Prior to its assault on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Israel appeared to be approaching a critical juncture in its war on the Gaza Strip from both a political and military standpoint. This was evident from the wide-ranging international consensus–including among Israel’s key allies–that imposed limitations on any further Israeli military operations in the Strip, particularly concerning the comprehensive occupation of the Palestinian city of Rafah. Second, Israel has run out of excuses to delay a truce and an exchange deal, particularly with the strong involvement of high-ranking US officials in the mediation group that included Egypt and Qatar. The presence of the US Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State has left little room for Israeli maneuvering to evade the need for halting the war efforts. Ultimately, Israel was unable to project a triumphant image with the results of its military campaign in the Gaza Strip. Only images of civilian casualties, widespread devastation, the war of starvation, and human tragedy lingered.
Harbingers of internal division within Israeli society had nearly reached a critical threshold due to the intense pressure from the prisoners’ families to finalize an exchange deal. The primary condition of this deal appeared to be ending the war, albeit briefly, which was unacceptable to the majority of Netanyahu’s cabinet. Furthermore, members of the Knesset, the opposition, and certain government voices levied allegations against the extremist wing and Netanyahu himself, alleging their perceived lack of competence in handling the crisis as a whole, particularly in regards to handling the relationship with Israel’s strategic allies (e.g., the United States) and countries of remarkable significance in the region, such as Jordan and Egypt that are intricately connected to the current events. While these internal harbingers were less impactful than the external ones, they still played a role in the deadlock. That is why Tel Aviv viewed it unavoidable to use the Iranian card to open a new window and rearrange the cards.
After six months of testing Iran’s stance on the Gaza Strip situation—a reasonable amount of time to gauge Tehran’s flexibility—Israel struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus. When it comes to the Gaza war, Tehran took a clear strategic decision to restrict its direct intervention and to ensure that the activities of its proxies in the region stay within low bounds that cannot be crossed or will not directly affect the direction of the current military operation in the Gaza Strip. It also decided not to even go so far as to harass the Israeli military on any confrontation lines, even though this could be easily accomplished on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts. Iran’s proxies’ actions remained subdued, controlled, and ineffectual. Even with regard to the Houthi proxy, which poses the greatest threat and disrupts navigation in the Red Sea, it is clear that Iranian interference through this proxy targets regional and international actors rather than Israel. Nothing expressed this more clearly than the direct assurances from Tehran that it had no interest in a broad regional conflict. Instead, Iran positioned itself as an engaged observer, strategically managing its actions to maximize its benefits.
The Israeli assault on the Iranian consulate accomplished significant objectives that are highly valued by Tel Aviv, including solidifying its position as an ally among Western powers, reproducing itself, and escalating the confrontation with Iran while being prepared to bear the expected cost associated with that strategic shift. Equally significant, Israel seeks to impose limitations on Iran’s ability to acquire weapons and its support for Palestinian groups. Israel believes that Iran must directly bear the consequences of the events that transpired on October 7.
Iran, on the other hand, was compelled to react to the Israeli attack. It carefully and intricately planned its response to target Israeli territory, with the goal of preserving a delicate equilibrium in the rules of engagement with Israel. This response was crucial to maintaining Tehran’s position of influence among its proxies and supporters, which it considers a vital strategic asset that cannot be compromised. Tehran was therefore eager to reassure its allies that it had successfully exited the strategic patience square and was prepared to confront the threats head-on, regardless of their originators. The Iranian interest in this matter is not primarily driven by the perceived threat to Iranian interests, as this has not been realized, at least up to this point. Instead, the aggression against Israeli territory was launched from Iranian soil, underscoring the shifting strategic balances and the powers active within the region’s geographical scope.
Hence, it was not unexpected that the US, British, and French military intervention played a significant role in protecting Israel’s security, nor was it unexpected when, days later, it became apparent that these countries’ military involvement had almost repelled two-thirds of the Iranian attack, which was supposed to be broad in scope.
Obviously, Iran, Israel, and the latter’s allies are extremely concerned with the rebalancing of regional strategic weights following the conclusion of the Gaza war. Further progress towards this objective necessitates increased engagement and focus from the principal Arab states, which are inextricably linked to these regional dynamics due to their historical and geographical ties to a region whose borders are undergoing a fiery redefinition.
