The 1973 October War represented a decisive test of the strength of Israel’s presence in Africa, which Israel had worked to consolidate during the 1950s and 1960s and had sought, since 1948, to leverage to break the isolation it faced in its Arab surroundings. However, the war exposed the limited ability of this presence to withstand regional and international shifts. In 1973, 25 African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel, and by early 1974, the Israeli Foreign Ministry had begun reshaping its policy toward Africa, without effectively containing the isolation resulting from the severance of relations or restoring its former standing.
This rapid shift highlights the contrast between the success of Israeli diplomacy in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s and the sharp decline in Israel’s standing by late 1973. Israel was unable to influence the geopolitical context that led to the severance of relations or mitigate its repercussions. Consequently, most African countries distanced themselves from Israel despite their previous relations with it, driven by the desire to preserve African unity, avoid international isolation, uphold African positions, and limit the economic repercussions of rising oil prices during the 1973 crisis.
I. From Rapprochement to Estrangement: The Shift in the African Position toward Israel
The independence of African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s enabled Israel to expand its presence across the continent. In March 1957, the Gold Coast gained independence as Ghana, establishing exceptionally close relations with Israel. Sixteen African states subsequently gained independence during 1960 and 1961, and only Mauritania and Somalia initially declined to establish relations with Israel; both later joined the Arab League.
From that point onward, Israel attached growing importance to Africa, despite the limited capacity of African states to provide it with arms, economic assistance, or immigrants. Israeli policy, particularly under David Ben-Gurion, who served as prime minister from 1948 to 1953 and again from 1955 to 1963, and Golda Meir, who served as foreign minister from 1956 to 1966 and prime minister from 1969 to 1974, combined pragmatism with an idealistic vision of Israel’s role. In this context, Israel presented itself as a non-aligned state in the Cold War and a source of assistance, while strengthening its diplomatic presence by sending a cadre of its diplomats to Africa with the aim of building relations that would discourage African states from becoming involved in anti-Israeli campaigns at the United Nations, particularly on issues concerning water, borders, and refugees.
Beginning in the late 1950s, Israel’s expansion in Africa was linked to a broader strategic shift embodied in the “Peripheral Doctrine,” which sought to establish relations with states outside the Arab confrontation states. During the 1960s, Israel capitalized on African independence to develop close defense relations with an increasing number of African states. By the middle of the decade, it focused particularly on securing its strategic flank and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea by establishing access to friendly ports. Against this backdrop, Ethiopia’s strategic hinterland in East Africa acquired particular importance, as did Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
However, the 1967 Six-Day War began to alter the political environment surrounding these relations. African states viewed Israel’s occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as an encroachment on African territory. Nevertheless, only Guinea severed relations with Israel, and by 1971, Israel still maintained diplomatic relations with 32 African states.
The pace of the decline accelerated on March 30, 1972, when Ugandan President Idi Amin abruptly ended the country’s close relations with Israel. While Israel initially attributed the rupture to Amin’s character and volatility, subsequent developments revealed a broader trend. Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, and Niger severed relations with Israel between late November 1971 and early January 1973, followed by Burundi in May 1973. While Israel continued to rely on its relations with 27 African states, signs of a continent-wide shift were becoming increasingly apparent, with the momentum toward severing relations steadily mounting against it.
At the same time, collective African pressure intensified. In June 1972, the Organization of African Unity adopted its strongest resolutions against Israel to that point, calling on “all member states of the United Nations” to refrain from supplying Israel with arms, military equipment, or moral support that would strengthen its military capabilities and perpetuate its occupation of Arab and African territories. However, the organization did not call for a halt to the importation of Israeli arms, and the African position at this stage did not amount to a collective plan to isolate Israel. Rather, most African states were seeking to achieve peace and press Israel to accept the plan put forward by Sweden’s ambassador to the United Nations, Gunnar Jarring, for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
By the end of 1972, major African states, foremost among them Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), had begun reassessing their relations with Israel. This was a greater source of concern for Israel than positions expressed by intergovernmental organizations. In light of its limited economic and diplomatic leverage, and growing Israeli concerns over the deterioration of bilateral relations, the Foreign Ministry concluded by mid-1973 that preserving its African ties required reducing the level of assistance without abandoning it altogether. At the same time, it sought to maintain a high level of investment in Ethiopia because of its strategic importance in East Africa, while preserving close relations with Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), given their influence in West and Central Africa.
