This March marked the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, a landmark agreement that ended the major Arab-Israeli wars and laid the foundation for a new security architecture in the Middle East. This agreement was the culmination of negotiations initiated at the 1978 Camp David Summit, led by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
Since the signing of the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel have embarked on an era of building relations based on trust and cooperation, a challenging journey given their conflict-ridden past and mutual distrust. With the explicit support of Washington, which guaranteed compliance with the treaty, Egypt and Israel have moved from a “cold peace” in the first decades after this historic agreement to a situation in which both countries can cooperate on security matters based on mutual trust. A notable example is the long-standing security cooperation on the borders between Egypt, Israel, and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. This cooperation goes beyond the cautious provisions of the peace agreement, which initially prohibited the deployment of Egyptian border guards or a regular army on its eastern border.
This status quo lasted until 2005, when Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, necessitating a redefinition of the 1978-1979 arrangements. The Philadelphi Accord, signed between Israel and Egypt after the IDF’s disengagement from Gaza, governs the coordination of actions along the Gaza border, particularly at the Rafah crossing. Officially known as the “Agreed Arrangements Regarding the Deployment of a Designated Force of Border Guards along the Border in the Rafah Area,” this agreement was signed on September 1, 2005. It aimed to facilitate Israel’s evacuation from the Philadelphi Corridor while preventing weapons smuggling from Egypt into Gaza and thwarting infiltration and other criminal activities by smuggling and terrorist networks. As a result, Egypt agreed to greater security involvement in border control, which is critical to limiting the fighting capabilities of Hamas – a group considered hostile by both Israel and Egypt. This coordination includes intelligence sharing, operations against smuggling and terrorist activities, and cooperation in crisis management.
Despite the historic significance of the peace treaty, there was a noticeable lack of celebration of its 45th anniversary in both Egypt and Israel. The ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, which has claimed more than 36,000 lives, mostly civilians, since October 2023, overshadowed the anniversary. Following a brutal Hamas terrorist attack that killed some 1,200 people and took approximately 250 hostages, Israel launched an air and ground invasion that has engulfed the entire enclave and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Galant, and far-right religious extremists Smotrich and Ben Gvir, have focused on recovering hostages and dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure, signaling a protracted and bloody conflict.
From October 2023 to May 2024, Egypt intensified its diplomatic efforts to stop the war in Gaza and alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Although these efforts did not lead to an immediate solution, they underscored Egypt’s pivotal role as a key mediator in the region and its commitment to stability and peace in the Middle East. In addition, Egypt strongly opposed any attempts to resettle Palestinians in the Sinai Peninsula, fearing that such a move would be permanent and would jeopardize Egypt’s national security. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi also stressed that such displacement would undermine the Palestinian cause. Despite its opposition to the resettlement, Egypt has continued to provide humanitarian and medical assistance to injured people from Gaza. Most recently, with Rafah’s health infrastructure under severe strain, the Egyptian Red Crescent worked with local organizations to set up additional medical facilities and command centers to increase health capacity and provide essential services to the rapidly growing number of displaced people in Rafah.
The Egyptian mediation focused on securing a permanent cease-fire between Israeli government and Hamas leadership. A critical component of this initiative was a plan for a humanitarian ceasefire and prisoner exchange in which Hamas would release civilian hostages in exchange for Palestinians from Israeli prisons. In addition, the plan proposed massive humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza to address severe shortages of food, water, and medical supplies. Egypt worked closely with other nations, including Qatar, which also played an important role in mediating between Israeli government and Hamas. For example, Egypt was instrumental in brokering a ceasefire agreement in Gaza in early May 2024. Hamas accepted the terms, which included a three-stage plan that included a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and a significant humanitarian aid initiative. However, Netanyahu rejected the proposal and decided to take control of the Philadelphi Corridor, drawing strong opposition from Cairo.
