On 8 November 2010, I published an article under the headline “Another Look at the Sudanese Question” in Al-Ahram. The opening paragraph read: “It is necessary to think about things that have not previously been thought about, and we must think about them using unconventional methods that differ from those we were used to in earlier situations. We need to consider the worst-case scenarios for the Sudanese issue, which assume that the upcoming 9 January referendum on the right to self-determination for South Sudanese citizens will result in a decision that provides for the South to secede from the Sudanese state, which will be followed by fresh waves of violence between the fledgling state and the mother state in northern and southern Sudan. This scenario might seem very pessimistic, but it’s possible that other, more optimistic ones will come to pass. For example, the Sudanese government believes that the option of the South may result in the continuation of Sudanese unity or that secession will occur peacefully or within a confederation that is agreeable to both parties. This debate is acceptable as each scenario has its proponents, and it is possible for diviners and magicians to enter the fray so that each of them may contribute to the field of predictions in their own unique way.”
As is evident, the situation was pivotal in the history of Sudan, deciding whether the state would remain cohesive and unified or whether there would be division and separation. In both cases, it was unclear how the two parties would interact with one another once they each went their separate ways. We now know the outcome: not only did secession occur, but it was also followed by a great deal of violence, both in the newly formed state of South Sudan and in the mother state, the Republic of Sudan. Because the Arab Spring had not yet begun, what occurred in Sudan may have been the manifestation of a terrifying prophecy that had materialized or a terrifying nightmare.
As this article was being written prior to Eid Al-Fitr, more people were falling victim to the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and there were growing calls for a ceasefire to protect the sanctity of the holy month or to find a window of time that would allow for negotiations and bargaining during Eid Al-Fitr. The negotiation and bargaining hypotheses fail to account for the fact that neither side would have initiated military operations without first preparing to eliminate the opposing side. What was also lacking was a model for resolving the conflict in Sudan that would promote development and assist in keeping the country united, at least within its current borders.
Diplomacy is obviously trying to buy time and ground in order to head off the worst-case scenarios, and it also provides cover for both sides to claim victory. However, it seems to us—and we could be wrong—that both sides are more interested in defeating the other side following a period of suffering, conflict, annoyance, and bloodshed between them. What’s worrying about this is that both sides of the Sudanese “military component” seem to be oblivious to the impact their ongoing exchanges are having on different parts of the country. We cannot rule out the possibility that Sudan will be affected by the ongoing international conflict in Ukraine.
The current “earthquake” in Sudan is not unprecedented in the region. The largest “earthquake” occurred at the start of the previous decade and resulted in what was called the Arab Spring, from which two distinct models of the Arab state emerged: the first is comparable to the current situation in Sudan, where armed clashes coexist with ethnic dismantlement, violence and cease-fire fluctuations, and a favorable imbalance for foreign ambitions that did not necessarily plan for the reality they see, but find opportunities to exploit. Second, there are countries that were shocked into realizing that the past was full of errors and dead ends and that the future needed to be different. Thus, the reformist Arab state emerged, with its foundations in the “national state”, “sustainable development”, and “renewal of religious and civil thought”, all with an eye toward bringing the region into line with the rest of the world in terms of economics, technology, creativity, and innovation. There isn’t really a third option between the two models; rather, the difference between them when considering the current Sudanese crisis is that the second reformist model serves as the framework through which we approach resolving the Sudanese issue rather than merely treating its wounds temporarily and preventing further bleeding.
The current crisis in Sudan can be traced back to a second wave of the Arab Spring, which was supposed to avoid repeating the mistakes and tragedies of the first. However, from the outset, following the overthrow of the Bashir regime, it was predicated on the idea of a separation between the “military component” and the “civilian component”, rather than affiliation with a single nation or homeland. And while the military had two weapons at its disposal—one for use in battle and the other for deterrence—the civilians had only the street and its never-ending sit-ins and protests.
In either case, there was no national project to build the new Sudan. Since this was the case, everyone seemed to agree on a three-year transitional period during which actual construction wasn’t necessary but rather negotiation, bargaining, verbal sparring, “silent” dialogue, bouts of clashing, and hours of calm would suffice. However, nothing has improved in Sudanese reality. However, the reality in Sudan does not alter except for the worse. The country’s situation runs counter to the reformist Arab countries’ efforts to forge regional reconciliation by enlarging the reform-related field and bringing the realm of the future closer to the arena of the present. In these efforts, Sudan is considered too large, significant, and historically significant to be left alone.
And if the Arab countries working toward reconciliation are currently pulling Syria in an effort to help it recover from its tragedy and mend its wounds, Sudan substituting for Syria in the arena of unending battles would not be a wise move. Avoiding this requires more than just convening Arab League meetings or urging the parties to halt hostilities and abide by the ceasefire; rather, there should be enough candor to acknowledge that the national state should have a monopoly on weapon use and that the Sudanese state must be an expression of a single national project determined to transform the country’s current miserable reality into a bright future for all Sudanese.
