanging military expertise and cooperating in counter-terrorism and securing the Red Sea.
- Economic Cooperation: Several agreements were signed to enhance economic cooperation aimed at boosting trade and investment between the three countries, developing regional infrastructure, enhancing energy cooperation, and food security.
Second: Signs of the Tripartite Alliance’s Disintegration
The current context is characterized by the crumbling of the tripartite alliance between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea, with Ethiopia adopting an opportunistic policy by signing a memorandum of understanding with the separatist region of Somaliland in January 2024. The memorandum’s key points include allocating a coastal area on Somaliland’s coast to Ethiopia for use as a commercial port and naval base, leasing the Port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, constructing a railway linking Ethiopia to Somaliland, and establishing an oil pipeline connecting Ethiopia to the Port of Berbera. This move angered the Horn of Africa countries, and the reasons for their anger can be outlined as follows:
- Violation of the Sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia: The Somali government considered the memorandum illegal and a violation of its sovereignty over Somaliland.
- Fears of Destabilizing the Region: Some fear that the agreement might destabilize the region, especially given the political instability in Somaliland.
- Impact on Regional Interests: Some countries fear that the agreement might affect their regional interests, especially in trade and maritime navigation.
Motivations for Engineering a New Regional Alliance
The opportunistic Ethiopian moves to enhance its closeness with Somaliland have prompted the Horn of Africa countries to enhance their closeness with Egypt, indicating signs of engineering a new regional alliance between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea. The indicators can be outlined as follows:
- Egyptian-Somali Rapprochement
Significant steps have been taken to enhance the rapprochement between Egypt and Somalia, evident in the official visit of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Egypt on January 20, 2024. This visit facilitated the exchange of views on mutual concerns, especially the Ethiopian agreement with Somaliland. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi warned against undermining Somali interests and emphasized Egyptian support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial unity. This raises questions about Somalia’s interests in enhancing rapprochement with Egypt, which can be answered by the potential for Somali to receive support from Egyptian political leadership in several areas, as outlined below:
– Military Support:Somalia faces security threats, and the rapprochement with Egypt could result in military support to combat the Al-Shabaab terrorist threat and coordinate with Egypt to secure the coastlines from piracy.
– Enhancing Trade Relations: Somalia seeks to develop its trade relations with Egypt, especially in food imports, and attract Egyptian investments in various fields.
– Country Reconstruction: Somalia needs to rebuild its infrastructure after decades of conflict.
– Energy Cooperation: Somalia aims to benefit from Egypt’s expertise in the energy sector.
- Egyptian-Eritrean Rapprochement
Eritrean political leadership has realized that Ethiopian policies are not in Eritrea’s favor, as evidenced by Eritrea’s rejection of the “Pretoria” agreement signed by Ethiopia with the Tigray Front in November 2022 to stop the war, excluding Eritrea despite its support for Ethiopia’s war against the Tigray Front. Additionally, Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland is interpreted by Eritrea as not only at the expense of its ports used by Ethiopia for exports, “Massawa” and “Assab,” but also – and more importantly – fearing Abiy Ahmed’s potential attempt to seize the port of “Assab” amid his expansionist ambitions.
Therefore, the official visit of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to Egypt on February 24, 2024, helped strengthen bilateral relations and explore cooperation in various fields. This raises questions about Eritrea’s interests in enhancing rapprochement with Egypt, which can be answered by the potential for Eritrea to receive support from Egyptian political leadership in several areas, as outlined below:
– Combating Terrorism: Eritrea faces threats from terrorist groups in the region, such as Al-Shabaab.
– Red Sea Security: Eritrea seeks to secure its maritime lines in the Red Sea.
– Trade: Eritrea aims to develop its trade relations with Egypt, especially in agricultural exports, and attract Egyptian investments in various fields.
– Developing the Port of Assab: Eritrea aims to develop the port of Assab into a regional commercial centre.
– Electricity Connection: Eritrea seeks to connect its infrastructure to the Egyptian electricity network.
- Djibouti’s Stance
Djibouti expressed its dissatisfaction with the memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of the current year, considering it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and potentially destabilising the region. Djibouti has taken several actions, including issuing an official statement condemning the memorandum, summoning its ambassador to Ethiopia, and calling on the international community to condemn the memorandum. Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti’s ports for its external trade, as a landlocked country, and the potential use of other ports such as the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, will have negative repercussions on Djibouti, including a decline in its influence as a regional commercial center and a decrease in the revenues of the Doraleh Port, in addition to social implications such as job losses in trade-related sectors.
In light of the above, it can be said that Djibouti would not oppose the formation of a new regional alliance led by Egypt to contain opportunistic Ethiopian moves in the Horn of Africa region. This can be translated through increased official visits between the two countries to enhance security and stability in the region and achieve economic development.
In conclusion, there is an opportunity to enhance the alliance between the Horn of Africa countries led by Egypt, considering that Egyptian foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa countries is based on principles centered around mutual respect, good neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful dispute resolution. Egypt can activate its role in the Horn of Africa region by employing its diverse tools, especially active diplomacy to resolve conflicts, providing developmental assistance in various fields, and military cooperation to enhance the security structures of the Horn of Africa countries to face terrorist threats.
