The events of 7 October 2023 undoubtedly came as a profound shock to the state of Israel and its society, despite efforts to portray a unified front in responding to the significant developments of that crucial day. In a simulated display of rationality marked by extensive deception both domestically and internationally, the political and military elite promote the idea that accountability for the events is impending, expected to unfold after the conclusion of the Gaza conflict and the fulfillment of its predetermined objectives. This attempt to present the deferral of the review as a sign of seriousness is undermined by numerous instances of both political and military failures.
The exaggerated Israeli reaction to the point of strategic recklessness alone can explain the magnitude of the shock, which continues to be felt 150 days into the war on the Gaza Strip. Israel is attempting to prove to itself and others its capability to eradicate nearly 2 million Palestinians, and to flatten all forms of life in the cities, villages, and camps, and even the limited spaces of this defiant geographic area, which dared–and succeeded–in causing this shift in the security balance. The declared objectives of this Israeli war reflect a significant degree of confusion and instability, as the path to dismantling Hamas’ military infrastructure seemed theoretical at the war’s onset, and after 150 days, led to a catastrophic toll (30,000 victims) in addition to the extensive material destruction. Yet, this goal remains a priority, undiminished despite the severity of the situation.
The Palestinian side is undoubtedly paying a hefty price, but its repercussions on Israel–both on the state and its people–will be no less significant in the near future. The specific goal of liberating Israeli captives through military operations has, over the weeks, proven not much different from the first objective, and the cover-up of its failure resulted in more blundering and fumbling, eventually falling into the illusion of pursuing that objective.
Liberating Israeli captives and this file’s political connection to the ceasefire and mediation efforts reveals the extent of deterioration among the right-wing leaders in the government. The Prime Minister resorts to sedating statements and meetings in front of the media and with families whose patience has run out. However, the reality reflects a genuine desire by Benjamin Netanyahu and military leaders to snatch this card from Hamas’ hand, even if it means burning this card and abandoning the captives, whether military or civilian.
This represents a completely new Israeli behaviour, affecting the state’s doctrine and Jewish citizenship, yet it unveils hidden aspects of the loss of a prudent compass in managing the reaction, as it quickly became apparent that retrieving the captives might lead to halting the fighting –at least temporarily–the desire to thwart the entire deal and sacrifice the captives to ensure the continuation of the war soon emerged. Observers, both within Israel and internationally, analyze this dilemma as a crisis exclusive to the Prime Minister, whose political future is threatened and tied to the continuation of the war. But the real shock is that the situation extends beyond Benjamin Netanyahu to include the vast majority of political and military leaders and a larger segment of the Israeli public. All, under the impact of their particular shock on 7 October 2023, have become more closely aligned with the ‘madness’ of power and fire, seeing no alternative but to escape from addressing destruction with more destruction and violence.
To estimate the magnitude of the Israeli shock, one can easily compare the situation on 8 October 2023, with what Israel was experiencing just one day before 7 October. Up until 6 October of that year, the state and Israeli people were living in a completely different situation.
The Palestinian cause and the rights of Palestinians were not a priority on any international or regional agenda, and Israeli society was quietly and steadily shifting towards extreme right without any interference, as the world and the region were preoccupied with the Russian-Ukrainian war and its economic repercussions, as well as its extension to the state of polarization among major international parties. Meanwhile, Israel was relying on its success in completing the Abraham Accords and was beginning to prepare for a similar agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, even if it meant paying some additional costs. This latter was the subject of internal Israeli debate, which saw that if this step were successful, it would achieve the greatest regional integration dreamt of by the State of Israel since its establishment. 150 days into the war, there is a vast difference between the scenes on 6 October and 8 October, and notably, under the effect of the shock, Israel believes that by adopting a reactionary agenda, it could somehow restore the situation to what it was before the war erupted.
The realistic interactions to what transpired in Israel can be observed differently, as after decades of complete denial of the possibility of reaching a political solution with the Palestinians, several voices of academics, military leaders, and former politicians have emerged, proposing the two-state solution as an inevitable path to achieving Israeli security and ensuring long-term security for residents of the Gaza Envelope areas and settlements, to prevent a repetition of the 7 October attack. The Israeli proposal may differ from what is presented on an Arab level or an international level, but the proposal itself is significant and will develop and materialize in the medium-term once the war ends, and the inevitable international and regional questions related to the day after.
The Israeli wing that has been destroying and besieging the Palestinian Authority for years –contributing significantly to cementing the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip–will recede in favor of other Israeli wings that will succumb to pressures and a reality concerning the necessity of dealing with a unified Palestinian Authority, which holds regional and international legitimacy and can, with some support from ready parties, engage in a political process with Israel on the condition of managing the entire Palestinian affair in a peace process leading to the attainment of rights.
The desire of the current Israeli government to expand geographically beyond the Gaza Strip will face significant restrictions. International parties, including Israel’s supporters, are cognizant that such actions amount to an escape-adventure that only prolongs the crisis. There is no valid justification for this expansion, whether political, security-related, or on a military level.