The motivations of these states in reassessing their relations with Israel varied. In Ethiopia, declining enthusiasm for the relationship was linked to a deteriorating security and regional environment. Arab pressure over Eritrea intensified, while Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and several African states supported Somali claims against Ethiopia. This coincided with threats from Muammar Gaddafi and his attempt to move the Organization of African Unity meeting from Addis Ababa to Cairo, as well as Emperor Haile Selassie’s failure to secure an increase in US military assistance during his visit to Washington in May 1973. These developments contributed to a growing inclination within the Ethiopian leadership toward greater African-Arab engagement and reduced reliance on Israel, without deciding to sever relations. In June 1973, Haile Selassie reaffirmed his commitment to the “historic” relationship with Israel, which, in turn, sought to preserve it by increasing assistance and pressing Washington to meet Ethiopia’s military needs.
In Côte d’Ivoire, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny maintained relations with Israel and sought to portray himself as its friend and a potential mediator between Israel and the Arab states, while simultaneously attempting to adapt to the growing Arab influence within the African system. Following the Organization of African Unity’s May 1973 decision, which took a firm position toward Israel without collectively requiring member states to sever relations with it, Houphouët-Boigny presented himself as having succeeded in preventing a call for the severance of relations. His position, however, was gradually influenced by Arab pressure, particularly after his meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Côte d’Ivoire’s position thus reflected a balancing act between maintaining its relationship with Israel and preserving its standing in Africa.
In Zaire, the shift was more closely linked to Mobutu’s calculations regarding his position in the continental system. Since Mobutu’s 1965 coup, military cooperation with Israel had expanded. Israel trained most senior officers, three paratrooper battalions, and police forces, while Israeli arms sales to Zaire reached $1.7 million in 1968. Mobutu, however, did not regard this cooperation as a political commitment to Israel. By 1973, he had begun to view his overt association with Israel as a burden on his ambitions for a leadership role in Africa. Accordingly, in May 1973, he announced the termination of defense relations, explaining that the Zairian army had reached the required level of proficiency. Nevertheless, he did not fully adopt the Arab position, remaining intent on countering Muammar Gaddafi’s influence and preventing him from imposing his orientation on the Organization of African Unity or Zaire’s foreign policy. He therefore downgraded the relationship and criticized Israel, but resisted a complete break. He also canceled Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s visit to Kinshasa in June 1973 to avoid appearing at odds with the growing African trend.
Nigeria’s position, meanwhile, was shaped by a combination of domestic and continental considerations. President Yakubu Gowon’s government faced pressure from the country’s large Muslim population and from the Arab states, while Nigeria played a pivotal role within the Organization of African Unity. Its position therefore oscillated between warning that relations with Israel might be reconsidered if Israel continued to defy the organization’s decisions and emphasizing Nigeria’s independent decision-making and rejection of Arab dictates. Thus, until September 1973, Nigeria maintained a balancing position between political criticism of Israel and the preservation of diplomatic relations with it.
At the collective level, African escalation reached a new stage at the Organization of African Unity meeting in May 1973 and subsequently at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Algiers in September 1973, when African states endorsed a strongly worded resolution calling for the diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural boycott of Israel. All 34 African states that maintained relations with Israel supported the resolution, but most did not treat it as an immediate obligation to sever relations. Thus, consensus on condemning Israel remained broader than consensus on severing relations, while some states sought to compel Israel to make political concessions or adopt positions concerning the occupied territories rather than terminate relations. Togo was among the few states to move toward a break before the war, announcing on September 21, 1973, that it was severing relations with Israel and linking the decision to its rejection of the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories.
Consequently, Africa entered the October War amid a gradual and non-uniform shift in its position toward Israel. The resolutions of the Organization of African Unity intensified, Arab pressure increased, and major African states began reassessing their relations with Israel, but their motivations remained distinct. Ethiopia’s position was linked to its regional security, the Eritrean and Somali issues, and its relations with the United States; Zaire’s stance was connected to Mobutu’s ambitions and his position within the collective African system; while Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria sought to balance Arab pressure against their bilateral and continental interests. Thus, on the eve of the war, there was no unified African policy of severing relations with Israel, but there was growing political ground for distancing themselves from it.
II. The October 1973 War: The Accelerating Shift from Pressure to Severance
With the outbreak of the October 1973 War, the political groundwork for distancing Africa from Israel developed into a rapidly accelerating wave of diplomatic severances. On October 4, two days before the outbreak of the war, Zaire announced that it was severing relations with Israel, citing opposition to Israeli territorial expansion and a commitment to its obligations toward African cooperation. The decision was particularly significant given Zaire’s influence in Central Africa and Mobutu’s ability to influence other states, as well as the element of surprise and its timing on the eve of the war. Nevertheless, it did not receive unanimous African support. Félix Houphouët-Boigny expressed his regret on October 5, while Nigerian Foreign Minister Okoi Arikpo described Mobutu’s decision on October 7 as the product of his personal ambition and “bad for Africa,” reaffirming Nigeria’s independent decision-making.