Over time, the patience of Egyptian diplomacy began to wear thin, especially as successive mediation attempts failed and the humanitarian crisis worsened. Israel, which did not send representatives to the latest round of mediation, imposed severe restrictions on aid deliveries by organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In addition, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) routinely targeted aid workers, suspecting them of links to Hamas. Despite occasional concessions on aid deliveries under international pressure, the volume and regularity of deliveries were grossly inadequate. For example, while some shipments of medical supplies and food were allowed, they were minimal and did not reach all those in need. The U.S. government – a strategic ally of Israel that regularly supplies it with advanced weaponry – was pressured to take a firm stance to ensure that humanitarian aid reached Gaza. UN officials, including Secretary-General António Guterres, condemned the blockade. During a visit to the Rafah border crossing in March 2024, Guterres called the blockade a “moral scandal” and urged Israel to remove all obstacles to the delivery of aid. Authorities in Egypt and Jordan have also sought to ease the blockade, with Egypt working to facilitate aid deliveries through the Rafah crossing despite logistical and security challenges.
In response to the threat of a full-scale Israeli invasion of Rafah, Egypt has taken more assertive steps beyond its traditional role as mediator. When initial diplomatic efforts proved insufficient, Egypt escalated its actions by issuing stronger warnings to Israel. Consequently, Egyptian diplomacy supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, emphasizing war crimes allegations. Furthermore, Egypt threatened to downgrade diplomatic relations and possibly withdraw its ambassador from Israel, signaling a significant escalation in diplomatic pressure. However, it was concurrently emphasized that the peace treaty was not at risk.
In assessing Egypt’s efforts to resolve the conflict, it is clear that Egyptian diplomacy has gradually increased pressure on Israel while carefully avoiding exacerbating already tense relations. Egypt’s rationalism is evident in a context where the Gaza war is increasingly stirring emotions across the Arab world, including Egyptian society. This underscores Egypt’s “cool-headed” approach to the crisis, which takes into account both the realistic possibilities of exerting pressure on a Netanyahu government and closely monitors the behavior of other international actors, including the United States, the European countries, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and others (like China or South Africa), and adjusts its actions accordingly. Meanwhile, Cairo is ensuring that the existing security architecture in the Middle East remains undisturbed, a task that requires nerves of steel. In diplomacy, the goal is to increase the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome, not to be swept away by emotions. However, the Netanyahu government may not be interested in a quick end to the war, as the ongoing conflict in Gaza could bolster the Israeli prime minister’s political survival. His resistance to international pressure (even from Washington) suggests that he is putting all his eggs in one basket: political survival.
In this context, the Arab states, including Egypt, should work together for peace in Gaza (as a prelude to the two-state solution) and put pressure on the United States – the only nation capable of influencing Israel. Given U.S. interests, the Arab world could strategically exploit the “Ukrainian card” that is critical to the Biden administration. Arab countries criticize the U.S. for its double standards, as Washington unequivocally condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but is reluctant to impose sanctions on Israel, which seeks to eliminate Hamas at any cost, wreaking havoc and death in what has been called the world’s largest prison, the Gaza Strip. The Arab states, therefore, rightly expect a more explicit condemnation of the Israeli invasion from the U.S. However, they maintain “neutrality” on the Russian-Ukrainian war, leading outside observers to accuse them of double standards as well. After all, people are also dying in Ukraine because of the Russian invasion of the sovereign Ukrainian state. If Arab countries were to take a more active stance and demonstrate to the United States what it means to rise above short-term interests in the face of a grave humanitarian crisis, it would be harder for the Biden administration to dismiss Arab arguments – especially if Washington is interested in a full normalization of Arab-Israeli relations, including an Israeli-Saudi treaty. Such normalization is not possible as long as Netanyahu governs Israel, but given his declining popularity, it is reasonable to assume that his political end is near. In this potential new era, Arab states – especially Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia – should play a pivotal role.
Michal Lipa, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor at the Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland (based in the Chair of North and Sub-Saharan Africa), specializing in the political systems, economic transformations, and international relations of the MENA region, with a particular focus on Egypt.
