The Gaza war served as a stark reminder to many around the globe of the peril of continuing to ignore the Palestinian cause. Following an extensive absence of substantial progress in resolution efforts concerning the Palestinian cause for two decades, the US, the UK, and other countries in Europe and beyond are once again talking about the two-state solution and considering the prospect of officially recognising the State of Palestine as a means to generate momentum towards achieving a final resolution to this enduring conflict.
This rhetoric is commendable; however, hasty or excessive jubilation should be avoided as the problem is far more complicated now than it was twenty years ago, and the solution we could not come up with then will not be simple to implement now.
When the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, a unique chance to end the Palestinian cause presented itself. The window of opportunity was open until the year 2000 and it has closed entirely since then. During this time, Israel withdrew from Palestinian territories, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was formed, and thousands of Palestinian activists returned to PA-held territories to lay the foundation for the eventual establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Back then, the Palestinians’ official spokesperson and representative was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Hamas movement operated outside of the PLO framework, but on PA territory and in accordance with the PA rules, without claiming the right to speak for the Palestinian people. During that period, the diverse Palestinian factions acquiesced to the leadership of Yasser Arafat, a revolutionary national leader who, in conjunction with his fellows of the Fatah movement, significantly contributed to the revival, embodiment, and representation of the Palestinian national identity.
While Palestinian political pluralism existed then, it was accompanied by a strong sense of national unity and a cohesive leadership. Nothing of this remains today. Palestinians fought, killed each other, and divided, resulting in two governments, each of which ruled a separate portion of Palestine.
Israel was distinct at the time, possessing a level of reason that allowed for compromise and agreement-making. The Oslo Accords were signed with a government headed by the center-left Labour Party, backed by left-wing and centrist parties, which held a narrow majority in the Knesset. The negotiations were interrupted when the right-wing Likud Party took power, but the Labour Party and its allies managed to win the majority, take back control, and start talks with the Palestinians. The Labour Party’s representation in the Knesset dropped to four seats, and the Israeli left lost power in 2001 and has not come back. Advocacy for peace with the Palestinians has waned among the pertinent Israeli political parties. Israel, which existed at the time the Oslo Accords were signed, has vanished, and the Palestinians no longer have Israeli partners with whom to negotiate compromises that would end this conflict.
During that period, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem posed a significant risk, although they were within controllable limits. Settlements pose a malignant danger that greatly diminishes the likelihood of establishing a sustainable Palestinian state. At the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the population of Zionist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was less than 265,000. However, as of 2022, the number of settlers had exceeded 733, 000. Previously, the settlers lacked elected representatives in the Knesset. However, they have now emerged as a substantial political entity, with their extremist representatives holding multiple ministerial positions in Netanyahu’s government.
A quarter a century ago, Iran was an isolated country, recovering from its defeat in the Iran-Iraq war and seeking to persuade neighboring countries to accept it. Its president was issuing subdued appeals for a dialogue between civilizations. Hezbollah, a Lebanese resistance organization, was actively engaged in the expulsion of Israel from occupied southern Lebanon. Now, Iran is a dominant force in the region, exerting control over multiple countries and standing confidently on the precipice of nuclear capability. Additionally, Hezbollah, under Tehran’s command, boasts a formidable military presence among various militias, extending their influence across the Gulf, Mediterranean, and Red Seas.
A quarter-century ago, the world of military might and technology was straightforward and easy to predict, and the hazards could be mitigated through security arrangements. There had been no such development, proliferation, or popularity for missiles of any kind. Drones were not available back then, and none of the numerous pro-Iranian militias operating in the region could mount a military intervention. A quarter-century ago, it would have been ridiculed to suggest that Yemen be included in the security arrangements that accompanied an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
A quarter-century ago, the world was characterized by a unipolar global system. During that period, the United States possessed the capability to take charge of the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis and exert its influence if it so desired. The available choices were limited to either collaborating with the Americans or avoiding any confrontation with them. This is no longer the case in the multipolar era we live in, with a broad swath of anti-American forces stretching from the China Sea to the Middle East.The Palestinian cause has become far more complicated than it was, and a speedy solution is not possible. Resolving the Palestinian cause is not an impossible task, but it is highly challenging. We will need to persistently handle this conflict for an extended period until the circumstances necessary for a resolution are fully developed and a new opportunity for a settlement emerges. I hope that this realistic perspective does not verge on pessimism.