The severances continued throughout October. Dahomey (Benin) severed relations with Israel on October 6, followed by Rwanda on October 9, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) on October 11, Cameroon on October 15, and Equatorial Guinea on October 16. Alongside Zaire, Israel focused on preserving its relations with the most strategically important states, particularly Nigeria and Ethiopia.
In Nigeria, the initial wave did not lead to a severance of relations. President Yakubu Gowon maintained Nigeria’s independent decision-making and sought to avoid appearing subordinate to Mobutu or Idi Amin. Nevertheless, on October 12, he warned Israel that its relations with Nigeria were at risk, before his government decided on October 18 to maintain them temporarily while continuing to review its position in light of developments in the war and regional pressures.
Ethiopia’s position, meanwhile, was more closely tied to its security calculations. The possibility of a Nigerian severance raised concerns in Addis Ababa about the widening of its diplomatic isolation, while the continuation of Nigerian-Israeli relations contributed to delaying its own decision. As the war developed and Arab and African pressure intensified, Haile Selassie moved toward severing relations with Israel, driven by interrelated security and political considerations, including efforts to limit Arab support for Ethiopia’s adversaries, particularly Somalia and Eritrea, amid Ethiopian assessments of a growing Somali threat.
Between October 4 and November 13, when Botswana announced its severance of relations, Israeli diplomats sought to work with African governments and at the United Nations to prevent what they regarded as a “chain reaction.” These efforts, however, failed to halt the expanding diplomatic rupture. Twenty-one African states severed relations with Israel during October and November, and by mid-November 1973, only four states maintained diplomatic relations with it, revealing the limited ability of Israel to contain the diplomatic deterioration.
At the same time, the oil factor added direct economic pressure. On October 17, OPEC announced a 70 percent increase in oil prices, raising concerns among African countries that were not oil producers about supply shortages. Although the significance of the oil factor remains debatable, within a week of OPEC’s announcement, Tanzania severed relations with Israel on October 18, Madagascar on October 20, the Central African Republic on October 21, and Sierra Leone on October 22.
On October 25, Nigeria severed relations with Israel, citing what it regarded as Israeli violations of the ceasefire. This reflected a shift in its position from resisting external pressure to being directly influenced by developments in the war and the African and international environment. On the same day, Liberia sought to maintain a different position. Finance Minister Stephen Tolbert warned of isolation and the disruption of Arab oil supplies, particularly following Nigeria’s severance of relations. However, on October 26, President William Tolbert adopted a balanced approach and decided to maintain relations with Israel, even requesting that an Israeli team be sent promptly to train his guards. This illustrates that the severances did not result from a unified African adoption of the Arab position, but rather from the interaction of African commitments, Arab pressure, developments in the war, security and economic considerations, and the calculations of individual states.
Liberia, however, did not maintain this position for long. On November 2, it severed relations with Israel, directly influenced by Kenya’s decision the previous day. Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia subsequently followed, further expanding the wave of “accelerating isolation.” By November 3, 1973, Israel maintained relations with only six African states, of which Côte d’Ivoire was the most politically prominent. On November 8, Abidjan requested the closure of the Israeli embassy, while Botswana became the last state to sever relations, doing so on November 13. The repercussions of the severance extended beyond 1973–1974. In July 1976, Mauritius severed relations with Israel, leaving Israel with embassies in only three African countries.
Diplomatic severance, however, did not necessarily mean an end to cooperation. African states sought to preserve their existing interests and relationships through unofficial channels. Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), for example, expressed hope on October 11 that relations would resume “when the diplomatic climate permits,” while Ethiopia described the severance on October 24 as “only a formal step.” On November 5, Liberia explored the possibility of maintaining friendly relations despite the severance, while Ghana raised the possibility on November 6 of establishing relations below the diplomatic level. Houphouët-Boigny also requested the continuation of Israeli assistance to Côte d’Ivoire’s national service project, emphasizing that he did not wish to damage relations with Israel. Mobutu, meanwhile, sought on November 13 to find a way to resume relations, while Kenya maintained contacts with Israel through the Mossad.
Thus, the events of October and November 1973 revealed a gap between diplomatic severance and the continuation of certain interests and forms of unofficial cooperation with Israel. The October War therefore accelerated the process of collective severance, pushing an earlier trend toward reassessing relations into a phase of Israel’s “accelerating isolation” on the continent.
III. Managing the Severance: Israeli Isolation and Its Diplomatic Repercussions
During the six months following the African diplomatic severances, the Israeli Foreign Ministry prepared several documents aimed at reshaping its policy toward the states that had severed relations with Israel. However, these efforts did not produce a coherent strategy, given Israel’s limited ability to alter the circumstances that had led to the severances. In part, the policy sought to punish these states by exploiting their concerns about the repercussions of the severances on their interests and by working “indirectly” to constrain development, investment, and tourism in those countries. The new approach focused on three areas: aid, diplomatic contacts, and economic relations.
In the area of aid, the Foreign Ministry decided in mid-November 1973 to withdraw all MASHAV experts from countries that had severed relations with Israel, but the decision was not implemented fully. Some training programs were completed, Israeli assistance to Côte d’Ivoire’s national service project continued, Agridev maintained its activities in Liberia, and a limited number of technical advisers remained in Kenya. This was reflected in a decline in the number of Israeli experts engaged in long-term assignments in Africa, from 138 in 1973 to 49 in 1974. Of these, only 16 were working in countries that had formally severed relations with Israel. Short-term assignments likewise declined from 150 in 1973 to none in those countries in 1974. The number of Africans hosted by MASHAV in Israel also fell from 340 in 1973 to 88 in 1974.
Diplomatically, by the end of November 1973, the Israeli Foreign Ministry had ruled out restoring relations with the states that had severed them, defining the purpose of its contacts as gathering information rather than restoring relations. Accordingly, Israeli officials held secret meetings in the following months with leaders in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, and Senegal. Contacts with African diplomats at the United Nations were also used to monitor the activities of the Arab states and identify signs of African dissatisfaction with unfulfilled Arab promises.
In the economic sphere, the Foreign Ministry decided in February 1974 that the absence of diplomatic relations did not preclude the continuation of trade. Israeli exports to Africa rose from $30.7 million in 1973 to $41 million in 1974, while imports from Africa increased from $29.1 million to $47.5 million. Israeli exports to these countries reached $75.4 million in 1979. Nevertheless, Africa remained a limited market, accounting for no more than 4–5 percent of total Israeli overseas sales. Moreover, the share of Israeli exports to Africa relative to Arab exports to the continent declined from 18.3 percent in 1973 to 7.8 percent in 1974 and then to 5 percent in 1979, when Arab sales amounted to approximately $1.5 billion. The absence of diplomatic representation also created uncertainty that constrained opportunities for economic expansion. Israeli arms sales remained limited, and the Defense Ministry failed to secure the major contracts it had hoped for, despite the continuation of certain forms of defense cooperation.
The course of the severances indicates that most African states were not motivated by an inherent hostility toward Israel so much as by the desire to preserve African unity and concerns about isolation and a chain reaction of further severances. At the same time, their positions were grounded in the conviction that Israel had violated international norms concerning refugees and the occupation of territory. They expressed these positions through the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations.
The severances had three principal effects on Israel. The first was the psychological and symbolic impact of 27 states severing relations with Israel in less than a year, including 21 states within 40 days. This trend was subsequently reflected in the vote of 19 African states in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 in 1975, which equated Zionism with racism, as well as in the continued support of the majority of African states for positions against Israel in most United Nations resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1972.
The second was the strategic and intelligence loss resulting from the disappearance of Israel’s diplomatic presence from most of Africa, which constrained its ability to gather information and monitor the activities of its adversaries on the continent. The third was the disagreement within Israeli decision-making institutions over the reasons for the deterioration in relations. In early November 1973, the Mossad placed part of the responsibility on the Foreign Ministry, accusing it of refusing to provide military assistance and share intelligence with certain African states. This reflected the emergence of an institutional dispute over the assessment of Israeli-African relations at the time.
IV. The Easing of Isolation: Israel’s Efforts to Restore Relations
Beginning in the early 1980s, new factors prompted African states to reassess the severance of relations. These included disappointment with the level of Arab assistance and the failure to provide oil at preferential prices; the perception among some governments that the severance had amounted to a surrender of their independent foreign policy; the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Israel’s completion of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1982; as well as growing African interest in the Palestinian issue and a desire to regain a measure of influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Accordingly, Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) restored relations in 1982, Liberia in 1983, Côte d’Ivoire in 1986, Kenya in 1988, Ethiopia in 1989, and Nigeria in 1992. The 1993 Oslo Accords, the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, and the development of Israeli relations with South Africa following the end of the apartheid system subsequently contributed to the restoration of relations by most African states. Niger represented the last significant setback: it restored relations with Israel in November 1996, only to sever them again in April 2002. By 2005, Israel had diplomatic representation in 41 African countries.
Thus, the period from 1973 to 2005 reveals that the African severance went beyond a temporary loss of bilateral relations to constitute a strategic shift in Israel’s position on the continent. The October War accelerated the transition of African states from political pressure to diplomatic severance and prompted Israel to reshape the tools through which it engaged with Africa. With the regional and international changes that unfolded from the late 1970s through the 1980s, a countertrend emerged that gradually paved the way for the restoration of relations.
